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Read interview below: This is a rush copy and may be updated. Interviewed 8 November 2009.

And so, I talked with him a few days ago, when he was in the United States.

The conversation ranged widely, but I want to draw your attention to two issues in the first segment — Musharraf’s view of Hamid Karzai, which is very dim, but also, what kind of government is possible in Afghanistan. He is of the view that, Afghanistan always had a loose, consensual arrangement between the central government and the regions — a so-called “Misak-i Milli” — and we should try to return to that kind of arrangement, not a strong central government.

GEN. PERVEZ MUSHARRAF, FORMER PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN: Thank you, Fareed.

ZAKARIA: One of the lessons that many people draw from Vietnam is that, if you are going to be involved in counterinsurgency warfare in a different country, you need a reliable, local partner.

Let me ask you bluntly. Is President Karzai a reliable partner?

MUSHARRAF: In Afghanistan, yes, I think he’s a reliable man. But it’s not a question of reliability. It’s a question of his competence. It’s a question of his potential to be able to deliver on the key issue of getting the Pashtun on board through a political deal. Can he deliver on that? That is the point.

ZAKARIA: And, your view?

MUSHARRAF: Oh, no, I don’t think he can deliver on that.

ZAKARIA: That’s a very pessimistic — I mean, do you understand the import of what you’re saying? I mean, that’s a pretty devastating critique.

MUSHARRAF: Well, he should try. At least he should try. They’ve been trying to do that since (ph) years. They must do that. They must get the Pashtuns on board.

ZAKARIA: So, has he been a — has he been corrupt? You know these reports that he relies on warlords, that he’s corrupt. In your experience — you dealt with him a lot in those years. Is this true?

MUSHARRAF: Well, I wouldn’t like to comment on that, because I don’t know. I don’t have information or intelligence of his corruption. But certainly, I heard (ph) reports of his brother’s involvement in gun-running, and maybe even drug-running. I don’t — I can’t substantiate 100 percent, but there were reports.

ZAKARIA: But what do we do about Karzai from here? Because, you know, you’re a practical man. Karzai may not be ideal. What do we do?

MUSHARRAF: Well, we are in a difficult situation, there is no doubt. I’ve been talking of how Afghanistan has been held together since the centuries under an arrangement called Misak-i Milli, a national covenant, a social-economic compact, where the four ethnic groups decided to remain together under the sovereignty of the king.

In ‘79, the Soviets deposed the king. So, that glue that held them together is gone. So, what we are trying to do when we talk of political elements, we are trying to create another Misak-i Milli, or national covenant.

Now, how can that national covenant take place when the Pashtun, the 50 percent majority, is not on board? So, we have to take them on board.

ZAKARIA: Now, I remember when we sat down in your office in Rawalpindi some years ago when you were running Pakistan. And we talked about — there were proposals, as you remember. Hillary Clinton was saying, why don’t you let U.S. forces go into Pakistani territory and deal with these terrorists.

You said, look, you don’t understand. If you introduce foreign forces into these areas, you will create more problems than you will solve. Let the Pakistani Army deal with it.

Why is the same not true in Afghanistan?

MUSHARRAF: Yes, they are not welcome. Foreign troops are not welcome there. But now that they are there, we have to win. And quitting is not an option at all. I don’t think quitting is an option at all.

Anyone who is talking of quitting doesn’t understand the ramifications of quitting. They must — he must sit down and analyze what will happen if he were to quit there without a solution.

We have to defeat the al Qaeda, we have to dominate the Taliban, and we have to introduce a credible, legitimate government in Afghanistan. When we do this, we (ph) need (ph) to quit, after that, whatever time it takes. But we cannot leave before that.

The concept where you want to create a central, strong central government, governing the entire area of Afghanistan, I think is a little alien to the place. It’s a tribal society. And the tribes in their areas have held dominance in their respective areas. The king, who was the sovereign, maybe ruled Afghanistan through autonomy — tribal autonomy — through the tribal sardars.

So, now, if you are thinking of some kind of democracy where the central president is going to be all-powerful all over Afghanistan, now we are introducing something alien there.

So, we need to get all these people and find out — they should tell us — what is the political resolution? Do they want to stay together and shun terrorism, eliminate al Qaeda? How do they want to do it?

ZAKARIA: So, what you are describing, I have to say, there are elements of the Biden plan which you’re describing, in the sense that you’re saying, look. This is a decentralized country. Don’t try to artificially create a strong central government with a massive army. Work with the system, and try to focus on those elements of the Taliban that are sympathetic to al Qaeda, and draw the other ones away, rather than blanketing the whole place with troops.

MUSHARRAF: Yes.

ZAKARIA: I mean, it’s fair to say that there’s a — on the political side you agree with what…

MUSHARRAF: Yes, absolutely. That is the way — but from a position of strength.

ZAKARIA: Yes.

MUSHARRAF: Now, if you did on the other side what General McChrystal is demanding, if you are thinking of reducing, no. You are weakening yourself. People there appreciate, they respect power and strength. They don’t respect cowardice and vacillation and — they don’t respect that.

So, let’s show power, which they respect, and then deal politically.

ZAKARIA: So, McChrystal first, then Biden, as it were.

MUSHARRAF: Simultaneous, yes. But you cannot weaken McChrystal.

ZAKARIA: Part of what you are saying, which, again, is something you’ve talked about for many years now, is talking to the Taliban.

Tell us what the problems are? Because you tried at various points to talk to the Pakistani versions of the Taliban.

How does one do it? Why is it that it has proved difficult? Or is it that people are not really trying in Afghanistan?

MUSHARRAF: No, no. You are talking of Taliban, who are, when (ph) on the Afghan side, they are Afghans. On our side, they are Pakistanis. We are dealing with our own people.

So, we need to wean them away from terrorism. We need to understand their problems, resolve them politically. That is what I am meaning.

ZAKARIA: And we will be right back with the former president of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

ZAKARIA: And we are back with Pervez Musharraf.

In the second part of the conversation, we widened the topics to include not just Afghanistan, but Pakistan. Now, we are listening to an authentic representation of the mind of the Pakistani military. Musharraf repeatedly denies that the Pakistani military is in any way involved with the Taliban, but most commentators would disagree.

When I pointed out to him the odd fact that the leaders of the Afghan Taliban are all in a Pakistani city, Quetta, he flatly denied it.

And then you will really see the Pakistani military’s world view, when he accuses the Afghan government’s intelligence wing as being totally under the influence of India.

Now, see, Americans see Afghanistan as a problem on its own. Perhaps now we understand that Pakistan is linked in with it.

But in reality, there is a 60-year-old geopolitical rivalry at play here that we have just walked into, and it is between Pakistan and India. Pakistan has deep suspicions that one day America will leave, and India will end up in control in Afghanistan, which means that they view the Afghan government not as a partner, but as a potential problem.

Anyway, listen to part two of my conversation with Pervez Musharraf.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA: OK, let me ask you about Waziristan, since we’ve now gotten into the details of this area in Pakistan.

As you said, in South Waziristan, there is what is often called the Pakistani Taliban, headed by Baitullah Mehsud, who was just assassinated by a drone attack.

There are some people, Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani journalist, who says this is a moment of truth for the Pakistani army, because they are mounting an attack against — in South Waziristan — against the forces of Baitullah Mehsud, who are the Pakistani Taliban, the Taliban that attack the Pakistani state.

But in North Waziristan you have the other elements of extremist groups, radical groups, the so-called Haqqani faction of the Taliban, the Afghan Taliban — the people who tend to launch attacks against Afghanistan, against India, against places outside Pakistan.

This is the Pakistan army’s moment of truth. Will it take on both the Talibans? Or will it only take on the extremist groups that threaten Pakistan?

MUSHARRAF: Yes, you are absolutely right, that there are various elements, as you said, in South Waziristan and in North Waziristan.

I have been telling since long, since three or four years, please give me drones. I want to look at this Baitullah Mehsud, because he’s the one who assassinated Benazir Bhutto. And he is the one who is carrying out these suicide attacks, indoctrinating people. Dozens of suicide attackers we know have been indoctrinated. They are going to carry out bomb attacks.

ZAKARIA: The argument is that, you know, the Pakistani army somehow never seems to get around to attacking, in North Waziristan, those groups who attack either Afghanistan or Western targets or India. And the reason is that these groups, who were often supported in the past — not now, but in the past — by the Pakistani military. And that, therefore, somehow in this planning process, you never get around to North Waziristan.

MUSHARRAF: They will not support it. They will not support it. That was not the government policy. That was not the military policy.

However, there was ingress — always, in every group — there is an ingress of the ISI. And that is the efficiency, the effectiveness of the ISI. You must have ingress, so that you can influence all organizations. And it is this ingress of theirs — which doesn’t mean that they are supporting them, but they have ingress. They have some contacts, which can be used for their own advantage.

ZAKARIA: Do you expect to see attacks on the Haqqani faction of the Taliban on the Quetta Shura, on those elements in North Waziristan that so far have not attacked the Pakistani state, but are clearly responsible for terrorism?

MUSHARRAF: Certainly, they should be eliminated. If at all they are involved with — any group which is involved in cross-border activity and with al Qaeda must be controlled, checked and militarily also.

You’ve named Quetta Shura. No. This is again a word which is known and spoken everywhere here. I have been there, and this Quetta Shura exists, probably, from my time, when they — it was, for instance, them that — I have been telling the ISI, and the CIA also has been operating with them in Quetta. There’s a corps headquartered there — 12 corps headquarters, with a full corps. There is an army Frontier Corps, IDFC (ph) headquartered in Quetta.

How is it that this Quetta Shura is existing in Quetta?

ZAKARIA: You tell me.

MUSHARRAF: This is absolutely wrong. Yes, I will tell you.

But somehow, everyone has got this. It’s easier to — easy to pronounce, maybe, Quetta Shura. Quetta Shura is not a building where there are conferences taking place, and Mullah Omar is sitting there holding a conference, issuing instructions and orders, and maybe there is a flag of Quetta Shura on top, and we know the location.

ZAKARIA: But, General, the tone comes from them. They, the group around Mullah Omar, now call themselves the Quetta Shura, because they live in Quetta, which is…

MUSHARRAF: No.

ZAKARIA: … a Pakistani city.

MUSHARRAF: That is absolutely, 200,000 percent wrong.

ZAKARIA: What part?

MUSHARRAF: Quetta…

ZAKARIA: They do not — they are not different (ph).

MUSHARRAF: No. They are there. Mullah Omar will not be there. I am 100 percent sure. He cannot be there, because he would be mad to be there.

Because they control the southeastern part of Afghanistan. Most of it is under the control of Taliban.

Now, if I am the leader of the Taliban, and I’m controlling any area, why would I endanger myself to go to another place where there is an army and Frontier Corps, and American intelligence also operating there? Why would I like to go there? Why don’t I stay with my own area?

And in any case, he has never been in Pakistan. Mullah Omar, in those years of fighting against the Soviets, or before that. He is known to have been in Pakistan as a teenager, in some madrassa. He has never come to Pakistan. So, why would he be there?

Now, Quetta — coming back to Quetta Shura…

ZAKARIA: But you know, just look. American intelligence, the Afghan government, Afghan intelligence all say, Mullah Omar is in Pakistan.

MUSHARRAF: Afghan intelligence, Afghan president, Afghan government. Don’t talk of them. I know what they do. They are, by design, they mislead the world. They talk against Pakistan, because they are under the influence of Indian intelligence — all of them.

The Afghan intelligence entirely under the influence of Indian intelligence. We know that.

ZAKARIA: But General Musharraf…

MUSHARRAF: Let me come back to Quetta Shura. I must (ph)…

ZAKARIA: … but you’ve — this is important, because you are revealing why people, many, many people feel that Pakistan has a very antagonistic attitude towards Afghanistan.

You view Afghanistan as a client state of India. And therefore, you do not — you are not willing to really help Afghanistan succeed.

MUSHARRAF: No, not at all. That is not the case.

Whatever I am saying, I am not saying it here. I have given documentary evidence of all this to everyone. There is the documentary evidence. And we know the involvement of Indian intelligence, in India, with their intelligence.

I have given documentary evidence to everyone from top to bottom. Everyone knows it. And we have the documentary evidence.

ZAKARIA: What about your own situation? There are reports that cases against you are going to be instituted or reopened, and that you would have to leave Pakistan. Is that true?

MUSHARRAF: I am already in London, (UNINTELLIGIBLE).

No, I have to go back to Pakistan. And whatever actions I have taken have been constitutional and legal, legally correct, constitutionally correct. And all of my actions have been validated by the supreme court, by the assembly. (here)

So, one has to face whatever comes. Let’s see what happens when…

ZAKARIA: I don’t want to delve back into that whole controversy, because, of course, you replaced the court, which then validated your actions.

But do you regret — if there’s one regret, do you regret replacing the court, and risking — there are a lot of people, as you know…

MUSHARRAF: You know, I don’t want to…

ZAKARIA: … who say you should have chanced it, and the original court would have validated you anyway.

MUSHARRAF: I — no, I don’t want to get into that discussion. I thought whatever I did was in line with pursuing a  democratic course, consolidating democracy.

ZAKARIA: General Musharraf…

MUSHARRAF: But sometimes, having said that, let me say I — because I gave this answer — sometimes even when you do a right, now I realized, because the effects are negative. So, maybe one has to be pragmatic, even in doing the right.

ZAKARIA: So, maybe you do have a regret on that one front.

MUSHARRAF: Well, yes, we shouldn’t have, because Pakistan is suffering, and I regret that. I regret that Pakistan is suffering.

ZAKARIA: General Musharraf, a pleasure to have you.

MUSHARRAF: Thank you.

Watch Video (here) and read excerpts of interview given below, on 22nd October 2009.  

Now at the same time, next door to Afghanistan, there is Pakistan to deal with. Last week Mr. Obama signed an aid bill that will give Pakistan more than $7 billion over five years with some strings attached. I sat down with former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf the other day to talk about all this starting with U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan.

COOPER: Do you think the U.S. should send in more troops to Afghanistan?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF, FORMER PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN: From a purely military point of view, I believe that the military come when you apply force to an area. It has an optimum troop to space ratio is very important.

At the moment I think purely military point of view, the U.S. forces and coalition forces are diluted in space.

COOPER: There’s not enough of them? 

MUSHARRAF: No.

COOPER: Considering the large amount of area they need to cover?

MUSHARRAF: Yes. So therefore I agree with General McChrystal that an increase is required, certainly.

COOPER: Let’s talk about what’s happening inside Pakistan right now. A U.S. official say the base of terror is in Pakistan; that that’s where the majority of al Qaeda is it.

MUSHARRAF: (INAUDIBLE) terrorism is Afghanistan where Mullah Omar and his Taliban who ruled Afghanistan — 90 percent of Afghanistan — for six years are there.

COOPER: As you know, U.S. officials believe and have said repeatedly they believe Mullah Omar who ruled the Taliban is in (INAUDIBLE), is in Pakistan. They say no doubt about it.

MUSHARRAF: That is a ridiculous idea. I don’t contribute at all anyone who thinks like that is absolutely and 100 percent wrong.

COOPER: I’ve had — numerous U.S. intelligence officials tell me that in Afghanistan that they have no doubt he’s in Pakistan.

MUSHARRAF: Your CIA and our ISI have been operating together in the tribe frontier, in the tribal agency (INAUDIBLE). So what are they doing? They don’t know the place? Where Mullah Omar is?

And also purely from logic point of view, eastern Afghanistan Kandahar region, the countryside is mostly under the control of the Taliban. Is that right or not?

Now if that is right, if I’m Mullah Omar, why would I go to Pakistan to get caught? Only to get killed? When I am controlling the countryside in my own area. Won’t I stay there?

COOPER: There have been allegations that much of the money that the United States has given over the years to Pakistan, to your government, was not delivered to the areas that it was supposed to be.

The U.S. now is proposing giving some $1.5 billion, $1.6 billion each year over the next five years. But they have put stipulations on where the money is to be spent; how it’s to be spent. And that has angered many in the Pakistan military who say this is insulting that you’re micro managing. In fact, you said don’t micromanage.

Doesn’t the U.S. government though have the right and the American taxpayers whose paying for this have the right to know that their money is not being spent on other things, it’s being spent on fighting terror?

MUSHARRAF: Yes, I’ll agree that you ought to be knowing where it is being spent. But as I said, there is a huge amount of money which is being spent there. The money that you give will be a small part of that kitty. Now there is no…

COOPER: It’s still a lot of money, $1.5 billion.

MUSHARRAFF: $1.5 billion Yes, $1.5 billion for Pakistan and for military, I don’t think it’s for the military. I don’t think any part of it is.

COOPER: They want it in particular for a lot of economic and social issues.

MUSHARRAF: Yes, socioeconomic. Maybe 20 times that amount is spent on the socioeconomic. We are talking of health. We are talking of education, poverty alleviation, employment generation; now why do we micro manage?

We have to put force there to fight against Taliban and al Qaeda. And that force will be used as per the dictates of the situation and environment and the threat. And the army is fully equipped to understand what the threat is. How much force is required and what equipment is required. Leave it at that.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf sat down for an interview with “Good Morning  America” co-anchor Chris Cuomo Sept. 23, 2009. The following transcript of their interview has been edited for clarity.

CHRIS CUOMO: Mr. Musharraf, let’s start with you and your future. Have you given thought yet to returning to Pakistan, returning to power?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Well — I give thought to what is happening in Pakistan. And I give thought to what the people of Pakistan are desiring, and I also give thought to whether I can do anything for Pakistan. Collectively — I have to take a decision based on all these three elements.

CHRIS CUOMO: Is a decision coming soon?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF:I wouldn’t be able to say that –

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: One has to look at this environment, and the issue of timing, of course, is — very, very important. So if I was to say it’s coming very soon, or a little later — I think the — I’m very conscious that the timing is extremely important — but one thing is — very sure, that I will return to Pakistan.

CHRIS CUOMO: Are you concerned that if you return, you may be arrested. You may be put on trial for treason.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Well, these are realities which one has to face. But however, I am very sure of one thing, that whatever I have done till now, constitutionally and legally, there is no charge against me. So if at all, anything happens against me, it will be not according to the constitution and not according — to legal (UNINTEL).

CHRIS CUOMO: With time and the benefit of looking back on your time as president, do you regret having removed the supreme court judge and the other jurists?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: I would — I would say that — I put it like this, that it was a correct action. I do not regret that it was a wrong action. It was very constitutional, whatever I did, and very legal. But however, the fallout then was bad. (UNINTEL) fallout, which led to upheaval that we’ve seen, and therefore, one would like to rethink if, with hindsight now, whether it was wise to do even a legally and constitutionally correct act.

CHRIS CUOMO: Would you have done it again?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Well, that’s a difficult question, yes. With hindsight, one would say — were not to show pragmatism even on right things. But I am a strong believer of doing — of doing the right, (UNINTEL) the constitution and the law to now, when you are asking me with hindsight, yes, one of — it’s more easier to say that maybe you’re gonna — one needs to show pragmatism. But if I’m confronted with another situation where I would, again, see the legality and constitutionality and right and wrong, and then — take — action in favor of right.

CHRIS CUOMO: In the decision to return to Pakistan, there is legal risk, political risk. But do you consider physical risk, given what’s happened to leaders in the history of Pakistan, most recently Benazir Bhutto.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: That risk is there. And — one has to accept that risk, and there’s a saying, “No risk, no gain.” One has to risk something to gain something.

CHRIS CUOMO: Mr. Sharif is seen as a political opponent, another potential leader in Pakistan. You criticize him. You believe that there is something that Americans should know about Nawaz Sharif.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yes, they should know a lot about Nawaz Sharif. First of all, I think he’s — I call him a closet Taliban.

CHRIS CUOMO: Strong charge.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Well, he is that, because even on Pakistan television these days, talk shows are going on — saying that he has met Osama bin Laden five times. Five times before 9/11. And he has been financed by Osama bin Laden. Then the other element is that he never speaks against terrorism and extremism. The man is a closet Taliban.

Then he’s been tested and tried twice, and failed. And took Pakistan to a state where we were defaulted and appealed state. And moreover, his interaction with people, his — his interaction, his dealings with officials — with people who — who are — who matter in Pakistan, he has — has been so abrasive, right from the beginning, he has never been on good terms with any army chief of Pakistan.

He has never been in good terms with any president of Pakistan. So I don’t know what kind of a mental makeup he has. But the man is abrasive against the other power — brokers of Pakistan, that is the president and the army chief. Always on a confrontationalist (?) course, right since the time of his joining politics, he has been on confront — he has been on a confrontation course with his — with his own mentor — back in the ’80s. So that is his mental makeup. Well, then — it’s for the people of Pakistan then to judge whether he’s the right man to — to run a country.

CHRIS CUOMO: Looking at Pakistan today, President Obama said a few months ago that he was worried about the stability of Pakistan. As you look at your country today, do you believe Pakistan is stable?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Pakistan can be very stable. Today, yes, there is — a degree of instability in Pakistan today, because of terrorism and extremism, and because of that — some elements — in Baluchistan, also raising their heads of — giving the cry of separatism. These elements are very small — and they have been there all along in Pakistan history — history

But they should not be tolerated by the government. But — having said that, I am a strong believer that Pakistan inherently is very stable, because the people of Pakistan, vast, vast majority of Pakistan, Pakistanis, want Pakistan to be a strong Pakistan. And the military of Pakistan is very strong. And as long as the people of Pakistan, vast majority, and the military of Pakistan is strong, Pakistan is stable and nothing can happen to Pakistan.

CHRIS CUOMO: If the Taliban came to power in Pakistan, how could you ensure the safety of the nuclear weapons?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: If they came to power, yes indeed. The — the nuclear weapons will be theirs, and I mean, we shouldn’t have any doubt, if they’re running a government and their — it is their government in Pakistan, the nuclear weapons, all the military. Everything is there. But the question is — this is quite — talk which will never come into real — reality.

They will never win in the politics of Pakistan. Today, they only have about two to three percent seats, and I’m not talking of Taliban. I’m talking of the religious, political party. They are not Taliban. Now who are the Taliban? How can they come into power in Pakistan? I don’t think that is at all possible.

CHRIS CUOMO: You don’t think it’s realistic.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: No, not at all. Even the religious parties who may be having some links or connections with them, or they may be having sympathy for them, even there, they’re all two — two to three percent of the (UNINTEL) today.

CHRIS CUOMO: All reports about what’s going on in Afghanistan point back to Pakistan, that that’s where the Taliban leadership is, that that’s where money and supplies are coming from, that that’s where intelligence help is coming from, through the ISI. If that is the case, what can we do to help in Afghanistan that does not involve the United States going into Pakistan?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Well, first of all, these perceptions are created, and they are all wrong. Money. How can money come from Pakistan? Where — where is — where is the money in Pakistan? The Pakistan’s government’s money, our exchequer (PH)? Where is the money? So it’s such a wrong perception. Money is from drugs, mainly, which are in Afghanistan.

They generate about $15 billion, maybe $4 billion to $5 billion (UNINTEL) there in Afghanistan. So what — what money are we talking of? Obviously the money flows from Afghanistan to Pakistan, in help of the Taliban in Pakistan and the Taliban (UNINTEL) weapons. Where are the weapons in Pakistan? Is the Pakistan army supplying the weapons?

CHRIS CUOMO: Are they?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Not at all. Pakistan army is very — one bolt of a rifle lost in Pakistan. We have (UNINTEL) such strong systems of maintenance and — holding of weapons — a person can be court marshaled for that. So let me — even — it is far, far better than the weapon that the American troops hold, because there’s a lot of (UNINTEL) maybe that goes on there.

Pakistan army’s weapons can never be pilfered. That that is not — let these perceptions not be there. The weapons, again, are coming from Afghanistan to Pakistan, so Pakistan, unfortunately, is blamed for exporting every — it’s an import. Weapons and money comes from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Let that be very clear.

CHRIS CUOMO: Then what about the allegation that the leadership of the Taliban are in Pakistan? Why would they be there if there were nothing there for them?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Right. Now who is the leadership of the Taliban? It’s Mullah Omar, in — in the Taliban of Afghanistan broadly have a unified command. In Pakistan, it is not the case. The leadership of Taliban in Afghanistan almost vast majority is Mullah Omar. And Mullah Omar very much is in Afghanistan, and I am absolutely 100 percent sure. This talk of some people who talk of Quetta shura and all that. Mullah Omar has never been into Pakistan. All these years, he was there maybe as a young — young boy, where he studied in some (UNINTEL). He has never come to Pakistan. Where are the others, now? Who are the other Taliban? In Pakistan, everyone may call himself Taliban.

All these people in South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Swat, all these people of various parties, groups, call themselves Taliban. Even– an extremist in the heart of Islamabad, in the red mosque calls himself — (UNINTEL) to Taliban. So who are the Taliban? It’s — it’s — doesn’t have one unified monolith command structure. So where are they now?

And they are the people who have sympathy with the Taliban. And they don’t — many of them, these people that I am talking of, they don’t go to Afghanistan. It’s the people — the people the Taliban in groups who go across. And– fight there. And it’s across the — in Afghanistan that they are — have a unified command under Mullah Omar.

CHRIS CUOMO: So you reject the idea that Pakistan is providing supplies and help and housing the leadership of al Qaeda, of the Taliban, to then go into Afghanistan.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: No, no. I don’t reject that. We must– what I have said it. Yes, there are sanctuaries in Pakistan, where the people, the Taliban from Afghanistan can come and stay. They have sanct — sanctuaries. And their support within the Pakistani Taliban. But it is not the perception that I’m — misperception that I’m trying to clear.

It is not that the Pakistani side is going there. It is Afghan side, the Taliban of Afghanistan, coming and having sanctuaries here. It is not that weapons and money is going from Pakistan. It is Afghan money and weapons coming here. So let’s get that — whole — thing clear. So it’s — it’s — it’s — when we talk of people, yes, people are moving across the border from Pakistan going across. And from Afghanistan, people coming into the sanctuaries in Pakistan. That is reality.

CHRIS CUOMO: Is it a safe haven? Are the Pakistanis giving open arms and saying, “Come, come here. We’ll protect you.”

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: No, you are talking about Pakistanis. What are we talking? We are talk of– they generally come to South and North Waziristan. Point two percent of Pakistan. So how can you say Pakistan? Why are we saying Pakistan? Pakistan 98.8 percent is other Pakistan. In point two percent of Pakistan, South and North Waziristan, they have safe — safe havens. And so, what is the issue? So it’s not Pakistan. People — some people in South, North Waziristan, Paktuns and Tali — local Taliban. They give them safe haven

CHRIS CUOMO: Is it fair to say that because so much of the population of that area’s — Pakistan is Pashtun, and so much of the Taliban that we’re dealing with Afghanistan are Pashtun, that it’s impossible for the Pakistanis to stop the cooperation between the two, because they’re bound by tribe.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yes. Yes. They are bound by tribes. They are bound by a geography. There have been — the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan has been porous. There has been an agreement called easement rights. In these easement rights, families could move across the border. The tribes were divided, across the border, and there were marriages.

There were interaction across the border, through these easement rights. Since British days and after partition also, this continued. And that it why it is porous. But having said that, when we decided in two thou — after 9/11, when we looked at the situation and we wanted to control the movement. One, we have to destroy al Qaeda, who are in our mountain. Yes, they have safe havens and they have to be destroyed.

But when we are talking of Taliban, we are talking of people from Afghanistan and people of Pakistan. So therefore, we have to go for a triple strategy of — military, political and social economics. But I had given an idea. I said, “We must mind the whole border. We can mine the whole border.” Now mining is very negative in Europe and United States.

But this is an unusual war. Nobody accepted my word. As far as I’m concerned, we should mine it so that people can’t go across. And we should even fence it. We could fence it, like the Indians have done fencing. But fencing means manning the fence. Otherwise it’s a useless thing — obstacle. Mines don’t have to be manned, so there are measures.

As far as Pakistan, there are (UNINTEL) concerns being posed, go (UNINTEL) in certain area. And I carried out mining of about 35 miles. Selectively, about five or six miles in certain areas where there are routes going in. I think that we could mine the whole area. Finances required, to man it and to mine the — mine it — or fence it. So we should go for those drastic measures also. United States should look into that.

CHRIS CUOMO: No matter what you do, though, if it’s the case that members of your military and your intelligence share that ethnic identity of being Pashtun, doesn’t that come first for them?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yeah. I — yes, I — the military (UNINTEL) is mainly (UNINTEL). And now, I — that (UNINTEL) ethnic balancing I did, from symbols (?) where people have come. So it’s not Pashtun. (UNINTEL) and Isai (PH) is not Pashtun. Yes, there are Paktuns and Isai in the army. The frontier corps of the second line force is all Pashtun. But they’re under discipline of the Pakistan Army.

They — they are officered by army officers, whereas the men come from the locals. Sure — they had some (UNINTEL) for thei — for Paktuns. But to say that they won’t fight, they’re fighting and they have suffered casualties. And — I think that’s not such a great issue. They will fight, and the army will also fight, because they understand that they have to remove — element — al Qaeda and also stop the Taliban from going across the border.

CHRIS CUOMO: But aren’t they compromised, if they are sharing tribal identity with the enemy? How can they ever consider them enemy if they’re both Pashtun?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: No, no, they are. Within the Pashtun now, there are tribes. And let me say that if you belong– yes, if are from one tribe operating a certain area, maybe they’ll be an inhibition on that tribal soldier or that tribal frontier corps man to shoot at his own tribe people. But tribes and subtribes have been fighting each other. So if you are in (UNINTEL) for example, and you’ve taken people from Hotak tribe and they are there. There’s — there’s not a problem. So we — we are to know even these tribal — differences.

CHRIS CUOMO: Now — now I want to make sure I understand this correctly. On some level, you — tell me if this is fair. Do you believe, on some level, that America has created its own enemy by abandoning the Mujahidin who now are Taliban. Do you believe that on some level, America allowed the Taliban to exist?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Not the Taliban, but the al Qaeda, yes. I always say that the first blunder that we committed, after ‘89, was the blunder of abandoning the place, abandoning Pakistan, leaving us high and dry. And not thinking of resetting or rehabilitating the — the — the Mujahidin that we brought, from all of the Muslim world, from east to west. About 25,000 to 30,000 of them. These people, by the way, are the ones who became– coalesced and became al Qaeda. Today many of them, are by the way, married and they have children there. The same people, the Mujahidin have — have children there. So therefore, their linkages with the tribes, with where they stay and they’re being harbored by the people also have — this reality should be kept in mind also, that they are there.

They will not taken away. They will not rehabilitated or re — resettled. So this is how al Qaeda was created. As far as Taliban are concerned, they are a creation of circumstances in Afghanistan. I would, for that also, I would like to (UNINTEL) United States, because they abandoned the region.

Whereas there should be — should have been some kind of a min i– mini-marshal plan for Afghanistan, after what they suffered for 10 years of war, rehabilitation, resettlement, some reconstruction activity. They just backed up and went — went away. And there was mayhem in Afghanistan, killing each other, all tribes.

CHRIS CUOMO: So isn’t the lesson then that it’s not about the troops. It’s about the infrastructure that you put in place. It’s about the development that you do within the borders of Afghan — Afghanistan, not how many boots you have on the ground. Why is the discussion about how many troops we need?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Now we have to fight — we have to speak from a position of (UNINTEL). If you remove the troops, there’ll be more development. You better quit the whole area. And there is no development, nothing.

CHRIS CUOMO: So you believe we must have more troops in Afghanistan?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yes, absolutely. I absolutely believe, because I have been saying everywhere that we are diluted (?) in space. A military man understands that. The space is too large. And your troop level is low.

CHRIS CUOMO: But nobody has won, in Afghanistan, just by having boots on the ground, not the British, not the Soviets, not you. Nobody has won that.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: This is only the first time, and we are — we are better equipped. The (UNINTEL) of weapons is not all. We are not have — we don’t have cavalry on horseback and infantry working on foot. We have helicopters. We have gunships (?). We have predators and we have all kinds of techno — technologically — technically advanced weapons. And therefore, we can win. Actually — we have to look at the external interference in Afghanistan. Where is the equipment coming from? Where is the weapons coming from? To the Taliban and to the al Qaeda.

(OVERTALK)

CHRIS CUOMO: People –

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Where is the money coming from?

CHRIS CUOMO: Your coun — your country. People say they’re coming from Pakistan. That’s where it’s coming from.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: I treat that as — as — as really — as a joke. Where is the weapon in Pakistan? Who has the weapons? Where’s the weapons coming from?

CHRIS CUOMO: The reports are that the ISI, that the organization of Pakistan’s government along the border allow help and assistance to flow over.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Not at all. That is not at all correct.

CHRIS CUOMO: General — (UNINTEL), who you agree with about Afghanistan strategy, he points the finger at Pakistan and says, “They’re getting help from over there.”

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Getting weapons from Pakistan — has he said that?

CHRIS CUOMO: He said assistance, help.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yes, help is there. Help in what form? Or if there’s a trickle — I wouldn’t be able to say that there’s not one rifle that was taken from Pakistan to the other side. Yes, indeed, they may have taken some rifles around, but the weapons generally are flowing from somewhere else, and not from Pakistan.

CHRIS CUOMO: Where do you think they’re coming from –

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: And also, we should know that your intelligence, your CIA has (UNINTEL) everywhere, and there is total cooperation between ISI and CIA. So how is it that CIA doesn’t– know all this and cannot plug (?) all this? That — that’s not the case. The weapons come from outside, from external sources into Afghanistan.

CHRIS CUOMO: When you say win to win, what would be winning there?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Winning would be once you try to win against al Qaeda and eliminate all foreigners in the area. That is –

CHRIS CUOMO: All foreigners?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: All foreigners. Al Qaeda is all foreigners.

CHRIS CUOMO: But you have said that everyone there carries a weapon, that they live in the mountains, and that you would basically then have to kill everybody, you’re saying. (LAUGHTER)

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: No, certainly not. Certainly not. That is the population of Pakistan, and there are people, and we cannot do that. That is the last thing that I will ever say. We have to (UNINTEL) the friendship between al Qaeda. Al Qaeda were — normally Arabs. Initially, they were Arabs, but then they were joined mainly by Czechians and Uzbeks.

Now with all the operations, I think we are back to mainly they are Arabs. We have to — they are foreigners, and we have to — when we have to eliminate them. As I said, there are elements who are married and settled there, so — so that is the complexity of the situation. But however, we have to eliminate the al Qaeda and that is doable.

CHRIS CUOMO: But what about the Taliban.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: No, Taliban is the other question. Taliban is a more serious question. Taliban are our own population. Taliban are the population of Afghanistan. Now, but all — all of Paktuns are not Talibans, and that is what we need to differentiate, although with the wrong policies, by not after 9/11, not moving toward the Paktuns, we did alienate the Paktuns and push them towards the Taliban. It is never too late. We need to get back the Paktuns away from Talibans, through a political arrangement, through dealing with them. That’s all we need to do, on the Pakistan side.

CHRIS CUOMO: So winning isn’t just about the military. Winning is about political remedies –

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yes.

CHRIS CUOMO: — economic remedies.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yes. Yes, absolute — socio, economic and political.

CHRIS CUOMO: Now just given the history, and you know the history very well, certainly better than I do. The force of troops in Afghanistan has never changed the culture of that country. Why aren’t you, as a leader in the region, pushing for the political and the economic first? And not just escalating troops, not just fighting against people who’ve never been beaten?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Oh, I am seeing simultaneous. I’ve been saying this since after 9/11. The three part of pol — military, political, social, economic, and I have been political. This is my term. All Pak — all Taliban are Paktun, but all Paktuns are not Taliban. I said this maybe back in 2001, or 2002.

And we didn’t listen to that. Even now, today, in Afghanistan, the dominant role is being played by Panchiris (PH). That should not be the case. So therefore, we have to move toward the Paktuns, and I have never said that move first or second towards anything. We have to have a three-track– approach. And all of them, simultaneously. We cannot give — give up the military because you have to speak from a position of strength, to have effects. And — never give up the strength part, the military part.

CHRIS CUOMO: Even though you’re dealing with a population that considers any presence there of U.S. troops a threat and hostile.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yes. Yes, that’s right. That’s right

CHRIS CUOMO: How is that str — how is that a position of strength, if the people there see your presence of military as hostile and they don’t respect it?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Well, you have to — when you go on a political track, and a socioeconomic track, you have to– as I said, win over the saner elements, who do– who should be convinced that when we bring peace or semblance of peace, and we will want to do political — we want — reach a political settlement agreement, the troops will leave.

You have to give them a hope of leaving, while you are duly dealing politically. You have to convince them that the only way that you are going to leave is — is if there is some kind of a political arrangement, and that you will carry out socioeconomic development, which will be good for their– for themselves. We have to convince them, on this line — the line of action –

CHRIS CUOMO: How –

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: — now that we are there.

CHRIS CUOMO: How long do you think it will take?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: I can’t say. I can’t say. It’s a long — it’s a long haul, certainly.

CHRIS CUOMO: As long as Iraq?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: No, can’t say again. It — it is a long haul. You — we — we have to — instead of concentrating on timing, I’ve always said, let it be (UNINTEL). We always talk of how long, in terms of two years, three years. I don’t believe in that. You cannot have it time related. It has to be effect-related. Let’s talk of effects, what effects we want to create. And then whether it takes two years, four years or ten years.

CHRIS CUOMO: What would happen if we left?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: It’d be very serious. There would be destabilization. Afghanistan certainly, and certainly it would be the center of all sanctuaries of al Qaeda. Maybe they grow and maybe they come under a unified command structure, emanating from those — from Afghanistan and from the mountains of Pakistan. They will spread their parts (?) into Pakistan, especially in the frontier province and beyond. And may I venture to say even create effects in India.

CHRIS CUOMO: Because the theory is, well, they don’t like that we’re there. They hate us for being there, and everyone who (UNINTEL) I think is with them as allies hate us for being there. We’re being imperialists. So what happens if you leave, and we continue to support our allies, Pakistan, India, now the Iraqi government, and let them deal with what’s going on in the region? This is your neighborhood, not our neighborhood.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yes. Yes. Yeah, that’s right. I mean, if you — if you’re giving a strategy with all American troops or coalition troops leave Afghanistan, and they help Pakistan in maintaining closing the border, sealing the border, help us seal the border, and then deal with the extremism in our– on our side. And allow whatever happened in Afghanistan. Well, that is a different strategy. One could think of that. I never thought of that.

CHRIS CUOMO: Must not be a good idea then, because what do I know? The last time we spoke, we were talking about Osama bin Laden. He’s always a hot topic whenever terrorism comes up. How close were you– or let me ask it this way. Is it true that you were once close to capturing Osama bin Laden and the U.S. frustrated your efforts?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: No, not at all. That never happened. There was a time, some three or four years back, where there was some intelligence reports of a certain area we are probably– probably there. And therefore, there was an intelligence effort which started focusing onto that area, to close the neck there. But then suddenly, that– that link or that closing up– that intelligence– field. And we couldn’t close up. And we lose all– all hints.

CHRIS CUOMO: It wasn’t about the U.S.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: ( UNINTEL)

CHRIS CUOMO: The United States didn’t make any mistake in the situation.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: No, I don’t think so. No. I don’t know such a thing.

CHRIS CUOMO: And I also asked you the last time we were together. If the Pakistanis were to capture Osama bin Laden, would they deliver him to the United States?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: This is– the policy that I followed, against al Qaeda, all foreigners, right from 9/11, we made a policy. Firstly, no Pakistani to be handed over to United States. Number two, any foreigner, first offer him to his country. If that country does not accept, hand him over to anyone. Don’t keep him in Pakistan. Don’t try him in Pakistan. I saw that out of the foreigners, the al Qaeda, not once did the country of his origin accepted. So therefore, we are not interested (UNINTEL), so that policy ought to be followed.

CHRIS CUOMO: Even with Osama bin Laden?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Anything.

CHRIS CUOMO: But wouldn’t it be–

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: But I think it’s better not to capture him.

CHRIS CUOMO: It’s– you think it’s better not to capture him.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Shouldn’t be– don’t increase problems.

CHRIS CUOMO: So you’re saying just leave him alone? Or you’re saying if you find him, you should kill him?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Well, one– well, I wouldn’t like to comment on that– but– capturing and taking him somewhere has its own– problems.

CHRIS CUOMO: The reluctance to deal with this question, to the American perspective, speaks to the cultural problems for Pakistan of fighting against the Taliban, that there’s too many connections between the two cultures for Pakistan to really take them on. It’s too close to home. Too many of your people may be sympathetic to the Taliban. Is that fair criticism?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Well, there was– there was certainly a time– in the recent years that Taliban had sympathy in many parts, public of Pakistan. Especially because of the donut (PH) acts, they gain sympathy. But then lately, after the Swat operation– when they were the– after they’re being cleared in– February ‘98, as I said, when we held elections, and a moderate party won the election.

And after that, with the resurgence of the Taliban, because of certain wrong decisions at the political level in the province, the Taliban came back with a vengeance in Swat. And they carried out very, very– they carried out represents against all those people who supported the army. And they did it in a very, very crude fashion of slaughtering people, burning schools, (UNINTEL) schools, burning our ski resort, et cetera. That now the public of Pakistan are– for with the army to win against the Taliban. So that is the good thing that has happened, I think.

CHRIS CUOMO: If the U.S. mission in Afghanistan fails, if they don’t take control of the situation, what happens to Pakistan?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Pakistan certainly will have to fight against the Taliban– because they would like to spread again. And they’re starting in– if they are to follow the same pattern– into the (UNINTEL) agency and north and going towards– because those mountains have more sympathy with the Taliban, the area of Swat, because there is this (UNINTEL) and his clan.

And they had to have a tend– they tend to go across the mountains. There’s one Shanglar (PH), a range, and go onto the Karacodomi (PH) way, which is our link with our northern areas and with China. So that is– the danger, and obviously, the army will have to protect the– and show the security of the Karacomdomi way. And then act against anyone who tries to expand that way.

CHRIS CUOMO: You say the United States should not consider any military operations inside Pakistan. But when reports come out, Nabibula Zazi (PH), who was just taken, he says, “I was trained in Pakistan.”… When Mashud (PH) is bombed in Pakistan by the U.S., when these reports come out, why doesn’t it lead to the conclusion that the U.S. has to have a military presence in Pakistan to fight the leadership of the insurgency?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: We are talking of an enemy, and we want who should deal with the enemy. I have said that Pakistan forces, Pakistan intelligence will deal with the enemy in Pakistan, just like would you like some other country dealing with your terrorists here in the United States? Why do you think the country’s sovereignty is different from your own country’s sovereignty?

We have our sovereignty. And that people believing in the sovereignty of Pakistan. So why should United States come into Pakistan when we have our own force, and which– which can deliver? (UNINTEL)… Massoud was enemy number one for Pakistan. He was carrying out of su– all suicide attacks in Pakistan.

He’s the man responsible for the killings of– Benazir Bhutto. Since long, I have been saying, we ought to be watching him with the predators, and I– may I say that we were denied that. We’ve– that was denied, and that is why he kept growing and was later that he was spotted then with probably, obviously the drone (?) then he was killed, which is good action. Now other than that, I’ve been saying, why don’t you give drones to Pakistan? What is the problem with giving drones to Pakistan? And Pakistan– military or Air Force handing the drones and attacking targets? Why are you not sensitive to our concerns, to our sovereignty and our concerns?

CHRIS CUOMO: The same question can be posed the other way, Mr. Musharraf, that when reports come out that Taliban is growing in Pakistan, and that more and more people are being seen there, like the names I’ve given you, it does raise the suspicion as to whether or not Pakistan can take care of its own situation.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: I’ve said that Pakistan troops have– they have delivered in Bajaur and Momond agency and in Swat. They can deliver in South and North Waziristan. The other point I want to make, what makes you think that U.S. forces will deliver there? You yourself think that they are not delivering in Afghanistan and they ought to be quitting.

Everyone is talking about running away from Afghanistan, abandoning Afghanistan. What makes you think you will come and succeed in Afghanistan? There is a more hostile environment. The terrain is more hostile. So makes you think that the same U.S. forces who are failing in Afghanistan will succeed in Pakistan and Afghanistan both?

What makes you think that by spreading out U.S. forces and diluting them in space more, because already their space problem is there in Afghanistan, you add the space of Pakistan, of frontier province and travel agency, you think that the U.S. forces will now succeed. I think it will be a blunder. It will be a military blunder, and you won’t succeed. And you will also cause an upheaval in the Pakistani mind that you are violating the sovereignty of Pakistan.

CHRIS CUOMO: How many troops do you think it would take for the U.S. to send to Afghanistan?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: I wouldn’t be able to say that. I haven’t analyzed that as– from the military point of view. But certainly, there are ratios– that have to be maintained in– with respect to terrain and since it’s a mountainous terrain, you need more troops. We need to raise Afghan national army, more Afghan national army, because it is the Sufran (PH) national army which can operate in the countryside.

While (UNINTEL) points are held as– as concentrations by the coalition forces and US forces. That ought to be a strategy. I am sure that maybe a strategy. I don’t even know what– the US forces and coalition forces are doing. But the ratio has to be much more. I can’t give you a figure.

CHRIS CUOMO: Do you think the U.S. has made any mistakes in Afghanistan so far?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Well, I have only been reading in news or newspapers of some civilians being killed through collateral damage. Those are the things which cause negative– (UNINTEL). But other than that, I don’t– I don’t really know what mistakes they may have committed– on the military. The– the mistake that I have already highlighted, that after 9/11, they did not pursue or get closer to the Paktuns. That was a blunder on the highest order.

CHRIS CUOMO: A political blunder.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yes.

CHRIS CUOMO: Because that wasn’t about troops on the ground.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yes. No.

CHRIS CUOMO: I mean, I think that’s the primary American concern is that the solution always seems to be send more people in to go fight, when the history of Afghanistan makes it very clear that the shortcoming there has been social, economic and political, that nobody has gone in there and just conquered them with military might. Is that fair to say?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yes. Yes, in the past, yes. But– again, maybe they didn’t take that kind of crux (?), to be able to– win.

CHRIS CUOMO: The Soviets gave a pretty earnest effort there. A heavy troop involvement.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yes. But then, on the other side, there were assistance from the whole world. They were the U.S. assistance. There was coalition. There was Pakistan assistance. There was a sanctuary available beside. There was a total supply of high quality weapons, equipment, manpower coming from the world, going in against the Soviets. It was a different situation.

CHRIS CUOMO: When do you think that the decision has to be made about what to do in Afghanistan? Can we wait?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: From– troop– additional troops point of view? I think you should take it immediately. You should have taken it yesterday.

CHRIS CUOMO: Yesterday.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yeah, we– we must– the the commander on ground wants more troops. And I believe, from military point of view, that is absolutely correct, so we have to decide whether we want to follow a strategy which is being recommended from the military point of view, or we have some other strategy. There is– some other strategy, by all means, then don’t send troops. But we’re not to be (?) clear, then what is the strategy?

CHRIS CUOMO: Will you– will Pakistan send more troops?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: To– to Afghanistan? No, no, I don’t think so.

CHRIS CUOMO: Why not?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: No, that– that is not possible. We– we have our hands full and we have– we have to deal with this, and there is– their situation on our eastern border, a threat which emanates from the presence of a very, very large force. Therefore, we have to be careful all around, from our external threat and an internal threat that we are dealing.

CHRIS CUOMO: Well, doesn’t the U.S. have a lot on its plate also and–

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yeah.

CHRIS CUOMO: –it’s been engaged now in a war for eight plus years.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yes. Yes– it started– it was you who invaded and came into Afghanistan, so you better face it now and win there.

CHRIS CUOMO: But you said that we had to go in there.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: You had to go in. Now you are going back to 9/11. I didn’t say you had to go in there at that time, you know?

CHRIS CUOMO: So you think–

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Because–

CHRIS CUOMO: –that the decision to go into Afghanistan in 9/11 was right or wrong?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Well, yes indeed, there was al Qaeda, and they carried out– the terrorist attack– of 9/11. And therefore, they had to be punished. I mean, any leader of any country would– react in a similar manner, after such a massive– terrorist– catastrophe. Having said that, as I said, we should have– caught the al Qaeda, and we should have not alienated the entire population. It comes to the political side again. While the military operation certainly, I think– because of the terrorist attack, was– became a compulsion– to punish the perpetuators of that attack, which can be called genuine, yes.

CHRIS CUOMO: What are you more worried about for Pakistan, the threat of the Taliban or India?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Both. Depends on which one is more– more life, more life. If India’s threatening to attack and punish Pakistan and carried– carrying out– hot pursuits and surgical strikes, certainly, India is the threat. And we will– we will not allow it. And all the force will be used to stop them.

CHRIS CUOMO: But it seems that most of the attacks that are in the media are Taliban-generated, not coming from India–

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: At this moment. At this moment, yes, because India is quiet. But after the Bombay attack, there was a demand by the politician and the media to punish Pakistan. Certainly at that time, nobody punishes Pakistan. Our forces are meant to stop that, and they will stop it.

CHRIS CUOMO: You don’t think there’s a risk to the United States that if they get even more involved in Afghanistan, that there’ll be more anger towards them, towards the United States in the region?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: More involvement in Afghanistan?

CHRIS CUOMO: If we get more involved there and take on another war, after the Iraq War, that it sends a message to that part of the world that once again, the United States is trying to prove that might makes right?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: You’re already there. There’s no other– it’s not– you’re not starting that you can think of not going there. You’re already there, whatever anyone is thinking, by putting 30,000, 40,000 more troops. Nobody’s bothered. It’s more in your media, if more troops, then nobody in Pakistan is talking of, other than, “Why are there more troops coming to Afghanistan?” Nobody ever thinks about.

CHRIS CUOMO: Nobody ever thinks about it, why?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Because they are not– they think of whatever is happening in Afghanistan, let it continue. Pakistan is (UNINTEL), when there are drone attacks in Pakistan, when our sovereignty is violated, yes, then they talk about it. But otherwise, they are not even reading or they are not even interested what level of troops are maintained in Afghanistan.

CHRIS CUOMO: To correct the record about something you were talking about in the– the briefing, the– the idea of the money that’s been given by the United States to Pakistan to help in this effort, you were quoted in the Pakistani press, saying that some of the money that we’d given you to fight the Taliban had been diverted to India. Was that your quote?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: No. How did money get diverted from Afghanistan to India? I don’t understand this logic. How does money get diverted there?

CHRIS CUOMO: I don’t know. I ask you because they say it’s your words.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: No, I don’t– I said that. (UNINTEL) we are talking (UNINTEL) I have explained many times this money– where– what is this money meant for? And the money was– half of it was reimbursement of Pakistan services– services provided by Pakistan. So why do you keep calling your own your money? It is our money.

We provided you services. You are reimbursing our services. So half of it has gone. The other half now, the money is for military aid and socioeconomic aid. Now the military aid comes for weapons, for replenishment of weapons because of wear and tear, for the ammunition that is being consumed by the Air Force, by the army, and is consumed there.

Now I don’t have the details. But now if we buy weapons and ammunition, this is given to the troops, to the regiments. And the lowest un– element is the unit or the regiment, which actually holds equipment and holds the ammunition. When they– this is given to a regiment, this regiment in Pakistan army, not organization is not static. It moves. It moves every three to four years. And from tribal agencies, they are operating in the tribal agencies or Swat. Every year, the unit changes. It will go elsewhere. And in going elsewhere, it can be anywhere on the border. In Kashmir, in south (UNINTEL) the desert, in the central Punjab against India on the eastern border or in Baluchistan. It can go anywhere.

It carries that weapon and ammunition with them. They don’t leave them in the mountains. They will carry it, because who else will take it over? Every regiment has its own equipment. So the new regiment comes. It brings its own equipment with it. Now whether it is given by the Chinese or Americans or Russians we don’t– we don’t know where it is. It– the regiment– it is the regiment’s equipment and the regiment’s ammunition.

Wherever it goes, it carries it around with it. So I don’t understand what is the– I mean, is the other Americans expecting that when the regiment goes from the mountains to– from there, would leave the equipment in the mountains and go somewhere else, in India and looks for Indian. What equipment can be used for India, and it takes all that equipment and goes there?

What I just don’t understand is kind of– logic that goes on. And on the– when you are talking all the social chapter (?), education and health, yes, it’s very good. Thank you very much for giving that. But we would need maybe about 10 times more than what you have given. And that 10 times more is coming from Pakistan’s own exchequer. I told you, what you have given something for education.

How much have you given? And I have told you that in– for higher education in 2000– in ‘99, there was an allocation of only 600 million rupees. And the allocation now by us was 28 billion rupees. Had this come from United States? No, sir, it’s our own money. So you have added a trickle into that major chunk that we have increased for education. So I don’t know.

You– please don’t think that it is only that two and a half billion rupees for– dollars for– for the socioeconomic sector for Pakistan. That is only money that Pakistan has. We have about 20 times more that money, which is allocated for that sector.

CHRIS CUOMO: Understood. When you look at Pakistan now, the new leadership, what direction the country is moving in, are you concerned about the safety of Pakistan?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yes, indeed. I am. Very much so.

CHRIS CUOMO: Since you’ve left power, do you believe it has become less stable?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yes, absolutely.

CHRIS CUOMO: Is there more of a threat to extremists getting a foothold on control in Pakistan now?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Well, extremists– are more threatening all right. And the Taliban and the Taliban addition (?) that was happening in Swat. But now they have been pushed back and I think– while– if I was to compare, in my time, certainly it is much more than that. But I think we are– succeeding.

CHRIS CUOMO: Is Pakistan as good a friend to the United States now as it was when you were there?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: I would like to ask if United States a good friend now of Pakistan. As we were, from ‘47 to ‘89, for 42 years, Pakistan was a very good friend, has always been very loyal, even to– even when the people were thinking that we are some kind of– puppets of the Americans. Even then, Pakistan was always in the western camp.

And it is now I would like to ask, and because the people of Pakistan ask, is United States going to again, abandon or ditch us, having used us again as they did between ‘79 and ‘89, in 1989? So instead of asking whether Pakistan would be more friendly, I would like to, on behalf of the people of Pakistan, ask United States. How serious are they, in aid of Pakistan, in the support of Pakistan, for the welfare of the people of Pakistan?

CHRIS CUOMO: Do you feel that the United States has not been supportive enough?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yes, certainly, I think so. As I told you, in the history of Pakistan– there have been– sanctions against Pakistan. When we needed equipment, there have been sanctions. When we were threatened, they were– they were sanctioned and there were impediments in that. We were abandoned in 1989, as I told you, for 12 years.

All the upheaval in Pakistan is because of that. We were all alone, and the Mujahidin were al Qaeda and the Taliban and Kashmir– everything was happening. Its impact on the social fabric of Pakistan. The United States was not assisting us at all. We were all alone. That is why the people of Pakistan ask these questions. So– I think– we need to be clear on– that the United States, is it going to show concern or sensitivity to Pakistan’s concerns and Pakistan’s national interests? And that is what the United States ought to be doing, to get closer to the people of Pakistan, as they were, beyond ‘47 up to ‘89.

CHRIS CUOMO: Does that mean invest more capital there?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Not necessarily. I’ve always, in fact, been saying– we ought to increase trade and not aid. I’ve been saying that. Economy of Pakistan doesn’t need injection of money. Injection of money– it is the– it’s the (UNINTEL) trade, because trade means expansion of industry, new factories, new jobs, and therefore poverty alleviation, reduction in un– unemployment.

That is the bigger gift. I have been always insisting on United States give us more– give us an FTS, featured agreement. Give us additional quota for our textiles and to– United States. That will expand our industrial base and give us jobs and poverty alleviation. Don’t give us money.

CHRIS CUOMO: Do you think President Obama has been an improvement?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: President Obama has intentions of improvement.

CHRIS CUOMO: Intentions of improvement. What does that mean?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: He’s saying the right things. So, I– he’s saying the right things. He’s– he wants to focus more on Afghanistan– compared to Iraq, which is the right strategy at this moment. He wants to reach out to the Muslims, which is again, the right strategy. So he has to deliver, on both these accounts.

CHRIS CUOMO: So he’s saying the right things, but you’re not sure if he’s doing the right things.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: No, no, he must be trying to do the right things. But we need to see them on ground, yes.

CHRIS CUOMO: Why do you think you haven’t seen them yet?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: No, I think the troops– we are– we are seeing the troops increase in Afghanistan, yes.

CHRIS CUOMO: Now what if he doesn’t increase the troops? What if he decides we’re going to pursue a different strategy here? We can’t have more boots on the ground.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: I need to see that strategy, because there is a talk here that maybe we reduce troops and concentrate in the main cities, all the main cities of Afghanistan. I don’t think a military man should ever say that. You hold cities. Who’s going to hold the countryside in between? And you’re going to isolate the garrisons there, so that they ultimately are– run there, from there, because they’ll be surrounded? What are we talking? There has to be a place. There– there are linkages. The supply line’s already clear. And we have links with outside world, everywhere– I think. I don’t know. I need to understand. What is the strategy?

CHRIS CUOMO: So you’re saying–

(OVERTALK)

CHRIS CUOMO: You have to be all in or not at all.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: No, I wouldn’t say that. I– I mean, you’re asking me questions that I haven’t analyzed the strategy of. You make me the commander of Afghanistan. I’ll give you a good strategy.

CHRIS CUOMO: Is that what you would want? (LAUGHTER)

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Well, I have been a fighter always. I don’t mind. I don’t mind challenges.

CHRIS CUOMO: You know, we were talking about earlier about Nawaz Sharif and your– depiction of him as a closet Taliban. What is the proof of that? You say he met with Osama bin Laden. Is there a way to show that? Is there proof of these meetings?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: No, I can’t– do that, but there are certainly. There are people who– who vouch for it, who were present there, who was– they were on the television. I saw it on the television, on Pakistani television. There was a man who said, “I introduced him. I took him. And he was from ISI. He was a brigadier (?).”

Then– while the– the– Nawaz Sharif supported (UNINTEL), they got an interpreter, who interpreted with the– you know, (LAUGHTER) Osama bin Laden and Nawaz Sharif. He said yes. I was there, sitting there and interpreting, so I think you can ask him (?).

CHRIS CUOMO: And it was a member of the ISI who had set up the meeting be– between Osama bin Laden–

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yes.

CHRIS CUOMO: And Nawaz Sharif.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yes.

CHRIS CUOMO: Is that a concern to you, that a member of the ISI was setting up a meeting with Osama bin Laden?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: No, it doesn’t concern. In ‘95, Taliban came into being in 1995 or ‘96. Now, and it swept across Afghanistan and captured 90 percent of Afghanistan. Pakistan and their– their (UNINTEL) were in the northern alliance. Northern alliance were– Taliban were all Paktuns. Northern Alliance– (UNINTEL) Kazaras. Who was supporting them? India. Iran and Russia.

What choice does Pakistan have now? Who to align with? Safeguarding its own borders and– its own interests. Who should– should it align itself with northern alliance or the Taliban? Taliban have geographic contegrity (PH), ethnic contegrity. So it was quite clear that the governments, from 1995 onwards, no love lost for those governments.

They– may have been (UNINTEL) Nawaz Sharif. But I think the policy of Pakistan was quite clear that we could not– we have to have relations with the Taliban. And we had. We were only one who had a mission. And let me also am reminded of another thing that President Clinton. In those days, everyone was– United States was telling me when I came on the scene in 1999.

“Why do we have relations with Taliban?” Because the whole world, we had broken off and– they didn’t have any relations. Saudi Arabian UE (?) had and they broke off. President Clinton came to Pakistan in the year 2000, and he told me that why Pakistan has relations with al Qaeda, with– Taliban. Why would we deal with them?

And I told him that, “May I suggest, Mr. President, that you change your strategy also? My strategy is you open missions (?) there, recognize the Taliban and open missions there, so that we then can call in moderate Taliban from within.” Had he listened with hindsight now, had that happened, maybe the Buddha statue would not have been destroyed. Maybe Osama bin Laden would not have– this problem would have been resolved.

So my belief is that in order to influence anyone, whether is it Iran or not, Korea or Taliban or anyone, unless you have (UNINTEL) on them, how do you influence? You put somebody on against the wall, and you have sanctions. You don’t give them anything. What control do you have on his– responses? He– he’s not taking anything from you. Why should he listen to you? Give him something, have relations with them. You are dealing with them. You are talking to them. Then you control them.

So I think it was the wrong policy, absolutely, that you did not recognize the Taliban and we didn’t have any missions. Had there been 100 missions there, now look at the impact. If there are 100 missions, and everybody’s saying, “Get hold of Taliban. Remove– remove Osama bin Laden from the scene. Otherwise we’ll close down our missions.” Or whatever, in addition you were doing for the Taliban, other than just merely having missions. We would have exercised some control over them. Some leverage over them.

CHRIS CUOMO: But you’re saying you can’t do that unless you have military might before it.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: At that time, it was not the situation. That situation was different. You didn’t have military, and you should not– never have had military there. You should just have had a mission, an embassy there, dealing with the Taliban, dealing with Mullah Omar. That doesn’t mean that you love him. If Pakistan has a mission, we don’t love him. We– we don’t mean that his thoughts should be imposed on Pakistan, but we have a mission there. We have a mission in Delhi, with India. That doesn’t mean that we are great chummy friends.

CHRIS CUOMO: So the mistake for the U.S. was ever using the military in Afghanistan in the first place.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: I’m sorry?

CHRIS CUOMO: So the mistake for the U.S. was using the military in the beginning, that it should have used political and economic in the beginning–

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yes. I mean, (UNINTEL) according to an environment, you can’t talk of how you reacted in 1995, and think that the same reaction should have been after 9/11. Now 9/11– reaction has to be seen, according to 9/11– 2001 environment. And ‘95– response is to be seen in the environment there. I’m talking of ‘96, ‘97. There is no military. Why should the military have been there at all?

CHRIS CUOMO: There was no threat there–

(OVERTALK)

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Just open an embassy there. And deal with the Taliban, deal with Mullah Omar, influence his mind. All together or all of us would have influenced. If that Buddha statue, when it was being– to be destroyed by the Taliban by Mullah Omar, the prime minister of Japan, Sri Lanka– Thailand and president of Sri Lanka, they all rang me up and they spoke to me. “Save the Buddha statue.”

And I told them I’ve been shouting around. Open your missions there. Open embassies. We– joined people that told Mullah Omar, “If you do anything, we are all going to leave.” Look at the pressure on the mind of the man. But now, we are all alone and you have put them on– he is nothing and– really you can’t do anything. You are not giving him anything. Why– you don’t exercise any leverage. We must exercise leverage over anybody, any country, any individual who we want to influence– to whom we want to dictate or tell something. If you don’t have the leverage, how can you make him accept anything that you want?

CHRIS CUOMO: What is your message to the American people about what they should think about the situation in Afghanistan and what needs to be done?

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Well, the message is certainly that– we have to win. And quitting is not an option, like I said. And in that, we must accept the duties. We must be prepared. We must avoid, as much as possible, casualties, but when soldiers move and armies act, casualties will be there, and we should accept casualties. We should be bold enough, brave enough, as a nation, to accept casualties. Don’t create a history– against that, because that encourages the Taliban and al Qaeda.

(OFF-MIC CONVERSATION)

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Supreme court, yes, because he — acted against the supreme court chief justice and removed the chief justice from there, yes, by bribing — the other side and

(OFF-MIC CONVERSATION)

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: They — they captured, under him. He captured the supreme court! (UNINTEL) people crossed the — gates and went inside, captured, took over the supreme court. (LAUGHTER) And we want him as a leader of Pakistan. Very good.

(OFF-MIC CONVERSATION)

END OF AUDIO

Original Link: http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/chris-cuomo-interviews-pakistani-president-musharraf-read-transcript/Story?id=8657043&page=1 

Interview given on 13th September 2009

A particular section of this interview by General Musharraf, was misquoted and misinterpreted by the international, Indian and Pakistani media. Indians including the Indian Minister for external affairs Shahsi Tharoor , accused General Musharraf and Pakistan of misusing the US aid, and cited these media reports as proof of Pakistan’s mala-fide intentions in its WoT. Please read a wonderful article and refute by Mr. Nadir Hassan below courtesy Newsline and view that particular video at YouTube.

Misquoting Musharraf

A politician claiming that his words have been taken out of context is like a schoolchild using the dog-ate-my-homework excuse. But former president Pervez Musharraf’s anger at the international media for distorting his words is, in fact, justified.

On September 13, Musharraf gave an interview to local TV station, Express News. The interviewer, Kamran Shahid, asked Musharraf if there was any truth to accusations that he had diverted aid meant to fight the Taliban for use against India. As interpreted by the international, Indian and Pakistani media, Musharraf seemed to confirm that Pakistan had misused US aid. Even Indian Minister for External Affairs Shahsi Tharoor cited these media reports as proof of Pakistan’s mala-fide intentions. Pakistan’s High Commissioner in Britain, Wajid Shamsul Hasan, without pausing to explain how this issue was a part of his job description, berated Musharraf for damaging Pakistan’s reputation.

Amidst the frenzy, no one bothered to check Musharraf’s words or the context in which he spoke.

Here is what Musharraf did say:

The interview is in Urdu so I have translated it below. Musharraf’s answer to the question about diversion of aid begins at about 3:20 in the video.

The interviewer asked the former president if there was any truth to reports coming from journalists like Ahmed Rashid that Pakistan had diverted US aid to the eastern border. Musharraf’s reply was typically bellicose.

Whoever is saying this, be it Ahmed Rashid, I would like to say this to them: “Don’t dabble in subjects which you barely understand.” Whoever has given us assistance, be it in the form of money or weapons, should know the organisation of the Pakistan Army and how it is deployed. The units and regiments in our army are rotated, at some point they could be in Kashmir, then they can go to Sindh, then Balochistan and if there is an operation in North Waziristan some will go there. Some will go to Swat, they can go anywhere. So, equipment, whether we buy it or it is given to us, they go to the units, the units hold them. We don’t just keep them in some store. Lets say there is a unit stationed in North Waziristan. Now, this unit gets American equipment. After that, no one can say that this unit has to remain in North Waziristan for a hundred years. They have a tenure of one to one-and-a-half years. I think it is one year. After one year, they have to move. Maybe they have to move to the Punjab border otherwise India might come into Lahore. This unit will take its equipment along when it goes. This equipment isn’t collected in some store room. So, whoever says this (that Pakistan has diverted military aid meant to fight terrorism) doesn’t understand how Pakistan operates. You can’t say that this is American equipment that can only be used against the Taliban and so it should be left in the mountains (when the unit moves). Units keep their equipment; wherever they go they will take the equipment with them. You can’t say that this equipment has come from America or Britain and it will be used here and that this equipment is Chinese so it will be used in such and such place. Please explain this to Ahmed Rashid for me.

The interviewer then asked Musharraf is these weapons can be used against India. Here is Musharraf’s hypothetical reply to the hypothetical question:

Absolutely. We will use these weapons wherever there is a threat to Pakistan. If there is a threat from the Taliban or Al-Qaeda we will use the weapons against them; if there is a threat from India we will use them there.

The interviewer further gpaded Musharraf into asking if we ever used these weapons against India. Musharraf never directly answered the question, preferring to ratchet up the rhetoric instead:

Whatever we did was right. We need to ensure Pakistan’s security. Wherever the threat comes from, we will use full force there

Miusharraf’s non-reply prompted the question of whether the US was upset about the use of military aid.

What do we care if America or anyone else gets upset. We have to look after our security and wherever there is a threat we have to use full force. America, in fact the whole world, should know that we will never compromise our security and whatever equipment is there, we will use it everywhere.

It is clear from this exchange that  a combination of a typically-rambling reply from Musharraf, the bellicosity that is an essential part of his character and journalistic laziness spurred this ‘controversy.’

An additional point needs to made: Even if Musharraf had revealed that weaponry given by the US was used on the Indian border, what’s all the fuss about? The US has always known and, at times, even encouraged such use. Lawrence Korb, a senior fellow at American Progress and a senior adviser to the Center for Defence Information, in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance on December 12, 2007 gave the breakdown of US aid to Pakistan. He explained that 60% of this aid shouldn’t be considered aid at all since it went to the Coalition Support Funds to repay the Pakistan government for services rendered in the war on terror. Another 15% was in the form of direct cash transfers to stabilise Pakistan’s economy. A further 10% consisted of development and humanitarian funds. The remaining 15% of aid, which equaled $1.6 billion, was in the form of security assistance. Korb said in his testimony, “The Pakistanis have used the majority of these funds to purchase major weapons systems, such as F-16s, for possible use in a conventional war with India…” So, not only does the US know that Pakistan is using military aid against India, it has actually sold us the weapons knowing their ultimate purpose.

Despite this, the media somehow managed to make a denial of impropriety from Musharraf sound like an admission of guilt.

Interview given on 11th September 2009

For complete non-stop video, view at StopDesi

In a SPIEGEL interview, former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, 65, discusses the dramatic  situation in Pakistan, where army troops are fighting Islamist extremists in the Swat Valley, his people’s ambivalent relationship with the United States and his country’s failures in combating the Taliban.

SPIEGEL: Mr. Musharraf, there’s a bon mot that states that ruling Pakistan is like riding a tiger. You were in power for nine years. Are you bored now?

Musharraf: I recently was in Saudi Arabia, China and London giving lectures. I have engaged the famous Walker Agency …

SPIEGEL: … which Bill Clinton, Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder all work with …

Musharraf: … In Prague, I am giving a lecture on leadership in front of high-level managers at a company which owns Pizza Hut and KFC.

SPIEGEL: Pakistan is in a major state of crisis. Close to 2.5 million people have fled the areas of fighting in the northwest and the Swat Valley. There are attacks almost daily. Is Pakistan on the verge of collapse?

Musharraf: This is wrong. Nothing can happen to Pakistan as long as the armed forces are intact and strong. Anyone who wants to weaken and destabilize Pakistan just has to weaken the army and our intelligence service, ISI, and this is what is happening these days. Lots of articles have been written claiming that Pakistan will be divided, that it will fall apart or become Balkanized. I personally feel there is some kind of conspiracy going on with the goal of weakening our nation.

SPIEGEL: Who do you believe is behind this conspiracy?

Musharraf: I won’t tell you exactly because then you will ask me for evidence. I can only tell you that India, for example, has 16 insurgencies going on and nobody is making a big thing out of it. But the West always focuses on Pakistan as the problem.

SPIEGEL: United States President Barack Obama has promised a new beginning. He wants to chase and fight the Taliban and al-Qaida in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan and has enlargened the territory of operations. What do you think of this new strategy, which he calls AfPak?

Musharraf: I am totally against the term AfPak. I do not support the word itself for two reasons: First, the strategy puts Pakistan on the same level as Afghanistan. We are not. Afghanistan has no government and the country is completely destabilized. Pakistan is not. Second, and this is much more important, is that there is an Indian element in the whole game. We have the Kashmir struggle, without which extremist elements like Lashkar-e-Taiba would not exist.
 

SPIEGEL: This group is believed to have been responsible for the terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Why should the US strategy also include India?

Musharraf: There are many Indian extremists who have links with extremists in Pakistan. So if the world is serious about combating terrorism, then don’t leave India out. Originally, Richard Holbrooke was supposed to be the US special representative for all three countries, but the strong Indian lobby in America prevented that.

SPIEGEL: Are you disappointed by Obama?

Musharraf: No, he is aiming at the right things. He is showing intentions of improving the dialogue with the Muslim world, which is good. He is right when he says that more forces must be deployed in Afghanistan. There is an intention of increasing funding for Pakistan, which is also good. But he also has to understand the reality in Pakistan and I am not sure he does.

SPIEGEL: And how is the situation?

Musharraf: One of the realities is that the Indian intelligence service RAW is interfering in our country. For example in Balochistan, our largest province bordering Iran and Afghanistan. One of the most brutal insurgents against our forces, Brahamdagh Bugti …

SPIEGEL: … the grandson of Nawab Bugti, a tribal leader who was killed three years ago in a battle with the Pakistani army …

Musharraf: … he is sitting in Kabul, protected by the Afghan government and provided with weapons and money by the Indian intelligence agency RAW. He has his own training camps and sends his fighters to Balochistan where they terrorize people and damage the civil infrastructure. RAW is also interfering in the Swat Valley, I know that. Where do all these Taliban fighters in Swat get their arms and money from? From Afghanistan. The Indian consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar only exist to be a thorn in the side of Pakistan.

SPIEGEL: Let us talk about the role of the ISI. A short time ago, US newspapers reported that ISI has systematically supported Taliban groups. Is that true?

Musharraf: Intelligence always has access to other networks — this is what Americans did with KGB, this is what ISI also does. You should understand that the army is on board to fight the Taliban and al-Qaida. I have always been against the Taliban. Don’t try to lecture us about how we should handle this tactically. I will give you an example: Siraj Haqqani …

SPIEGEL: … a powerful Taliban commander who is allegedly secretly allied with the ISI.

Musharraf: He is the man who has influence over Baitullah Mehsud, a dangerous terrorist, the fiercest commander in South Waziristan and the murderer of Benazir Bhutto as we know today. Mehsud kidnapped our ambassador in Kabul and our intelligence used Haqqani’s influence to get him released. Now, that does not mean that Haqqani is supported by us. The intelligence service is using certain enemies against other enemies. And it is better to tackle them one by one than making them all enemies.

SPIEGEL: Are the Americans and the Pakistanis still even pursuing the same goals?

Musharraf: The Americans are hated in the country today. The US drone attacks, which we have been living with for months now, are most unpopular — there is no doubt about it. Regardless whether they are killing terrorists, Taliban or al-Qaida figures or not, there are too many civilian victims. The deployment of drones has to be stopped.

SPIEGEL: The US military eliminated several high-ranking al-Qaida figures through drone attacks. What would be a possible alternative?

Musharraf: We have to find a way or method with which the Pakistani army could conduct these attacks itself. There would immediately be much better acceptance amongst the populace and we would cause less collateral damage and there would be fewer civilian victims.

Part 2: ‘The US Left Us Alone with 30,000 Mujahedeen that They Brought’

One of the most prominent problems of the world is terrorism. RT spoke to a man who is no stranger to the “War on Terror”, ex-president of Pakistan and a man who ruled the country for nine years, Mr. Pervez Musharraf.

RT: To your opinion, what is the role of Russia in the “War on Terror”, and, specifically, in the region of Afghanistan?

Pervez Musharraf: Yes, Russia has been very familiar with the region, and therefore it must have a very positive effective role in stabilizing Afghanistan. What we need to develop in Afghanistan is a homegrown political system which keeps the integrity of Afghanistan intact.

Therefore, Russia must contribute towards that, and develop a homegrown political solution to the situation inside of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan was together for 300 years, more than that, through a term called Missah-ke-Milli. This is a socio-political contract, a national covenant, where all the ethnic groups: the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Khazars, Pakhtuns. They decided to remain intact and accepted the sovereignty of the king.

http://www.russiatoday.ru/Politics/2009-05-28/Pervez_Musharraf___We_fight_for_Pakistan_.html?fullstory 

CNN (Video-1) (Video-2)

(YouTube 1) (YouTube 2) (YouTube 3)

Read Full interview below: This is a rush copy and may be updated.

17 May 2009 – FAREED ZAKARIA, HOST, GLOBAL PUBLIC SQUARE: This is GPS, the GLOBAL PUBLIC SQUARE. Welcome to all of you in the United States and around the world. I’m Fareed Zakaria. If Pakistan and Afghanistan are the biggest global stories of the moment, the man who can shed the most light on them is surely Pervez Musharraf, who was Pakistan’s president for almost a decade until just last year. He is my guest today for the hour.

ZAKARIA: Joining me now is President Pervez Musharraf. Welcome, sir.

PERVEZ MUSHARRAF, FORMER PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN: Thank you.

ZAKARIA: Well, a lot of people watch what’s happening in Pakistan and ask, why is this happening in Pakistan? Why does Pakistan seem to be filled with these radical elements, extremist movements, Taliban, elements of al Qaeda? Ten years and $10 billion later, it appears they are stronger.

But why has it not been successful? Let’s just take what the end result is. You have the Swat Valley overrun by Taliban.

MUSHARRAF: Why is it not succeeding? Because of Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, more than 50 percent of Afghanistan is under Taliban control. Why are U.S. forces and coalition forces not — if you succeed in Afghanistan, all of this will be over.

ZAKARIA: Perhaps that’s due…

MUSHARRAF: If you succeed in Pakistan…

ZAKARIA: … to all these militant groups in Pakistan.

MUSHARRAF: Nothing will — they get their — they are there because they are supporting in Afghanistan, because they are getting all their military hardware through Afghanistan. Where are they getting their — the money comes through the drugs in Afghanistan. Arms comes from Afghanistan. So, Pakistan is a victim of what is happening in Afghanistan.

The world and the United States, and whatever discussion we have had, is through Pakistan, and everything is in Pakistan. Sir, a half of Afghanistan is under control of Taliban, of Mullah Omar.

If you control here, if you are successful against Taliban and al Qaeda in Pakistan, let me assure you, the battle is not over, because Afghanistan is Afghanistan, and they will continue. If you succeed in Afghanistan, you will succeed in Pakistan. We have suffered because of what is happening in Afghanistan. And we still continue to suffer because of that. Our society, I would say, our social fabric has been torn, and we are trying to repair it.

So, the world must understand, and the world must help Pakistan repair this torn fabric of ours, national fabric, instead of criticizing — why is Pakistan like this, Pakistan is spreading Talibanization. At this moment, we are lucky — the world is lucky — that we have this army and the ISI.

Now, instead of weakening them, abusing them, criticizing them, we must strengthen them. Because, if they don’t deliver, who else is going to deliver? We’ll all fail. So, therefore, don’t criticize the ISI and army. They are suffering with all this, and yet, going ahead. 

ZAKARIA: So, let me ask you about the Pakistani Army and the ISI, because, as you know, there is a great deal of criticism. And the criticism basically takes the form that says, the Pakistani Army was, under your watch, given about $10 billion, that Pakistan in general was given $10 billion.

And the criticism goes, you took it, barely said “thank you.” And what do we see 10 years later? More Talibanization, al Qaeda is stronger, Taliban is stronger. “Where did the money go,” people ask.

MUSHARRAF: In Afghanistan the United States has spend $143 billion, I believe, and you’re talking to Pakistan for $10, for all that we have suffered? And that too, I have explained to you what it is, out of this $10 billion, I have said when being interviewed by Wolf Blitzer. Five billion — half of it — is reimbursement for the services provided by Pakistan. It is not your money. It is our money.

(View Video of this conversation regarding $10 billion for Pakistan and $143 billion for Afghanistan)  <— Click to see Video

So, let me say it again. Half of it, $5 billion, is our money. We provided services to you, so you are repaying us. So, $5 billion gone there.

Now we are left with $5 billion. Half of this $5 billion was meant for military, and the other half for social sector — education, health and all that.

So, half of it, which was for military, was for — I mean, it is pittance to maintain the helicopters, the air force, the ammunition that is being used to fight all these people. It is too less. And there was a time when, out of our 20 attack helicopters, only two were serviceable.

And I was — I created a hue and cry. And then, only, could we get some support. So, that was for military support.

Now, people keep claiming that we are using all that on the eastern border against India. Now, that is a separate story altogether. Yes, indeed, our army has been maintained to have security against any threat.

ZAKARIA: But a lot of people feel that you are overly focused on the threat from India. And here you have people 60 miles from your border — from your capital — trying to take over Punjab, and you should be spending a much greater amount of time, money, energy, attention on that problem rather than the deterrence issue with India. MUSHARRAF: Well, we have to be balanced in our approach. On the eastern border, if Pakistan — Pakistan’s existence and security is under threat, when a big force like India is maintaining.

Let me now come into the military figures. They have about 33 infantry divisions. Twenty-four are on Pakistan borders. They have three armored divisions, all three against Pakistan borders. They have three mechanized divisions, all three against Pakistan borders.

Being a force commander, what would you do, when this huge force is there ready to attack you, and when they are saying that we are going to come and attack Pakistan, and when the public and the media is demanding that Pakistan should be punished and go and attack them?

ZAKARIA: This was after the Mumbai attacks, which were linked to Pakistan.

MUSHARRAF: After that also. After the attack on the parliament, also, we had this whole army, this whole force came on the borders. For 10 months they were there.

Obviously, I used — I put my force there, and I threatened them, that if you try to attack us, and we are (ph) able (ph) to attack you. So, don’t take Pakistan lightly.

So, Pakistan’s security cannot be compromised. That is the first thing.

ZAKARIA: But your security is being compromised in the west…

MUSHARRAF: No…

ZAKARIA: … by the Taliban.

MUSHARRAF: By they Taliban. Now, the question is, yes, indeed. One has to — certainly, Pakistan’s security is not being compromised by the Taliban. They are not of that strength.

This point that a lot of people say they are just 60 miles from the capital, the threat is not from these people. They dare not come onto the capital. They will be stopped by any force, any time.

But inside, extremism within, some elements who are right inside Islamabad, maybe in the form of — in that Lal Masjid, in the Red Mosque, which we had to attack and eliminate in my time — now, these are the people within our society. They are a small minority. But we must control them, because if we don’t control this extremism inside our society, they develop linkages with the Taliban who are there, and al Qaeda.

So, al Qaeda, Taliban and these people develop linkages. We have to break that linkage through squeezing them.

It’s all — one has to have a proper strategy.

ZAKARIA: But it does sound to me like you’re saying, look, the threat from the Taliban is not that great; we have to be more prepared against India. And that is what people fear, that the Pakistani military is not taking this as an existential threat.

MUSHARRAF: No. No, no. They are taking it.

I think — please, I think, Fareed, we must not try to teach the Pakistan army where is the threat coming from. They analyze things. We have conferences. They take very, very deliberate decisions. They know where the threat is down and when it is up. And they take action accordingly.

When the Indian threat was there, when Indians, now, after the Mumbai attack, were talking of — after the parliament attack, initially, they brought the whole army on our borders in 2002. Yes, indeed, we took the whole army against them.

So, yes, we are looking after Taliban, but we have to look after the eastern border, also. So, the thoughts are divided.

So, please don’t tell us that you are entered (ph). There has to be a balance according to the threat analysis. And this threat analysis is done by the army very, very regularly.

You analyze your threat wherever it is coming from, whether it is Taliban or Indians, and take balanced action.

ZAKARIA: So, let me then tell you what Ahmed Rashid, the Pakistani journalist, says. He says that in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas the Pakistanis were reluctant to break cease-fires they had made with Baitullah Mehsud.

Some Pakistani officials still continue to give the Taliban a kind of legitimacy. The governor of the Northwestern Frontier Province claimed the Taliban movement was a national liberation movement.

In other words, there is — this is a Pakistani journalist saying the Pakistani military still viewed many of these people as allies.

David Sanger, White House correspondent for the “New York Times,” in his recent book quotes a CIA intercept of a  conversation in which your successor, General Kayani, the head of the Pakistani Army, calls another key Taliban commander, Jalaluddin Haqqani, a strategic asset for the Pakistani military.

The fear is that the Pakistani military still views many of these Taliban militants as being useful in launching guerrilla operations, potentially in Kashmir, potentially against Afghanistan.

MUSHARRAF: No, this is absolutely baseless, and absolutely wrong.

I take serious exception to this, whoever has said that Kayani could have said that. I know Kayani since, I don’t know how long. I can’t imagine that he would have said this.

Intelligence is — again, we are — a lot of things happened. A lot of things happened.

ZAKARIA: You have contacts with the…

MUSHARRAF: Yes. Yes, indeed. After all, the KGB had contacts in CIA. CIA had contacts in KGB. That is how you have ingress into each other, and that is how you can manipulate things in your favor.

So, ISI also is an intelligence organization. They do exactly what CIA does or RAW does in India.

So, there was a way (ph) of dealing, but they were not supportive of them. Nobody is supportive of the Taliban. But, yes, there is complexity.

When drones come and attack, and the projection is that a lot of civilians are getting killed. So, therefore, within the army, like within the whole nation, there is a — we are feeling against those attacks and in favor of those people who are being killed. So, there is a complexity involved.

There is an anti-United States feeling in the public, and also maybe in the army, yes, indeed, because of what has happened over ‘89 to 2001, in these 12 years when we were left alone, and the United States abandoned Pakistan’s strategic relationship.

For 42 years, from ‘47 to ‘89, we were the strategic partner of the United States all over the world, in everything. We fought a war with them for 10 years.

What did we get in return? We were abandoned. So, what do the people of Pakistan think?

ZAKARIA: But I’m asking you about now. The question people have is — let me put it more specifically, then.

The credence, the evidence for the fact that there is still reluctance is that the Pakistani military has not launched an attack of any serious kind against the Haqqani Taliban. It has not launched a serious attack on the Quetta Shura, the remnants of the Afghan Taliban that are in Quetta. It has not launched attacks on these people, perhaps because have (ph) used them.

This is the thinking.

MUSHARRAF: No, no. That’s…

ZAKARIA: As useful. One day — the theory goes, one day the Americans will leave. You, Pakistan, will be left with a strong India, and you want to have these militants…

MUSHARRAF: No, no…

ZAKARIA: … to be able to operate guerrilla war.

MUSHARRAF: … (UNINTELLIGIBLE) absolutely. Let me assure you that against India we maintain a deterrence level of force, conventional. And India will never attack us, as long as we have this force. They cannot. They know what we have, conventional and unconventional.

So, leave India aside. We maintain our…

ZAKARIA: So, why not go after these militants?

MUSHARRAF: We are going after them, and we are doing our best. Now, that is what needs to be understood here.

And when you said we haven’t operated against them, so, we have about 700 al Qaeda people who were arrested or eliminated after 9/11. Have all been done by Pakistan, Pakistan Army. Who else had done it? Who else had arrested all the senior al Qaeda leadership?

Name one arrested by you, the United States. All by Pakistan, in Pakistan.

(END VIDEO)

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

MUSHARRAF: I warned her, because I got intelligence reports.

Now, coming to a threat, yes, indeed, there was a threat. I knew it, and I told her. I told her personally.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

(BEGIN VIDEO)

ZAKARIA: And we are back with Pervez Musharraf, the former president of Pakistan.

One of the things you have heard publicly in Pakistan, here in the United States, is that in some way you did not provide enough security for Benazir Bhutto, or were in some way implicated in her death.

As you know — and I know Wolf asked you this — there was an e- mail she sent indirectly to Wolf Blitzer, saying, “I hold President Musharraf responsible.”

MUSHARRAF: Well, these are — I don’t have words. I don’t — I think I would undermine myself if I were even to reply to any accusation that I was involved.

I have certain principles. I’ve been raised in a certain manner. I belong to a certain cultural background and a family background which doesn’t believe in these things, of assassinations and eliminations.

ZAKARIA: But you believe, actually, you warned her.

MUSHARRAF: Yes. I warned her, because I got intelligence reports.

Now, coming to a threat, yes, indeed, there was a threat. I knew it. And not only me. But some certain friends of ours from the Gulf sent a special messenger to me, indicating that there were certainly some groups, terrorist groups, who supposedly have come to Karachi, and they would do an attack on her.

And I told her. I told her personally.

ZAKARIA: How did she respond?

MUSHARRAF: Well, she responded all right. She used to be all right with me on telephone. But she didn’t say whether she was going to — what she was going to do.

But I told her, I’m warning you that there is a threat in Rawalpindi, where she decided to go and address a gathering in Liaqat Bagh.

This is a place — anyone who knows Pindi, which is most — the thickest part of the city, with tall buildings all around, congested, heavily congested, and a main square. And this ground is open to all the buildings all around.

I told her, “You must not go.” And the first time, in fact, I stopped her.

ZAKARIA: So, you specifically warned her not to go there.

MUSHARRAF: Yes. She was not allowed to go the first time. And she created such a hue and cry that she is being restricted, of political activities being restricted. It had a lot of negative fallout on me.

The next time again she wanted to go, she — and then she went. And that is what happened. And she went. There was certainly a threat against her.

ZAKARIA: Let me read you something her husband, the president of Pakistan, said, Asif Ali Zardari. He’s asked on “Meet the Press,” he says, “You know, Mr. President, there’s a widespread belief that your military and your intelligence services still have sympathies for the Taliban.”

This is President Zardari. “I wouldn’t agree with you. I think General Musharraf may have had a mindset that to run with the hares and hunt with the hounds, but certainly not on our watch. We don’t have that thought process at all.”

MUSHARRAF: How could I be supporting them? From what point of view? So that they come and kill me?

I mean, it’s a ridiculous accusation. It’s a very ridiculous accusation.

ZAKARIA: But the president of your country is making it.

MUSHARRAF: Well, I have said my bit, so it’s his word against mine. You take whoever you want to trust.

ZAKARIA: The current president of Pakistan has 19 percent approval rating. For much of your presidency, your approval was in the 60, 70 percent range, though it did go down later.

Do you believe that Asif Ali Zardari, the current president of Pakistan, has the legitimacy, the political support to pursue this struggle against the Taliban?

MUSHARRAF: Well, in this part of the world, you believe very strongly in democracy. Democratically, he was elected by two-thirds of the parliament. So, he has democratic legitimacy.

ZAKARIA: But he’s not a political figure in Pakistan. His wife was. He is not — does he have — the polls suggest that he does not have that much mass support.

You said to me once when I was talking to you in a Newsweek interview, you were referring to Benazir Bhutto in those days. You said that the leader of a country like Pakistan that is fighting terrorism needs three qualities. You must have the military with you. You must be seen as a non-religious — you must not be seen as a non- religious person. And you must not be seen as an extension of the United States.

And you said that for that reason, Benazir Bhutto would find it very difficult to succeed as the leader of Pakistan.

Now, President Zardari seems to have all three strikes against him. Can he succeed?

MUSHARRAF: Well, that makes his task difficult in the eyes of the people of Pakistan.

ZAKARIA: Do you think that there is something he could do? You know, what advice would you have for him — other than resign?

(LAUGHTER)

MUSHARRAF: I would like to comment on this. I think he is trying his best in his own way. Maybe he has some compulsion (ph) and inhibitions.

I wish the government well, because they are facing a very, very strong challenge of rectifying the economy, first of all, fighting terrorism. And then, over and above, there are political challenges. That makes the situation in Pakistan complex.

ZAKARIA: Why did the situation deteriorate to the point it is now, you know, this mess? MUSHARRAF: Yes, I would say now, there were no clear-cut instructions to the army what does the government want them to do. And they were pulled in different directions. A provincial government telling the army, “Oh, you hold on. You stay away. We are dealing politically.”

So, they re-exerted. So, unless you are continuously pressurizing them and reducing their space for action, they will keep trying to expand.

ZAKARIA: This sounds like a failure of the new democratic government in Pakistan.

MUSHARRAF: Well, you can take any way. Well, it should have been — the situation should have been handled with more strength, strongly.

Never give up strength. Because we had achieved something. You just have to maintain pressure. That is all. Just maintain pressure.

ZAKARIA: You talked about the sociopolitical compact that kept Afghanistan together. Is Hamid Karzai the man to  reestablish this sociopolitical compact? Do you feel that he is — is he today an ineffective leader?

MUSHARRAF: Well, let me not comment on him. Yes, indeed, when I was — I used to be annoyed with him was because he was double-dealing with us. And I don’t like double-dealing at all.

In a situation like this, I feel that the basic requirement is a unity of thought and action, by all — by the Afghan government; by the coalition forces; and within coalition forces, the American forces and the others; in Pakistan, by the central government, by the provincial government and the army.

There has to be unity of thought and action. Unfortunately, that unity of thought and action is not there.

ZAKARIA: Meaning he would say one thing but do something else?

MUSHARRAF: Yes. He would be hiding things from us. There are things which were hurting us. He would — he knew, and he wouldn’t help out in addressing issues which were causing trouble to Pakistan.

ZAKARIA: You saw the recent press conference where he, President Obama, President Zardari were all there. They talked about a breakthrough. It seemed like they were getting on much better.

Do you think that the personal chemistry is now better, and so everything’s going to be all right?

MUSHARRAF: Maybe. No comments. Maybe, yes. I hope that it is all right. I hope it is all right. And I hope they mean — I hope he means whatever he says, because I found that he doesn’t mean what he says. ZAKARIA: Do you believe that the Pakistani military is a professional military, in control of the nuclear weapons, dedicated to fighting the Taliban? Or is there a need for some transition? Is there a need for a strategic mind shift?

MUSHARRAF: Five hundred percent, there is no need of any mind shift. These aspersions are caused by those who want to weaken Pakistan.

Pakistan’s strength is its army. And anyone who wants to weaken Pakistan attacks the Pakistan army and the ISI. And unfortunately, I…

ZAKARIA: And you stand by both, the ISI and the army?

MUSHARRAF: Yes, yes. Yes, indeed.

So, I personally think that there is some vicious campaign going on against Pakistan. Because if anyone wants to weaken Pakistan, attack these two institutions, not realizing that if you want to weaken the fight against terrorism, weakening them also weakens that. So, we are not realizing that.

Pakistan Army is an inheritance from the colonial period of the British Army. It’s an extremely disciplined army. It carries out orders from the top. And army leadership carries out government orders.

ZAKARIA: So, there are no…

MUSHARRAF: Nobody…

ZAKARIA: … rogue elements within…

MUSHARRAF: There cannot be.

(END VIDEO)

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

MUSHARRAF: I make up my own mind, and I have my own convictions and my own principles. So, therefore, those who know me, know that.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

(BEGIN VIDEO)

ZAKARIA: You’ve spent a lot of time with President Bush. In fact, in Pakistan people would sometimes accuse you of being “Busharraf.”

What was your sense of him as a president, as a man?

MUSHARRAF: Well, first of all, whoever accuses me of being “Busharraf,” or something, I’m nobody’s man. I am, by nature — by nature, I am not a follower. I don’t follow blindly.

And I make up my own mind, and I have my own convictions and my own principles. So, therefore, those who know me, know that. Those who don’t know me can call me anything. I don’t care about that.

Having said that, President Bush — I’m going to be frank — he’s been defeated. Yes, indeed, he’s been much maligned. Yes, indeed, President Obama has come.

But you have asked me, so I must speak my frank views.

I liked him very much. And I think he was a very sincere person. I think he was a — what I liked in him was that he was a straight- talker. And he was a very good friend. And I like that.

I like these qualities of a person, an individual, where he talks straight, up front, and prepared to listen up front also, because I used to do straight-talking also. And he showed sincerity in his friendship with me on a personal level. So, therefore, I have a good opinion about him.

ZAKARIA: But there were policies of his you disagreed with, for example, the war in Iraq. 

MUSHARRAF: Yes. I think the war in Iraq, other than disagreeing with the war on Iraq, I had disagreed on the way it was launched, actually. And I think maybe it was the military planners who should have done better.

Because I, as a military man, I always think, when you are going to operate against an enemy, whether it’s a country or anything, you want to see where the center of gravity of that force against which you are going to operate. And you must make a plan to disturb that center of gravity, or to break that center of gravity.

In Iraq, the center of gravity was not the whole of Iraq and not the people of Iraq. It was one man: Saddam Hussein.

So, let’s make a plan. If I was the military commander, I would have made a plan to get to Saddam in the cheapest, simplest way, and not undertake an invasion of the whole of Iraq, because I knew from my contacts in the Middle East that he was an unpopular man in Iraq. The people of Iraq did not like him.

So, therefore, if the military planning was rockets and missiles coming from the air, from the navy, from the land, and double pincers and triple pincers coming as if it is the Second World War going on, with tanks and maneuvers, which are going to last for months — where is the center of gravity? The center of gravity is that one man, sitting in Baghdad inside (ph).

Why couldn’t Baghdad be taken, block the routes of entry and exits, and some efficient, effective, small force goes in to locate where he is, take public support, locate him and get him? And that is the end of an operation. I don’t know. I thought we — that led the world — when the Muslim world saw missiles landing in Baghdad, and all fire and all hell let loose on the television, I think it led to — and the whole of the Muslim world was in uproar.

ZAKARIA: Do you think we should leave Iraq on about the timetable that President Obama has said and laid out?

MUSHARRAF: No. No, now that also — I know the public sentiment in the United States. But I would like to warn the people of the United States and President Obama. It’s not that easy. The situation is not that simple.

We must not take Iraq to be Iraq alone. We have to see the whole region. We have to see the effect of leaving, first of all within Iraq. There is a Shia community. There is a Sunni community. There is a Kurd community.

What are the sensitivities of Turkey against the Kurds? What is the linkage of the Shias with Iran? What is the linkage of these with Hezbollah in Lebanon? What effect will it create in Lebanon?

And then, what effect will it create in the Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia?

We need to analyze all this very deliberately and not take any action — just for the sake of semantics, because people are demanding this — that you destabilize the whole region.

Real leadership, it comes under test. That is my belief. When public opinion may not be correct, that is where leadership comes. You don’t flow with public opinion then; you change public opinion. That is real leadership.

So, I will say, one needs to analyze. The United States understands, and President Obama understands compulsions (ph) here much more than me.

But there is a lot of deliberation required before we take action which has seeds of destabilizing this whole region.

ZAKARIA: What do you think of President Obama and what he has done in terms of the Muslim world, in terms of the Afghanistan strategic review? Do you feel like he’s on the right track with both the political, cultural outreach and the military strategy?

MUSHARRAF: I don’t see much change, frankly. I mean, I am trying to observe what is the change here. We always — or always, I thought there should be more force in Afghanistan, because I think the force available there is diluted in space. That is a military term we use when the space is too large and the force is small.

So, and he has done that. He has done that physically. Maybe President Bush also thought that we should have more force there.

On the other side, I am glad. I think that he is looking at putting in more finances into the war in Afghanistan. That is the correct approach.

And the third area, that he believes in political dealings within Afghanistan, with the warring factions, with the other side. That is also a correct approach.

ZAKARIA: Talking to the Taliban is what you’re saying.

MUSHARRAF: Yes, talking to the Taliban. And also, maybe overall, his concern on improving the United States’ standing in the Muslim world, I think is also very positive.

ZAKARIA: But this…

MUSHARRAF: So, I believe…

ZAKARIA: … is all sounding quite positive.

MUSHARRAF: Sorry?

ZAKARIA: It’s all sounding positive. I mean, it seems like you’re comfortable with where he’s going.

MUSHARRAF: Yes. Yes, absolutely. I said that. Yes, I think he’s on the right track.

ZAKARIA: And we will be back with President Musharraf to talk about more, including whether or not he foresees himself returning to the political fray in Pakistan.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

ZAKARIA: There is a ban on your returning to political life in Pakistan, a two-year ban, which will expire in about a year.

MUSHARRAF: In November, six months.

ZAKARIA: Not that you’re counting.

(LAUGHTER)

What will happen to Pervez Musharraf after that? Will you run for office in Pakistan?

MUSHARRAF: There is no running for office in six months. I mean — well, frankly, I am on lecture circuits. I am enjoying this professor-like activity of giving lectures, which I could never imagine, as a military man, that I’ll be doing that.

But one is concerned about Pakistan. Certainly, one does get concerned. Where are we headed? What are we doing?

I wish — as I said, I wish the government well, that they must handle Pakistan and take it forward, bring peace and economic development. If that happens, one is — I would be the happiest person continuing whatever I am doing.

ZAKARIA: But if Pakistan is still in trouble?

MUSHARRAF: If Pakistan is in trouble, and if any Pakistani, including myself, if he sees that we can do something for it, I don’t think — well, my life is for Pakistan.

ZAKARIA: And if the political party that supported you, the Muslim League Q, were to ask you to be its leader again, that’s possible?

MUSHARRAF: They haven’t asked me yet. Let them ask me first, then I’ll reply.

ZAKARIA: Any regrets?

MUSHARRAF: Well, regrets, now, my regret is that on the first three years that I got, I should have gone to the supreme court and asked for another five years, because there were a lot of things that had to be done in Pakistan to bring this country on a path of continuous progress and balanced political and democratic activity, which I believed in.

I introduced the essence of democracy into Pakistan. What, after all, is democracy? It is the empowerment of the people. And I empowered the people, including (ph) the empowerment of women. Women were never empowered.

Today in our National Assembly, there are 72 women out of 243. Twenty-two percent are women. At the local government level, 30 percent are women.

So, who has done that? I did that. I brought about these changes and empowered the women.

We empowered the minorities. And then we liberated the media with freedom of speech and expression.

So, all this was done. That is democracy.

ZAKARIA: How do you wish to be remembered? How do you think people will remember your reign in Pakistan?

MUSHARRAF: Well, they should remember it as a period where Pakistan progressed. And they should remember it in accordance to a definition that I elect (ph) people (ph) for (ph) like this, yes.

I made a definition a long time, a long, long time back, of what will — what is the responsibility of a leader or a government? I think the responsibility — and this is my own definition, absolutely, not taken from any book.

And I think it’s a simple definition: ensure the security, progress and development of the state, the welfare and wellbeing of its people.

On all three counts, the nation should understand, I provided all. I kept Pakistan secure from all threats.

ZAKARIA: President Pervez Musharraf, thank you very much.

MUSHARRAF: Thank you, Fareed. It was my pleasure.

ZAKARIA: And we will be back.

(END VIDEO)

View Video of Musharraf’s Interview 

Read full interview below Courtesy of  ‘Af-Pak’ War

Frost: Hello, and welcome to Frost Over the World. Today, in an exclusive interview, we are speaking to the man who ruled Pakistan for almost a decade. Former president Musharraf is with us here in the studio, now. Later we’ll hear about the South African elections, and ask why it is that the Somali pirates appear to be so successful, and untouchable. But first, it was a miitary coup in 1999 which brought General Musharraf, the head of the Pakistan army, to power. You remained in charge for almost ten years. And during that time Pakistan changed quite a lot. Most notably perhaps it became a focal point for the US war on terror, declared after 9/11. President Musharraf fell from power in August last year when in a rare — indeed what became a very rare — show of unity, opposing political parties worked together to oust him. In the end he resigned, and is here now. Thank you for being with us.

Musharraf: My pleasure.

Frost: Tell me, uhm what are your feelings today; as you look at the current state of your homeland, of Pakistan. I mean, uhm, what are your emotions, as you see the situation now?

Musharraf: Very sad, I feel sad, and… [pause] despondent, at whatever is happening; because, Pakistan is suffering.

Frost: Despondent, and sad, yes. And, do you think with all the list of problems that there are at the moment, and food shortages and power shortages and turmoil with… and indeed the insurgents and the rise of extremism and all of these things and the economy… uhm do you think … if you’d, still been there, that you could have dealt with some of those, successfully. Or, is it just an, insoluble problem?

Musharraf: No, no, not at all, I think my experience of nine years shows that the nation has a great potential and it has all the resources, it also has the acumen, the people are intelligent, to understand what the problems are and resolving them. So its not the problem of lack of understanding, of lack of resources,  or lack of potential. The people unfortunately…. The people have to have confidence in the government, and if that happens, I think the situation is recoverable.

Frost: Its recoverable…

Musharraf: Yes.

Frost: And, and what, what should the president or the parliament do most? What is the most urgent task to deal with?

Musharraf: I think terrorism; terrorism and extremism. That poses a danger to Pakistan, and of course to the region and the world. But basically to Pakistan; that needs to be addressed. And the other is the economy, because I think if the economy is on a downturn, and going down, nosediving downwards, then you can’t address any other issue. You will be begging others. So these are the two critical issues.

Frost:  In terms of the security issue, and so on, in your book  which was written basically in 2006, you said that … you estimated, that there were probably 300 seasoned fighters from al Qaeda, somewhere in Pakistan. What would the figure be like today?

Musharraf: I can’t be… it will just be a guess, but certainly they are more than three hundred. Initially these are al Qaeda, the same people who were holed up, the Mujahideen who were holed up since… in the ‘79 to ‘89… we brought about twenty five to thirty thousand Mujahedin here. After ‘89, after the victory over the Soviets, they were not rehabiliated or resettled, so they remained there. Everyone left us, and so Pakistan had to fend for them. These were the people who became al Qaeda, so they were a lot. But then after the breakup of Soviet Union, lot of Chechens and Uzbeks came in. So I think now… But then Pakistan acted, our forces; they were in our cities and in the mountains. They are no more in the cities; in the mountains, yes they are. Now how many are there? I wouldn’t be able to give a figure; but certainly much more than three, four hundred.

Frost: Yea. Is there a possibility that the insurgents, and the militants, and so on, could win, and overthrow the government of Pakistan?

Musharraf: I don’t think so. I don’t think so; unless we blunder, keep blundering and giving them space. They are militant, they are aggressive, and the vast majority of Pakistan are moderate, but they are… they get scared of people who are brandishing weapons, and killing, and slaughtering people. So, if we… loosen on the use of force, err, then we keep giving space to them, and that is how they keep getting encouraged and expanding. But as far as the control of the government is concerned, in the elections in 2007, err 2008, the result was totally anti, religous parties. Religious parties who had about 17% of the votes, seats, in the 2002 elections, got only about 3 or 4%; even in the frontier province where the religious party coalition ruled for five years, they were totally rejected and eliminated, and it was the ANP, which is a moderate party, they won the vote bank, even in Swat, where there is problem. So there is no way that they can win through an election and come into government in Pakistan.

Frost: And what about the situation like the sort of compromise that was worked out in the Swat valley and so on where…, they allowed some sharia law, again, and so on, with the dangers of the various punishments for sharia law, and so no; from what you are saying, that is the wrong way to deal with militants.

Musharraf: Well, now, when we are talking about Swat yes I said any compromise, on a position of strength, when you are dealing with them, is the wrong way. We must deal politically, but from a position of strength. But when you talk of particularly of Swat and sharia, there is a little bit of confusion in the understanding of the world. In Swat it all started that the people were demanding speedy and cheap justice, Nizam-e-Adl, what they were saying, calling it Nizam-e-Adl. Because Swat, historically, up to 1969 was a state, under the Wali of Swat … Wali is like a Nawab, in charge… They were dispensing justice very fast. In ‘69 it was absorbed into Pakistan and here our legal system went with, with all its defects, and shortcomings, and delays. So that people’s demand on fast, speedy justice always remained. Now, the deal now, initially was on Nizam-e-Adl, that you give them speedy, Kazi Courts, speedy cheap justice. Now to that extent its good; but if that means that it will be out of the legal system of Pakistan, the, the high courts, the supreme courts, there is a legal system functioning in the, in, in Pakistan. So whatever you do in Swat must be within that legal system, legal structure. If it is outside that legal structure, you cannot have a … It’s a challenge to the writ of the government. And if the same people are demanding things beyond that, that their, their judgmens will not be challengeable, and then they are… they, they started [ad]opting measures of punishing people for, for things that… probably, a moderate person would not, err, thinks it is tolerable, err, so that becomes challenging to the writ of the government. So there is a bit of a confusion, err which the governent must face boldly. Speedy, cheap justice must be ensured; within the legal ambit of Pakistan, and the constitution of Pakistan. But denying the constitution of Pakistan and bringng laws which are different from Pakistan, must not be allowed.

Frost: And in the situation of the law, and so on, uhm tell me, are you, do you feel, safe when you are in Pakistan? Safe from the revenge of your enemies, as it were? Two of your opponents, or enemies, or whatever, both Mr. Nawaz Sharif, and Mr. Chaudhry, the chief justice, both of them you threw out, as it were, and er do you think they both like revenge on you?

Musharraf: Wel, errr Mr. Nawaz Sharif is all the time talking of it. But from legal, constitutional, point of view, there is no way that I have done anything wrong: legally, and constitutionally. So, therefore I feel confident. But then again, one has to face, whatever, if they want to go into the illegal and unconstitutional mode, well that is different.

Frost: Yes, but they, but also of course they can’t… there are a lot of things that they can’t do anyway because as the Nation reported, I mean you, you in fact were able before, before you resigned on August the 18th, to negotiate immunity from civil and prosection charges  that might come from your nine years. That was an important thing for you that.

Musharraf: Yes. Yes indeed. Err, err all the actions that I took, err whether it was ‘99, or beyond, have legal cover, err constitutional and legal. So therefore, yes, it was the same supreme court, with an eleven member bench, which has passed judgments, err, declaring whatever I did, as quite all right.

Frost: And, and in terms of, and in terms of the, the coming against you, on on legal points, I mean the, presumably the immunity would cover anything they brought up?

Musharraf: Immunity is… I don’t know what you… the President of Pakistan has immunity when in office, but beyond that he doesn’t have immunity as such. But, as I said, the action have been legalised through Supreme Court judgments.

Frost: So that, so that you would be confident… In that situation could they, could they bring in the thing, to the exit veto, whereby, whence you go back to Pakistan, you are not allowed to leave again. Could they do that to you?

Musharraf: Well, it has legal hitches… err there has to be a case against me, err there is no case against me in the courts, err the case has to be under trial, and err so at the moment there is no such possibility.

Frost: Right. But, but, Mr. Chaudhry is said to have a file, that he’s, he’s going through, about you, he’s said, he’s said to have… [inaudible]

Musharraf: Everyone maintains files on each other [both laugh] unfortunately. I keep saying that one has to, with what Pakistan is facing, we ought to be looking forward, instead of getting bogged down against each other, we need to look at the country, we need to save the country, and move it forward on the path of progress and development. That, if we keep getting bogged down in past events, and also get bogged down in personal vendettas, I am afraid Pakistan will keep suffering.

Frost: [Grunt] But just on that one point: they can’t put you on the Exit Control List, you are saying?

Musharraf: Urw, well, no, I wouldn’t say, I wouldn’t, couldn’t say that. It is the courts who have to decide. But from legal points of view, as I said, there is no reason absolutely.

Frost: Let’s go back to the beginning of your presidency…

Musharraf: As I understand the legalities… [laughter]

Frost: Yeah! I bet you do, yeah. The… Let’s go back to the, to the first days, when you, when you, when your coup succeeded in 19, ‘99, uhm was the reason, was in fact, uhm Nawaz Sharif’s, err unconditional surrender, as you put it, over Kargil; was that the thing that made you feel, he’s got to go?

Musharraf: Err, No, no, not at all. Not at all. He went and… although he keeps projecting that I sent him to United States to talk to president Clinton, to save the army from Kargil and all that, which is absolutely wrong; he went himself and the army was perfectly fine, whatever it had done, we were very confident. But, as far as he must go, my decision, no, I didn’t take such a decision at all. I was in Sri Lanka. In fact just a few days before I went to Sri Lanka, he had made me the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and the army Chief, both of them, for which I was thankful. And I went to Sri Lanka fully confident about the situation, and in fact throughout my one year stay as army chief, I always told him that Pakistan is in trouble, but the army is prepared to assist you, help you, and that is how we helped him in WAPDA, we even helped him even to establish military courts. It was only when I was coming back from Sri Lanka that he himself decided not to allow me to enter Pakistan and to leave Pakistan airspace and go into some other country, wherever. The, the, air, the airbases, the airports were all, black… there was a blackout on all airports, we couldn’t land anywhere, we were forced to go out, all this happened, and that is how the army reacted, on ground. I was not even in contact with them.

Frost: That’s right, and there, and there were buses and other things blocking the runway in Karachi… and, and so… and, and how many minutes gas did you have left…

Musharraf: Seven, or eight minutes, I think

Frost: [inaudible]

Musharraf: …and the pilot told me that if there was a jerk or a air pocket, we’ll crash.

Frost: Erh, really? So it was that close, that close. Of course, very soon, uhm 9/11 changed your presidency, didn’t it, really?

Musharraf: Well, ahmm, from some points of view positively, some points of view negatively, because I think I had an agenda. The supreme court gave me three years and they also said that I cannot bring about major constitutional changes. Now, in those three years, I had an agenda to reform the civil services, restructure the government, which I couldn’t do then. Because, because of the distraction after 9/11 to fight terrorism, extremism, al Qaeda and then, finally, Taleban, etc. It was a total distraction. So those three years couldn’t be used fully concentrating on the, on the progress and development of the state and welfare, well-being of the people…

Frost: But I mean, was it a difficult decision to take, to join the alliance, against the Taleban, and against Terror. I mean, did that cut off some of your options within Pakistan?

Musharraf: No, umh I think it was a very very right decision from Pakistan’s point of view. I mean even when Taleban were in Afghanistan and we were the only country who had recognised the Taleban, err and had our mission there — the other two were Saudi Arabia and UAE, but they had closed their missions — err, I always believed and I even told president Clinton this, when he came in 2000, when he said that you… I mean he was trying to tell me that Pakistan ought to break relations; I said the opposite strategey, I said that everyone should recognise them, open their mission, so that we can change them from within. I rec… I understood that they are very obscurantist in their views; we don’t want that kind of Islam in Pakistan. We don’t want Talibanization in Pakistan. So while we had our mission, certainly, we, not only I but the whole government and the whole of, people of Pakistan, didn’t want that kind of obscurantism in Pakistan. So it was easy for me to… to take a decision that was a favourable decision. We didn’t want that kind of Islam in Pakistan.

Frost: So, who, who do you think today is the greater threat to Pakistan and the world, between the Taleban and al Qaeda?

Musharraf: Taleban.

Frost: Taleban.

Musharraf: Yea

Frost: Because of their, because of their level of support?

Musharraf: Because they are the population; they, they get strength from the population. Al Qaeda doesn’t get strength from the population. If you deal with the tribal elders in the various agencies, they are prepared to… agree to getting rid of all the foreigners, al Qaeda. But if you, if many of them would like to go across the border, and fight with the Taleban there against the coalition forces.

Frost: And in, when, when, as we come toward the period of your negotiations with Benazir Bhutto, and so on, umh, during that period, I read the… on July the 27th, or whatever, (which I would have been, I suppose 2007), umh you did actually meet to talk, to negotiate, to talk about a coalition? You actually met?

Musharraf: Twice.

Frost: Twice.

Musharraf: Yes.

Frost: Where did you meet?

Musharraf: Abu Dhabi.

Frost: Abu Dhabi, hunh; and those, those negotiations went well?

Musharraf: I think that they went very well.

Frost: And it could’ve, it could’ve been put into action if… there hadn’t been the tragedy, or if there had been a different result in the election?

Musharraf: If, er the tragedy of Benazir, assassination, and also her returning… umh she was not supposed to return before the elections.

Frost: Umh. Oh I see. She was, she’d agreed to wait until then…

Musharraf: Yea.

Frost: …so the elections would have happened, and she would have survived the elections. Because you realised that she would be in even more danger than you would be, during an election?

Musharraf: Yes there were threats on her, yes, certainly, and we even got intelligence reports from, from the UAE; and I told her, personally, that there are threats, very very potent threats. If you don’t believe us, we’ve got intelligence from UAE; but she came. There were certain threats, when she landed, and she travelled from the airport . There were definite threats of a number of suicide bomb teams, presence; she ignored all that. And there was a, bomb blasts en route, and so many people killed. And then, when she went to address this public gathering in Rawalpindi, this is a very very busy, and a very congested location, in the Liaquat… but it’s popular for political activity. On the first time she wanted to go there, I did not allow her to go there, because there was a definite threat, at that time. And I said, you must not, and unfortunately they made a lot of hue and cry against me, that I am not allowing her political activity, but it was simply a threat to her life. The next time, then she ignored all that, I said OK, she wants to go [laughs] let her go, she is not understanding. And, then you know what happened.

Frost: Yea.

Musharraf: Unfortunately.

Frost: Unfortunately. She was a brave woman. But in that case, you would have said she didn’t listen enough…

Musharraf: Yes. Absolutely. Absolutely.

Frost:  …in that particular situation.

Musharraf: Absolutely. You should see the… just a week.. or two, two weeks, maybe earlier, where she was not allowed to go, and what all the People’s Party, her party, said, against me. That I a not allowing political activity whereas that was not the case.

Frost: And that, and that was not, that was not the case. That was a tragic, a tragic incident. The… when it came time for you to step down, how difficult a decision was that to take? Or was it just obvious that you’d had several years of the economy going well, and things like that, but now your time had come, as it were…

Musharraf: Yea

Frost: …how difficult was it to decide that?

Musharraf: Wehh, very honestly speaking, the difficulty was not from my personal point of view. I don’t have an ego, I don’t have any lust for any riches and all that, that I must remain in position and perpetuate myself permanently. That was not the case, so it was easy for me personally. But I knew, that it would lead to tremendous amount of turmoil; that was the difficulty, the difficulty was from Pakistan’s point of view. So, finally, but when I saw that it’s inevitable and that even if I stay on I’ll be some kind of an impotent president, what is the point in staying? I am not the kind of person who sits around uselessly. I can’t be a useless man. So therefore I took the decision, and I think I was right in my judgment of what will happen to Pakistan.

Frost: Wh… which we talked about earlier, and, and, and so, and in terms of, in terms of the, the situation there, you said how things would have been different if you’d, uhm, if you’d still been, still been there in power, and so on, but the… What about the relationship, today, with America? That’s… Is that healthy now? Or, not as healthy when you were there?

Musharraf: Ther is a… unfortunately, a trust deficit, I think, and the…

Frost: A trust deficit?

Musharraf: Yea, err as far as the attitude of the people of Pakistan toward the United States, it remains the same, almost, if not a little worse; but as far as the, the worst part of the whole situation is where there is a trust deficit in United States agaist the ISI, and in many quarters, against the army. Now that is a very serious situation which never existed. These are the two institutions which are the guarantors of stability of Pakistan. They are the two institutions which have played a critical role, and an important role, throughout the last three decades, from ‘79 onwards, in whatever we wanted them to do, whatever the government wanted them to do. Now if we have to fight terrorism and extremism, and these two institutions are to be mistrusted, who in Pakistan is going to fight terrorism and extremism. I mean they are the people who are going to do that. So how can we have such a wrong attitude towards them. So I think firstly, if anything has to be repaired, this trust deficit has to go, certainly. Otherwise, I think the two elements which are critical to fighting terrorism and extremism, they are demoralised and they are not getting the entire support.

Frost: We are going to extend this fascinating interview, after this break.

Frost: You mentioned, President Zardari, your successor, do you think he can pull this off? Do you think he is doing pretty well, or what?

Musharraf: No I wouldn’t like to comment on that. He’s trying…, maybe he’s trying his best; but, well, Pakistan is suffering. I mean anybody knows that, and I’m sure he also knows that, so he needs to put his act together and ensure that the government brings Pakistan out of the economic morass, the threat of terrorism and extremism, and I would say even, relations with India, this because that is another distraction.

Frost: Big distraction.

Musharraf: Yea.

Frost: Distraction to… [inaudible] during your time too.

Musharraf: But we were trying to, it was a distraction all since our independence, since 1947, but we tried our best to repair that, and get on the course of rapproachment, and we achieved a lot. We almost reached a resolution of, even the Kashmir dispute we were moving ahead, which is so critical. But then, now, with any minor incidents, terrorist incident, if there is war hysteria whipped up, more in India, not in Pakistan, in India, by politicians, by the media, if there is war hysteria, er er, then the gulf between the people increases. You create a war hysteria in India, the people start hating Pakistan, on something which… between Mr., Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and myself, in the Joint Communique we had mentioned that we will not allow terrorist acts to hinder, to impede the process of peace. Now, it is impeding, war hysteria, and delays, and now the whole peace process that we had initiated is in doldrums …

Frost: It’s in the doldrums now that the conditions, the relations, particularly after Mumbai, of course, are, are that much worse. Do you, do you think that it’s true that although Pakistanis were very much involved in Mumbai, that the Pakistan government was not, and the ISI, were not involved, do you…

Musharraf: Absolutely

Frost: … believe that?

Musharraf: Absolutely. See, David, I mean, these are… in Lahore, the incident that took place in Lahore, against the Sri Lankan team, lot of Pakistanis think that it is RAW involved. So should we create a war hysteria against RAW, just like they do against the ISI? ISI, army, is not involved in Bombay attacks. That is… terrorism has no nationality. I mean, the government has cooperated, in unearthing that Bombay incident. So they cannot whip up war hysteria because the government is not involved; and the army, and the ISI is not involved.

Frost: I see, ya. The, the chief justice, Mr. Chaudhry, umh said in a couple of quotes that he was investigating the question which I’ve read articles about and, [inaudible: therefore I wanted to ask you about] investigating the question of missing people, during your presidency, people who were detained or abducted in some way; how many such people were there, do you think?

Musharraf: This is quite a populist kind of a…

Frost:Ya.

Musharraf: …action. Unfortunately, I know the reality. They were initially talking of about 114, 115 missing people. These missing people are those who have joined some kind of Jihad somewhere, either Kashmir, or Afghanistan. I know one of the leaders, a person, a lady, who is talking of her husband missing. I personally know, because we investigated that, that he was involved in Jihad. If you see his photograph, you will say yourself, yes, this man must have gone somewhere and done something. They are missing on their own. We know that many young people went for Jihad into Kashmir, on their own, left their homes. I know of a school in Sargodha, one of the very prestigeous public schools, from where two children, two students, were missing. Their parents wrote to me, when I was the president, and we found out where they were. They were indoctrinated, and they went for Jihad, they went for Jihad.

Frost: I see

Musharraf: So these are the people who go on their own, and then people are talking of them being missing. They are missing on their own. They have left homes and gone for Jihad somewhere or the other.

Frost: So what you’re saying is that none of the missing people were… there were no government involvement or police involvement…

Musharraf: Not at all.

Frost: in abducting them…

Musharraf: Not at all.

Frost:You are saying that they did it, did it vol… The missing persons are missing, you are saying, because of their own decisions?

Musharraf: Yes. Dozens of Mujahideen groups, independent Mujahideen groups had come up, and people were joining them and going, and then this Taleban activity, people are going there. So therefore people from south Punjab, many I know, have gone and joined these… trying to join Taleban. So these are people who then are said to be missing, or whatever.

Frost: And so that… what you are saying obviously is that if Mr. Chaudhry does investigate the missing persons he, he’ll, he won’t come up with anything?

Musharraf: No he must investigate. Yes, he won’t come up with anything. He must investigate. [inaudible] he is saying…

Frost: You’d welcome that.

Musharraf: Yes, indeed. Yes, indeed. This is going on since two years, I think, two or three years, this missing persons; why don’t they investigate, OK investigate, and find out.

Frost: And what do you feel about the United States, is their use of drones something that you welcome, or do you deplore it?

Musharraf: No…

Frost: …use of drones, over Pakistan?

Musharraf: Yea. Ayee, it’s a Catch-22 situation, as far as these drones are concerned. Err, we cannot allow any foreign force to attack on our side of the border. We must use our own forces and whatever resources are lacking, Pakistan must be given those resources. What these drones see are obviously much more than we have through human intelligence. Our… we bank on human intelligence, and also some technical intelligence. So it is human intelligence, technological, and this aerial surveillance. We don’t have any kind of aerial surveillance. From the air you can certainly see what is going on on ground. Any militant activity, goups of people who are doing military training, and with weapons and concentrated in some areas. So while we would like to certainly attack them, we must attack them, because they are doing carrying out militancy, now on many occasions Pakistan forces are handicapped on attacking them in those remote areas, in a short time, before they, they vanish. I mean they are not there permanently. So therefore the need of attacking militancy on our side is definitely there, but it must be by our own forces. The resources must be provided to Pakistan. So therefore to that extent I would be against, certainly, no Pakistani would be in favour of any drone attacks. Why don’t… why isn’t Pakistan being given the drones?

Frost: So that, you’d oppose that, for those reasons?

Musharraf: Yea.

Frost: Why isn’t Pakistan not given those drones.

Musharraf: We must be provided with all the resources.

Frost: Do you think tht in fact things have changed for the better with the coming of President Obama? Do you, do you like what you see so far, or are you neutral?

Musharraf: I think he’s… I don’t see any change, really. I mean, what is the change as far as terrorism and extremism is concerned? And as far as our region and Afghanistan is concerned? There is no change. Force is required; he has taken the decision to send more force. So, what was happening in the past? There was force requirement, and he’s following exactly the same strategy.

Frost: Hearing you talk, today, President Musharraf, the… It’s clear you’re still obviously fascinated in the subject of Pakistan, and the subjects that dominated your life, in the period when you were running Pakistan, so could you be tempted back into politics, if people wanted you?

Musharraf: [Laughs] I really don’t know, I wouldn’t be able to comment at the moment. My… I always have coined a term, ‘Pakistan first’; that caught on, it’s Urdu version is ‘sab say pahlay Pakistan‘ Pakistan first. It caught on so much and… I am proud of that. So I still believe in that. Pakistan comes first. I hope and pray that the government handles Pakistan, does well for Pakistan, as I said, progress and development of the state, welfare and well-being of its people. If they can ensure this, I’ll be the happiest man. But if this is not ensured, and Pakistan is on a nosedive or a self-destruct mechanism is on and we are going and then if I, if I, can contribute something, to… to rectify the situation, certainly, I will, my life is, for the country, for Pakistan.

Frost: Well, thank you for being with us. We have covered a great deal of ground in this conversation, and we thank you very much for it, President Musharraf.

Musharraf: Thank you very much David.

Frost: Former President Musharraf, there.

Musharraf’s Speech  (Video)

Q&A session with Musharraf  (Video)

Bismillah Rehman Ur Rahim.

Aroon Puri Sahab, excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen. It is indeed my proud privilege to be speaking to such an august gathering. I would like to express my gratitude first of all to Aroon Purie sahab for having invited me and then giving me this opportunity to speak frankly to this august gathering. I would also like to express my gratitude to all of you for being here together and for honouring me. I would also like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the officials of Government of India for all the care that they have taken and they are taking for my security and protocol. Thank you very much ladies & gentlemen.

The subject that I have been given to speak is indeed the challenge of change. I am presuming, obviously, that the challenge of change in the context of Indo-Pakistan relations and not the world. So therefore, I presume ki yeh ek apas ki baat hain, apas ki baat karni hai and we have to be very frank and forthright in this apas ki baat. The subject indeed is most apt. It is apt because it rally depicts what is happening in the world, in our region and also may I say in our respective countries and there is an urgent requirement of a change. But when we say change, I take it implies breaking the status-quo, burying the past, moving forward positively. That, to be exact, is the essence of my speech or my lecture today.

Ladies & gentlemen, I stand for peace. Peace between Indian and Pakistan, whether you believe it or not, irrespective of all the cover, what you have said on the cover. And I mean every word of it again whether you believe it or not. I stand for peace, for the sake of the whole world, which today considers our region as a nuclear flashpoint. I stand for peace for the sake of our region, the South Asian region, where progress and development is tied to harmony between India and Pakistan. I stand for peace for the sake of the people of our two countries. The down-trodden, toiling masses of India and Pakistan and I stand for peace for the sake of our future generation to whom we owe a better life and a better environment.

Yes, indeed Mr. Aroon Purie, I was being advised against coming, even by my daughter – because of her concern for me nothing else. Because of her concern for me against the extremist reactions, negative reactions by the extremists on both sides, in India and Pakistan. But I decided to come. I decided to come to prove a point that the extremist must not have their way. We the moderates must guide events. We the moderates must stand for resolution of all issues, of all disputes, between us for everlasting peace and we must not allow the extremist to create obstacles in the way of that peace of that direction towards peace. I know that the people of Pakistan desire peace, I know it for sure and I would like to tell all of you that, that is the reality. But they would like to have peace with honour and dignity, not a peace through coercion – a peace with sovereign equality.

Ladies & gentlemen, my credentials as a man for peace, you must differentiate a man of peace from a man for peace. I can’t be a man of peace because I have been solider. So I am a man of war but I am a man for peace and my credentials are proven by all my actions, the action that I have been taking in all the years that I have been at the helm of affairs. It was I who started/initiated the thawing of the relations between India and Pakistan. When I rang up Prime Minister Vajpayee after your most unfortunate earthquake in the year 2000 in Gujarat and I offered support from Pakistan. It was again Prime Minister Vajpayee and myself, I who finalized the draft joint declaration after the Agra Summit in July 2001 which would have formed the basis for durable peace.

The drafting of this declaration was indeed done at the highest level, by me myself, Foreign Minister of Pakistan Mr. Abdus Sattar, Prime Minister Vajpayee and your Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh sahab. We did the drafting. It is just unfortunate that some force behind the scene sabotaged this attempt twice where we could not finally reach an agreement on this joint declaration. Subsequently, we again went into the cold situation of the past, till a very unfortunate occurrence of the attack on your Parliament in December 2001 and what followed was very furious indeed. Firstly you went for a troop build-up, all the Indian forces moved on our border, including the forces on the Eastern command and we reciprocated of course. So there was a force stand of for almost one long year between us with the forces eye-ball to eye-ball contact.

Another thing that happened and I saw was that all along this one year there was a war hysteria that was whipped up in the public in India and if I may be allowed to say, by whom. By your political leadership and also the media. If I was to take a dig at India Today, maybe your magazine or your India Today also, that was the situation here. On our side, I tried my utmost to cool tempers. And you can read any of my statements or whatever I did, my actions. If you remember, my role was positive throughout. In January, just one and half months after this and during this stand of I decided to go for a handshake with Prime Minister Vajpayee at Katmandu during the SAARC summit in January 2002, to defuse the situation. And throughout this one year I was insisting on de-escalation, reduction of tension, I was asking for dialogue.

Ultimately, ladies and gentlemen war was averted. Thank God! These peace overtures finally led to the SAARC Summit in Islamabad in January 2004 and it resulted in the Islamabad resolution which stipulated resumption of dialogue and initiating confidence building measures for resolving all our disputes. That was very good. But Ladies and Gentlemen we lost two and a half years since the Agra summit in July 2001. So we restarted the same process. We also started the back-channel diplomacy. And then in India there was a change of Government – BJP lost and the Congress took over the reins of the Government. The good thing was despite this change the peace process did not get derailed, it continued and we came for the Delhi summit between myself and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. That was in April 2005. And after this Delhi summit we issued a joint statement which stipulated very importantly, the peace process being irreversible and that purposeful dialogue on Kashmir to be initiated for its final settlement. That was all very good. But again Ladies & Gentlemen, we lost another one and half years. So if you see from the Agra Summit in July 2001 and now it was April 2005, we lost four years. And again we were at the same point, good intentions of moving forward towards peace.

If you allow, I would like to digress a little and give you a very interesting episode during this Delhi Summit where myself and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh went to see the one-day cricket match between India and Pakistan. And there we were batting and Afridi, our great hitter whenever he is in form, was informed so he was hitting every ball for a six or a four to the boundary and the ball used to come near our enclosure every time. It was very embarrassing and whenever he hit, I would start looking left and right so that I avoid looking at, I don’t know what he is doing over there. And the match continued and then we left and went for the official meeting and at the meeting, I told Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, I said Mr. Prime Minister I suggest although we are not scheduled to go for the closing ceremony, let us go for the closing ceremony also and let us do the prize distribution. He did talk about security problems, but then he very graciously agreed that we would go and I said very good and we started our discussion. But during the meeting my MS, my Military Secretary always had instructions whenever there is match or some kind of interesting thing going on, keep me informed even during important discussions, so every time he would enter with a chit. Maybe Prime Minister Manmohan Singh thought that he is giving me some important discussion point, actually he was giving me the cricket score. And I used to look at the chit and in that chit every time India loses two wickets, they are two down, the next chit comes after another half-an-hour, forty-five minutes, they have lost another one or two wickets.

Finally, when they had lost eight wickets I told Prime Minister Mr. Manmohan Singh, I said Mr. Prime Minister it appears that your team is sabotaging our attempts to go for the ceremony and that is exactly what happened when the team was all out before we could go. However, please don’t take it that I am thinking that Pakistan team is great. I think your team is a great team and they are playing much better than ours these days. And Afreedi is not at all in form like he was at that time.

So, coming back to the subject, Ladies & Gentlemen, we also took a lot of other bold steps. I declared a unilateral ceasefire on the Line of Control, a unilateral ceasefire which was reciprocated by India, by you and it is still holding out. We have save so many lives and so much loss of property. The idea of the Srinagar Muzafarabad Bus Service and also opening of maybe five more routes for travel across the Line of Control and a transit trade relationship came from our side. And also may I say after the devastating earthquake in Kashmir on both sides and our frontier province in 2005, I even said that we need to open the line of control totally for relief operation on both sides.

Ladies and Gentlemen, may I very honestly and sincerely say that I was not doing all this for any showmanship or for any point scoring. I was doing all this with a very sincere understanding and a very sincere conviction that the path of peace is the right course to be adopted for Pakistan and for India and for this whole region and for the whole world.

Ladies and Gentlemen we have done enough damage to each other over all these years since our coming into being. We have fought three wars. We fought a number of mini wars and we have had a cold war throughout since 1947. I strongly believe that we should try for peace now with equal zeal as we tried confronting each other. The twenty-first century is a century of geo-economics they say and they also say that the nineteenth century belonged to Europe, the twentieth century belonged to the United States and they say that the twenty-first century belongs to Asia. The question that comes to my mind is are we the South Asians poised to be a part of this Asian century of progress and development. The answer that I gave to myself is no. We are not, I am afraid we are not. While South-east Asia, East Asia, North-east Asia, China, Australia they are all cooperating for economic development, South Asia, Central Asia, this region is out of the loop. It is out of the loop because the only reason out of the loop because of Indo-Pakistan acrimony and hostility. The three most serious challenges common to both India and Pakistan that we have to face together and separately in our respective countries are:-

(i) The curse of terrorism and extremism

(ii) Poverty and underdevelopment; and

(iii) Hostility between our two countries.

These are the three issues I think which we have to address and resolve to move forward, together as I said and separately in our respective countries. Our social indicators, maybe, are the worst in the world. Maybe we are the most illiterate, most backward and the poorest. There are hundreds of millions of people who live below the poverty line. The situation indeed demands, bold and affirmative action. We must overcome the burden of history. That is what I feel to move forward. We must look at the present realities and we must work for the future. We have to cooperate to rise together and I have always said for the sake of the people, for the sake of toiling masses of our two countries, we can draw a lesson from Europe. Europe was at each other’s throats. They were warring for centuries, even outside their boundaries in other parts of the world, in South America, in Africa and in Asia they were warring with each other. But then they realized the dividends of peace and may I say they decided to put aside the burden of history and therefore, now we see the European Union, their common currency the Euro and their cooperation for progress and development. I think we need to learn a lesson from them. We must also see the dividends of peace that will accrue.

On the issue of trade, I think at the bilateral level there will be manifold increase in trade. I am sure we all will agree. In the few years of reproachma when during my tenure at the helm of affairs in Pakistan were our relations indeed irrespective of the covers, was the best ever between India and Pakistan, the relation between India and Pakistan I think in those years. During those years, the trade, the importable items to Pakistan, I know increased from two hundred to one thousand four hundred. That benefitted both sides Pakistan as well as India. So, therefore, I know bilaterally the trade will increase manifold to our mutual advantage. Intra-regionally, there will be interaction as far as Pakistan is concerned, maybe we have a road access to Nepal and Bangladesh. As far as India is concerned, you will have a road access to Afghanistan. Inter-regionally the South Asia and India in particular, could interact with Central Asia, could interact with the Gulf, could interact with Iran and IPI pipeline is the case in point. So certainly economically we stand to gain immeasurably. On the defence side, there will be certainly a defence expenditure reduction, more resources diverted towards development, well-being and welfare of the people. Our fight against terrorism and extremism will be more coordinated. With cooperation from each other we will able to fight it more strongly.

SAARC, the only organization representing South Asia will be rejuvenated from all points of view. Tourism will boom especially religious tourism on both sides – there are so many people who would like to come to India and so many people in Pakistan and so many people in India you know because you have your revered Hindu shrines in Pakistan, Sikh shrines in Pakistan, Buddhist localities in Pakistan. So there will be a tremendous boom on the tourism side. I don’t think we need anybody else coming in because there will be millions of people coming and going from our two countries. The question that I ask myself – is such a dream of peace possible? And the answer is yes indeed, it is possible. But it is made difficult when we funnel public hatred within our public, for political expediency and also through a negative media, taking the public apart, increasing the gulf between the people of the two countries and the key to progress on peace lies in the affinity of the people of the two countries. If instead of bringing them closer to each other, if we were take actions where we are increasing the gulf between them – that is certainly not the direction of peace. The start point in my mind is to reduce the trust deficit through very genuine confidence building measures.

We must avoid hyper reaction. We must avoid war hysteria, whipping up war hysteria in the public, creating hatred in the public because of any terrorist attack that may have taken place. We must realize that we are the victims and we have to go for solutions together. We are victims together of terrorism and extremism and we have to go together to solutions for terrorism and extremism. So let us not create such a hysteria in our public where coming together becomes difficult, where cooperation on the issue of terrorism and extremism becomes almost impossible.

Having done this, improving the environment, we must then take on resolution of disputes with true sincerity, flexibility and boldness. These are the three qualities that are required because the last element, boldness, unless boldness is there sincerity and flexibility and understanding is useless and meaningless. Because if you don’t have the boldness to go for the solution, and solutions may I say are very much possible, if our niyath and I am not purposely saying intention, because I don’t think niyat means intentions, it is far bigger, deeper than intentions. Niyat comes from the heart, intention I think is only from the mind. If the Niyat is there from the heart and minds, solutions to our problems are very much possible.

I would like to give very short comments on each of our dispute. And the first one that I want to take on is Kashmir itself. We have to head for a solution. I had given a formula which was my idea, which could form the basis for moving forward and taking it towards a solution and the formula included identifying the zones of Kashmir, going for graduated demilitarization, especially from the cities, going out of cities so that the people of Kashmir can heave a sigh of relief and giving maximum self-governance to the people of Kashmir and having some kind of an over-watch on the self-governance. We thought of even making the Line of Control irrelevant. I think this is another Berlin wall which needs to torn down and not kept as a water-tight Berlin wall where people cannot even meet each other families and relations.

Then is the issue, and may I say lot of progress was made in the general direction that I have said and I am very proud of being a part of that progress that we made, Siachen is the other dispute. I think it is the easiest to solve because I think both of us are suffering. And may I hasten to add the Indian soldier is suffering far more than the Pakistani soldier because of the weather and terrain hazards that you face. And also may I say that there is an environmental hazard now in Siachen where the glacier is melting down. So for the sake of peace, for the sake of environment, we need to reach an accord. We must disengage and demilitarize. I think it can be done very easily.

Sir Creek is the third issue/ dispute. The significance of Sir Creek is no longer land it is more extended into the sea, into the EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone). Well we have carried out a joint survey and completed the joint survey during my being at the helm of affairs. And we certainly have a very clear idea of the problem. We must go for a compromise solution, that is very much possible. Even if in this zone, if all the mineral wealth of the world and all the oil and gas of the world is within this area that we are fighting for, we must find a common solution. And it is very easy.

Lastly is the water dispute. Ladies and Gentlemen, I think futuristically this has potents of danger. We must not open new fronts and we must stick to the water treaty, Indus Water Treaty.

Having identified the disputes, I feel we must show resolve to solve these disputes and to start and in the words of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, “we must pick the threads again” from where we left and start moving forward. We must start meetings for the dispute resolution at the Committees level and at the summit level. We must also initiate confidence building measures without any loss of time, we must stop unconsidered accusations against each other and also we must stop meddling in each other’s domestic affairs. And then we should also restart the back channel. I think it is very useful.

My hope, having said all this, Ladies and Gentlemen, is that the public and civil society at both ends, in India and Pakistan, and the media should play a positive role to put pressure on our respective Governments to go for peace, make progress towards resolution of disputes and ultimate peace. In this globalized world we all understand the significance and the importance of the media. The media can create perceptions on the positive side as well as the negative side. It is the cry of the day and the environment today that the media must create positivity and be positive for the sake of, as I said the toiling masses, because peace will be a win-win for both, especially for the people of Pakistan and India. So let the media and the political leadership show positivity.

Having said all this, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am coming towards the close. I would be remiss if having travelled all the way from Islamabad to Delhi, and had this opportunity to address such an august gathering at this very prestigious India Today Conclave afforded by Aroon Purie sahab, I was not to open my heart to you and talk very frankly, not that I haven’t talked very frankly in the past, but I would like to go for some more frank talk. And I do expect a very frank question and answer session, a very frank question session and a more frank answer session.

Firstly, Ladies and Gentlemen, there is a dire need of an attitudinal change, at both ends – more in India, less in Pakistan. Please bear out with me. We have to or you have to accept the reality and the sovereign equality of Pakistan, because I know that in some quarter this is not acceptable. We have to change and we have to improve public perceptions of each other. The perceptions of Pakistan in India are poor and I sincerely think so. Why are there poor? Why do you perceive Pakistan to be poor, to be bad from all points of view? And I say this with authority having interacted with many Indians who have come to Pakistan and when I go abroad. We see Pakistan bashing in your political campaigns. We see Pakistan bashing, Pakistan army bashing, ISI bashing and maligning of our society in your media, including India Today Sir. And I do read India Today, because you have a good magazine and certainly it is a lot of reading material. It creates misperception of Pakistan in the public. Therefore, whenever Indians come to Pakistan, and I have met so many of them, they get very pleasantly surprised when they see what we have in Pakistan and when they meet people, and their attitude, the attitudes of the people of Pakistan. What I see that either the people who come there do not know us, they don’t know anything about Pakistan or they have very negative distorted impressions of Pakistan and many of them have told me that they thought that things are this, this, however they see that it is very different.

Also talking very frankly of attitudes, I remember when Advani sahab came to Pakistan and I think he praised or said some good words about Qaid-e-Azam, Mohd. Ali Zinnah, and I remember the uproar here in India and I think he was forced to resign or he was forced to do something or the other. I am told by a very avid reader, a friend of mine, who comes here, he says he visits the book-stores, all book-stores. He says that on Qaid-e-Azam, you will not find a positive book in the book-stores of India – I am talking about Delhi and other cities. The one that he saw was, ‘Zinnah the man who broke India’. I would like to ask you what drawing a simile, what should Pakistan’s attitude be towards Bangladesh for that matter. We had a very violent separation. Should we live in our history, hate each other. I think we have buried the past. We have undone this burden of history. It was terrible. In fact when I went to Bangladesh many years back and they took me to the monument of their 1971 monument, it is quite embarrassing for me. I wrote there words to the effect that, maybe I am slipping up on a few words, that the courage needed to reconcile and compromise is far greater than that needed to confront and fight. I am prepared to show that courage. I hope there is reciprocation. I think we need to change this attitude of ours, between our two countries, show that courage to reconcile and compromise.

May I say that this hate campaign is to quite an extent one sided. I don’t see any India bashing or very little India bashing in Pakistan’s political campaign. So I think we need to correct the situation, try to improve images of each other. Because I believe we cannot as I said get closer and hope for peace if the people of the two countries hate each other or there is great divide or there is a gulf between the people. As I said we have to create positivity and one hopes that all this august gathering the civil society of India and Pakistan, and the media of India and Pakistan create this positivity so that the people start getting closer towards each other. And this was happening in the past few years but all these events of terrorism and extremism which I am going to talk now have created that negativity again which needs correction. One does understand that India is a large country, you have very strong forces. But Pakistan is also not a small country and our armed forces are also not of any mean strength.

So, therefore, Ladies and Gentlemen, we have to understand that Pakistan cannot be coerced; the people of Pakistan cannot accept and live with corerce. India has to show magnanimity and humility and I know that you will gain in stature when you show magnanimity and humility in your bigness. One cannot be a large country with a small heart.

The second point that I want to make of the attitudinal change is that we have to resolve all our disputes, especially Kashmir, without any loss of time, because it is impacting negatively on our respective societies. And I want to make two points on this issue of resolution of disputes. Number one Ladies and Gentlemen, as I have learnt through my own job training of the eight-nine years, that resolution of disputes involves a give and take. It cannot be a take and take. And it is the give part which is the difficulty and that is where leadership demands, there is a demand on the leadership to be bold enough to give on both side, then only can you reach conclusions, otherwise you will never reach conclusions, you will never reach peace, you cannot resolve disputes if you think you can take everything.

The second point that I want to make in the resolution of disputes, fleeting opportunities, Ladies and Gentlemen, do not last forever. They come for maybe a short period. The demand on the leadership is to grasp that fleeting moment and that is why I said it needs boldness. You cannot allow the fleeting moment to go by because it is not going to last forever. So, I only hope that the leadership on both sides grasp fleeting opportunities and they bring peace above.

The last point that I want to make is on the issue of terrorism and extremism which indeed is a curse for all of us. It has to be defeated. But how? How to defeat terrorism and extremism – in the world, in the region, in Pakistan, in India, how to defeat it? Firstly, we have to have a very realistic and clear understanding of the root causes of terrorism and extremism. And then addressing those root causes is the critical issue, otherwise Ladies and Gentlemen we will fail. We can fight for centuries against terrorism as it exists now, if we don’t address the root causes, it will carry on and on and on. We have to adopt a holistic approach towards eliminating terrorism and extremism and here I would like to point out, very frankly, that we must consider some ground realities in India also. I am going to talk about Pakistan also. Please don’t take it that I am just here to give a lecture to the Indians on what is happening here, I do understand the environment in Pakistan also. But we have to understand these things, we have to talk very frankly about them, we have to understand them and we need to address them. And if we all behave like Ostriches with our heads in the sand, well then we won’t reach any kind of peace.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Kashmir remains the key dispute and the sore point. We had a freedom struggle since 1947 going on and from 1989 onwards this non-violent movement turned into a militant struggle. This has a direct impact on Pakistan’s society. There is an emotional involvement of the people of Pakistan with the people of Kashmir. There is public sympathy in the people of Pakistan for the people of Kashmir. Therefore, this has given rise to dozens of freelance mujahedeen groups and it is encouraging militancy in the Pakistan society which certainly needs to be controlled. But the task of controlling these dozens of militant groups who have come up since 1989, is not easy, it is very difficult. And I personally feel that dispute resolution is the only permanent solution and we must go to the dispute resolution.

The story also does not end at Kashmir, Ladies and Gentlemen. New phenomenon of terrorism and extremism have erupted in your society and in Pakistan’s society. If you need to address the alienation and the frustration of the minoritisation, in general and the Muslims in particular, in India as a result of some prejudices, unequal opportunities, may be some atrocities are leading to extremism within the Muslim youth here. This needs cognizance and correction at our level with the Government policies. As I said please don’t think that I am not cognizant about what is happening in Pakistan’s society. We face challenges from four facets of terrorism and extremism.

We face the challenge of terrorism from Al Quida, we face the challenge of terrorism from militant Taliban, we face of the challenge of extremism of the Talibanisation of the Tribal districts of the frontier province, we face the challenge of extremism in our society. I know that we evolved strategy to deal with each one of these four. So please understand, I am talking very bluntly and in a straight-forward manner, but please understand that there are problems in India, there are problems in Pakistan, there are problems in this whole region and in the world. We need to understand those core issues and the problems, strike and go for the resolution of those core issues, I always have been saying drawing a simile between terrorism and extremism with a tree.

If you kill terrorists, wherever anything happens whether it is Bombay, Lahore or anywhere, you have plucked leaves of a tree. The leaves will grow again, maybe in great numbers. If you are able to cut off any terrorist organization, you have chopped of one branch of that tree, the tree will continue to grow. You have to get to the root of that tree, uproot that tree, then only will you end terrorism and extremism and that is root that I always keep talking about. That is the root which the world has to understand and we have to understand in this region, you have to understand in your own country and we have to understand in our own country. My belief has always been that terrorism is born from the womb of festering political disputes.

 Chronological record of events, that validates President Musharraf’s election as President and  subsequent endorsements by Supreme Court

Written by: Afreen Baig

1-      On 13 May 2000, Pakistan’s 12 member Supreme Court unanimously validated the October 1999 coup and granted Musharraf executive and legislative authority for 3 years from the coup date. Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was one of the judges that validated. (Link)

2-      On 7 October 2002, the 5 member bench of Supreme Court validated LFO and amendments to constitution. Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was one of the judges that validated. (Link)

3-      On 29 Dec 2004, PML-Q government passed the 17th constitutional amendment bill in National Assembly, with 2/3 majority, also approved by Senate that allowed President Musharraf to hold dual offices. (Link)

4-      Constitution of Pakistan – Article 63 clause (1) paragraph (d), read with proviso to Article 41 clause (7) paragraph (b), allows the President to hold dual office.

5-      On 13 April 2005, the 5 member bench of Supreme Court gave judgment in favor of 17^th amendment and President’s uniform. Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was one of the judges that validated. (Link)

6-      On 28 September 2007, the Supreme Court cleared the way for President Pervez Musharraf to seek another five-year term, and stand for Presidential elections, when six of the nine judges, rejected a tangle of petitions against him and threw out a major legal challenge to his re-election plans. Presided by Justice Rana Bhagwandas. (Link)

7-      President Musharraf was elected President of Pakistan, on 6th October 2007, by a combined electoral of the Senate, National Assembly and the FOUR Provincial Assembles.

8-      President of Pakistan declared emergency on 3^rd November 2007, as per Article 232 of the constitution.

9-      The 10 member bench of Supreme Court (SC) on 24 November 2007 directed the chief election commissioner and the government to declare Pervez Musharraf president for a second term. (Link)

10-  On 24 November 2007, the Pakistan Election Commission confirmed Musharraf’s re-election as President. (Link)

11-  President Musharraf won by 58% votes, declared in November 2007, as the constitutional President of Pakistan!

12-   On 28 November 2007, Musharraf relinquished the office of Chief of Armed Staff, as per November 2007 verdict of the Supreme Court.

13-   On 15 Feb 2008, the Supreme Court validated the proclamation of emergency of 3rd Nov 2007, PCO 2007 and oath of the judges. This full court judgment was written by Chief Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar. (Link)

These facts above raise serious questions regarding the credibility of those so-called political intellects and experts of judicial matters that appear on media talk shows, accusing President Musharraf of violating the constitution, thereby seeking to apply Article-6 on him. They do so, merely for publicity and self exposure, overlooking the role of the Judiciary all along and misguiding the public to zenith. They should know that the Parliament and the Supreme Court, has approved and endorsed every single decision taken by President Musharraf. President Musharraf – being the President of Pakistan was the rightful authority to sign amendments to the constitution, after being approved by the Senate.

Article 270-AA of the constitution gives full protection to the 17th amendment and the 1999 coup, which cannot be called into question in any court of the country on any ground what-so-ever. The 17th amendment was approved by the National Assembly by 2/3 majority and made into law, as part of the constitution.

Then, the Constitution (Amendment) Order, 1980, (P.O.No.1 of 1980) section 2 clauses (3A), (3B) and (3C) give full protection and immunity to Martial Law Regulation made by the Chief Martial Law Administrators, any sentence passed by a Military Court or Tribunal, Chief Martial Law Administrator or a Martial Law Administrator or any person acting under the authority of either, and cannot be called into question in any court.

Then, Article 248 clauses (1) (2) (3) (4) of the constitution, protects the President, and he shall not be answerable to any court for the exercise of powers and performance of functions of his respective office, no criminal proceedings whatsoever shall be instituted or continued against the President or a Governor in any court during his term of office and no process for the arrest or imprisonment of the President or a Governor shall issue from any court during his term of office.

All of President Musharraf’s decisions were according to the constitution, approved by the supreme Parliament and endorsed by the Supreme Court.

Despite these above mentioned facts and articles as per the constitution, if those prejudiced intellects and revenge seeking politicians, call to apply Article-6 on President Musharraf, then they should know the article in full.

Article-6 clause (2): Any person aiding or abetting the acts mentioned in clause (1) shall likewise be guilty of high treason.

Which clearly indicates – that the Supreme Court and the Parliament itself that approved and endorsed the events from 1999 till 2007 shall be held equally responsible, for abetting, if a case ever arises. Yet, as Article-6 itself is NOT a self governing article, that could decide and instigate itself automatically, hence Article-6 provides a clause, leaving it to the supreme Parliament to decide, if and whenever, such a case arises and is brought to the attention of the Parliament.

Article-6 clause (3): [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)] shall by law provide for the punishment of persons found guilty of high treason.

Other than the supreme Parliament, no other institution can approve nor apply Article-6. 

Afreen Baig is an independent analyst majoring in International Relations and Economics. She can be reached at afreenbaig@gmail.com

By: Tariq Saeedi, with Sergi Pyatakov in Moscow and Mark Davidson in Washington

Mumbai episode is the latest in a long and nefarious story that started unfolding some 16 months ago in the barren hills of Baluchistan, a sparsely populated province in western Pakistan.

 After more than 22000 kilometers of road and rail travel, endless legwork chasing small and seemingly unrelated clues, hundreds of interviews and many dozens of field trips, all we have been able to do is just remove the lid on the American designs on Pakistan and India. Equally disturbing is the reality that Central Asia, China and Russia are also in the crosshairs of the United States. What we have found is sheer in scope, mind-boggling and frightening.

 The USA seems to have decided to:

• Bifurcate Pakistan using all possible means, including the religious elements that can be bought, coerced or tricked;
• Pull the plug on the Indian and Pakistani economies by creating a situation of perpetual confrontation;
• Prevent India from becoming an economic rival of the United States in foreseeable future by denying it the energy resources of Central Asia and Iran, and draining its precious human and material assets in dead-end pursuits;
• Promote drug addiction in South and Central Asia so that all the opium produced in Afghanistan is consumed in the region and little or none is left for export to the American markets;
• Block the economic growth and expanding regional influence of China and Russia;
• Acquire logistics facilities and infrastructure network for military action against Iran;

The Bumper Crop of Spies

We started working on this story in July 2007 on a vague tip that some foreign spies had been caught in the Pakistani province of Balochistan. We traveled to Balochistan and started talking to people who had many interesting things to tell.

“They caught a spy transmitting from the backroom of a pharmacy in Dalbandin,” said a local shopkeeper.

“Yes, it was about eleven in the night. They caught him without any trouble.” said his friend.

The capture of another spy was rather hilarious.

“He was dressed like a Baloch, and he looked like a Baloch,” said a shepherd.

 ”But we knew immediately that he was not a Baloch and we tipped a militia patrol,” he added.

“How did you know he was not a Baloch,” we asked.

His brief explanation: “He was not walking like a Baloch.”

It is easy to understand the shepherd if you have ever seen a real Baloch in motion. The lilt and majesty of Baloch gait is inimitable.

Another spy was pretending to be a bush.

“The spy was concealed in a small bush on ——– [name of the mountain omitted deliberately],” told a farmer in a settlement opposite Ahmedwal town.

“Why did you think it was not just a bush like any other bush,” we asked.

“There was no bush there the day before,” was his simple reply.

Because of the keen observation and vigilance of the locals, five spies were caught in less than two months. There were at least three others, who were detected but managed to escape. It is difficult to say as to how many more operated unnoticed, completed their work and went back to wherever they came from.

What was significant was that the locals said that four of the five captured spies were Amreeki (Americans).

This sudden surge in American spies was inexplicable.

We decided to consult Sasha and Misha, two retired KGB colonels, living in a quieter district of Moscow.

Back to Sasha and Misha

 Sasha and Misha (not their real names), are retired KGB colonels and top-notch experts on Afghanistan and Pakistan. They were among the architects of the original BLA (Balochistan Liberation Army) during the Russo-Afghan war. They know Balochistan better than anyone else we ever met.

 Afghanistan and Pakistan are their first love and like faithful lovers they always keep tab on what is happening in that part of the world. And, they are in touch with many of their old contacts.

 ”There can be many reasons for increased espionage. It usually indicates some major shift in policy or preparation for a big operation. Looking at other developments, I would say that it is the both. The Americans are going for a major shift in their policy toward Pakistan and they may also be putting together some big operations,” said Sasha.

 ”Go look for something unorthodox,” added Misha.

 The trouble with Misha is that he speaks Cryptese. With his inherent fondness for crosswords, anagrams and puzzles, Misha is almost always difficult to decipher.

 ”Unorthodox what,” we asked in exasperation.

 ”Such as Yankee-Jihadi marriage,” said Misha with a naughty twinkle in his eyes that suddenly made him look much younger.

It was clear that we were not going to get anything more from the duo before doing some spadework.

Yankee-Jihadi Marriage

We turned our attention back to Balochistan and patched into the local grapevine.

Misha’s phrase ‘Yankee-Jihadi Marriage’ was the key we were trying on every lock.

Something seemed to click after a while.

There was buzz that a representative of a jihadi outfit recently had a meeting with an American in the Sadabahar area at the edge of Quetta. This was the beginning of August 2007 and the meeting was unusual. Americans of all descriptions travel frequently between Afghanistan and Pakistan but they were not known, till then, to seek clandestine meetings with jihadi elements.

According to our source, the representative of the jihadi outfit was a burly man in mid thirties with medium-length, thick beard. In Sadabahar, where the compound walls are typically high, he met an American who was dressed like a Pushtun. The meeting lasted more than three hours and the jihadi left with a canvas bag full of cash.

We could not identify the American but we managed to trace the jihadi to a splinter group of LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba).

As is known, LeT is not a single entity; it is more like a brand name, used by many groups with diverse objectives and split loyalties.

The jihadi went to Karachi and met a colleague in Shah Faisal Colony and apparently gave him some of the cash he received from the American in Quetta. This assumption is based on the fact that the jihadi’s colleague in Shah Faisal Colony purchased a flashy SUV a few days later.

We returned to Sasha and Misha.

Money Explodes

“It cannot be an isolated phenomenon. There must be something before and after it. Look for patterns, always look for patterns,” said Sasha.

Misha said, “This money will explode. It will explode in many places.”

It was early September 2007, and Misha’s black prediction was not long in coming true.

BB [Benazir Bhutto, former prime minister of Pakistan] returned to Pakistan on 18 October 2007 after nearly eight years of self-imposed exile, and her huge convoy was hit by suicide bombers en-route to the mausoleum of the father of the nation. Hundreds were killed and wounded but BB escaped unharmed.

Was there any connection between the suicide attack on BB’s convoy and the American funding of a jihadi outfit?

Instead of jumping to conclusions, we went back to Sasha and Misha.

Look at the whole picture

“Look at the whole picture. Never get distracted; look at the whole picture,” said Sasha.

“That is what we are here for – show us the whole picture, or at least as much of the picture as you can,” we said.

Sasha looked Misha in the eyes for a few seconds. It is disconcerting, the way they can communicate with each other silently and make you feel dumb.

There seemed to be some kind of accord.

“OK, let’s a bit of picture for you,” said Sasha.

He started, “BB has hired the lobbying firm BKSH & Associates in a six-month contract for US $ 250000. It is the same firm that is working for Hillary Clinton.

“Burson-Marsteller is the parent company of BKSH and pollster Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates is its affiliate. Mark Penn is the president of Penn Schoen and CEO of Burson-Marsteller and he is also the chief advisor of Clinton in her presidential campaign.

“Now that Republicans are sure they cannot win the elections, they are betting on Hilary. She is a Republican among Democrats and by looking at her policy stance as senator, I can say confidently that if she wins the elections or finds her way into the new administration, she would continue with the Republican foreign policy. She is the last hope of Neocons.

“It is no coincidence that BB decided at this very time to return to Pakistan and hired BKSH to lobby for her in Washington.”

“She has been chosen as pillion rider to a wayward Musharraf,” interjected Misha.

“Yes,” continued Sasha, “she is the chosen pillion rider but there are likely other plans, several of them in fact; a dead BB would be more useful for Washington.”

Complicating the picture

“It is a rather confusing picture you are painting. First we find that Americans are funding a splinter group of LeT, then you predict that the money given to that jihadi outfit will lead to ‘explosions’ and now you are saying that BB was chosen as pillion rider to Musharraf but a dead BB will be more useful to Washington. Are you suggesting that Washington sent BB to Pakistan just to get her killed by LeT or some other jihadi lunatics?”

“Listen to the end,” said Sasha rather sternly.

“Sorry,” we said, afraid that he might clam up.

“First, let’s clarify the question of funding by Americans. Financing, arming and training of enemy elements is nothing new in the American policy. The whole Russo-Afghan was fought on funding and training the kind of people who would never be welcome in Washington. However, their being loathsome was not a barrier against their being funded and trained to fight the Russians because, as the Americans are fond of saying, the end justifies the means.

“If BB is removed from the scene, it would bring several benefits to Washington, the topmost being swift departure of Musharraf, replaced by a weak government that would be heavily dependent on Americans for its very survival”

Misha started speaking when Sasha broke the conversation. “We are not saying that LeT did or did not engineer the suicide bombing in the BB procession on 18 Oct.

“What we are underlining is that a dead BB would be very useful for the region-wide American objectives, and the contract to bump her off may have been outsourced to more than one contractors.”

Look for patterns

It was even more confusing.

“Sorry, but we cannot make head or tail of all this,” we said.

“Look for patterns,” said Sasha like a teacher whose patience was wearing thin.

 ”The pattern here is,” explained Sasha, “that CIA and other American agencies are funding, training and arming MeK [Mujahideen-e-Khalq] in Iraq and Iran to use them against Iran, they are funding and supporting Jundullah in Pakistan and Iran to create trouble in Iran, and now they have co-opted some factions of LeT, possibly some other jihadi outfits also, to do their dirty work in Pakistan.”

“Go chase Vickers,” said Misha with the finality that indicated the end of our session with the spymasters.

Chasing Vickers

 Chasing Vickers is easier said than done.

Michael Vickers is the assistant secretary of defence responsible for special operations and low intensity warfare. A former Green Beret, he was confirmed as assistant secretary for defence on 23 July 2007.

Vickers was the principle strategist for covert CIA operation in Afghanistan that resulted in the defeat, and subsequent break-up, of the Soviet Union.

At the height of Afghan operation, he was giving strategic and operational direction to 300 unit commanders, 150000 full time and 500000 part time fighters. He coordinated the efforts of ten countries and oversaw an annual budget of more than US $ 2 billion.

In other words, Vickers was the direct challenger of Sasha and Misha in Afghanistan.

Special Operations Command (Socom), a part of the portfolio of Vickers, is based in Tampa, Florida. Its annual budget is US $ 8 billion. More than 60000 covert and overt personnel are on its payroll.

Vickers has offices on the third floor of Pentagon in the ‘C’ ring.

X is for eXpert

Washington is not an easy place for us; the people are reluctant to talk. Everyone who knows us is wary of us, and those who don’t know us, don’t care to talk to us.

However, there are three experts with deep knowledge and insight, who sometimes cooperate with us. For this story, we have given them a composite name ‘X’ – X for expert.

“Vickers is not a bureaucrat. He is a fighter, first and last,” said X.

He elucidated, “Vickers has four qualities that put him head and shoulders above the crowd: 1. His multi-track mind that can process several scenarios simultaneously; 2. His ability to co-opt enemy to fight the enemy; 3. His talent to add or remove the essential elements, as the situation demands; and 4. His uncanny sense of timing; where to strike, when and how.

“He would think a thousand times before setting a goal, but once he has decided where he wants to go, he would use endless, flexible tactics to get there.”

“We are impressed already,” we said, “but what is the connection between American funding of some Pakistani jihadi outfits, the return of BB to Pakistan, and suicide attack on her convoy?”

“BB is the daughter of her father. Popularity goes to her head and she tends to become stubborn, even arrogant.

“Remember? Her father, ZAB [Zulfikar Ali Bhutto], made an extremely fine impression on JFK in their first meeting. JFK said that if you were an American, you would be in my cabinet. ZAB replied, ‘Watch your words Mr. President. If I were an American, you would be in my cabinet.’ She is no different.

“Although she has been sent as co-pilot for Musharraf, she might change her mind any time and that would be quite inconvenient for her American handlers. However, if she is bumped off, preferably with traceable links to some jihadi outfit, it would fit nicely with American plans for Pakistan and the entire region,” said X.

“And, what could those plans be,” we asked.

X said, “There is general agreement among all the 16 intelligence agencies of the United States that Pakistan is ‘on the edge,’ the situation is ‘very bad, very bleak.’ The latest National Intelligence Estimate describes Pakistan as ‘no money, no energy, no government.’”

He was of the opinion that not only the entire intelligence community but the mainstream Democrats and Republicans, and the Pentagon leadership, had come to the conclusion that nothing was going to go forward without dealing directly with Pakistan.

“Vickers is in the forefront. He was one of the authors of the QDR-2006-2025 [Pentagon's Quadrennial Defence Review for the next twenty years]. QDR defines terrorism as the immediate threat and China, Russia and India as long-term threats,” said X.

Expanding on the theme, X said, “There is the concept of ‘Total Force.’ This includes active and reserve components, DoD civilians and contractors. DoD, specifically its special operations wing, has been tasked to enable ‘other actors‘ to perform key tasks, roles and missions.

“There is also the concept of ‘freedom of action’ which means that indirect approach, stealth, flexible basing and strategic reach, outsourcing of missions, co-opting enemies, and conducting covert operations in countries that are not at war with the USA, are all fully permissible.

“There is the stress to ’shift the cost balance’ to the adversaries. It means that military and civilian activities are to be conducted across the spectrum to establish and maintain desired order in countries and regions, and in doing so, one enemy should be used to cause damage to the other enemy.

“In addition to QDR, there is the special hit list of Socom. Vickers has short-listed 20 ‘high priority’ countries. Pakistan is at the top of the list and India is not very far behind. These are the countries where Socom will conduct all kinds of clandestine operations. External actors will be playing, wittingly or unwittingly, the script written by Vickers.

“You should never forget that Vickers is on first-name basis with lot many of the original jihadis of the Afghan war – he was their paymaster and handler – and these are the people running or guiding most of the present jihadi outfits.”

Some of it was already going over our heads. The information was piling up like a shapeless lump, eluding any handle.

The best thing was to take a break for brainstorming.

Brainstorming

We tried to put together what we had uncovered so far in our investigations and match it with the information we obtained from X, Sasha and Misha.

Only some parts of the overall picture were visible, and it looked like this:

• American espionage activity has intensified in Pakistan, indicating some major shift in policy and possible preparation for big action.
• Americans are funding some jihadi outfits and militant elements in Pakistan, including at least a splinter faction of LeT. This is part of the known pattern of American tactics to finance enemy to fight the enemy. Other examples are US funding, training and arming of MeK and Jundullah.
• BB has returned to Pakistan after reaching some kind of understanding with the current and future power players in Washington but the actual scriptwriters would like her dead because that would accelerate their regional ambitions.
• Michael Vickers, assistant secretary of defence for special operations and low intensity warfare since July 2007, is a CIA veteran and chief strategist of jihadi war against USSR. He has big budget and huge manpower at his disposal for conducting clandestine and covert operations anywhere in the world. He has successful track record of co-opting enemy to fight the enemy. Pakistan is at the top of the list of his target countries and India is not far behind.
• American establishment is unanimous in its opinion that a radical solution is needed for ‘Pakistan problem.’
• There are region-wide American ambitions, although we don’t know much about them, but whatever those ambitions are, they cannot be advanced without severe damage to, possibly bifurcation of, Pakistan.

Where do we go from here? There were no fresh leads. We were also aware that we don’t know the right questions to ask.

We were still in a state of indecision. And, BB got assassinated.

Benazir Assassinated

BB (Benazir Bhutto) got assassinated on 27 December 2007, when she was leaving Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi after addressing a huge rally.

It was absolutely shocking news and our first reaction was to kick ourselves in the butt for not going public with our story in November 2007. Would she still be alive had we released the story in November? It is a question that would always keep haunting us.

We went to Sasha and Misha with a blurry video clip, showing a clean-shaven young man pointing and shooting a hand gun at BB.

It didn’t take Sasha and Misha long to identify the weapon.

“It is a 0.22 high velocity pistol,” said Sasha.

“Standard personal weapon of Mossad agents,” added Misha.

“What does it mean?” we asked.

“It points to the source of training. If you are trained to use a knife, you will use a knife when required. If you are trained to use a 0.22 pistol, you will use that when the time comes,” said Sasha.

“There are all kinds of speculations, even claims, that BB was assassinated by a jihadi organization,” we mentioned.

“If Americans can fund a jihadi faction, what is wrong with Israelis training them?” countered Sasha.

He added, “You keep forgetting what I tell you. Look for patterns. There is certain CIA-Mossad signature that you cannot fail to miss if you are trained to look for it. The nerve gas used to paralyze the pilots of the C-130 carrying Ziaul Haq was made in Israel, but Israelis didn’t put the little box in the mango crate, they used the local people. The poisoning of Shahnawaz [younger brother of BB, who died of poisoning in mid 1980s in Cannes] can be connected to CIA-Mossad if someone cares to open the case again, but it was just the maid of Shahnawaz who did the dirty work, not the Israelis or CIA. There is unmistakable similarity in the riots and endless public processions that led to the ouster of Salvadore Allande in Chile and ZAB and Musharraf in Pakistan; in none of these cases you saw CIA or Mossad officers leading the processions and riots. Look for patterns.”

Wasted time, weak leads

From January to November 2008, we were held back by weak leads and drying up sources.

Only two things of any significance came to light but hardly a story to go public.

X said in Washington, “Vickers and Gates [US secretary of defence] are close friends. My assessment is that they might like to do something really big before Bush leaves the White House so that the next man should not be able to deviate much from the Neocon agenda.”

Misha said in Moscow, “The opium production in Afghanistan for the last three years is nearly twice the worldwide demand of opium-based narcotics. Have you ever wondered where all the surplus opium is going?”

Mumbai mystery and Vickers

It was the fateful last week of November 2008, when terror struck Mumbai, the economic and financial heart of India. A group of probably ten persons, split into small teams, wreaked havoc in several public places for more than 60 hours, causing death and destruction at large scale, and bringing India and Pakistan to the brink of yet another war.

We returned to X in Washington and Sasha and Misha in Moscow, determined that we will go public with our story now, even if our findings cannot be backed by definite and demonstrable proof.

“Vickers is written all over it,” said Misha.

“Looks quite like Vickers,” agreed X.

X in Washington and Sasha and Misha in Moscow pointed to a number of features of the Mumbai mystery that they consider hallmark of Vickers.

Here is the gist of our several conversations with X, Sasha and Misha:

Choice of the sea route to Mumbai is the first thing that should ring alarm bells. If it was a homegrown jihadi outfit, they would have chosen the Bhuj route in Rajasthan with which they are familiar and which is not as risky as the sea route.

The likely departure point was some small settlement left of Hyderi and not the main port of Karachi as is widely reported and believed. If a fishing boat starts from any point left of Hyderi and moves along, hugging the coast, it has very little risk of being challenged. This was the route followed by India to send back trained Al-Zulfikar and other militants to Pakistan. This is also the route favoured by the Shah group and other drug smugglers known to cooperate with the Americans.

In addition to the route, there is the matter of drug use by the terrorists during the siege. Being in the midst of a shooting match with the security forces was enough of a stimulant to generate necessary quantities of adrenaline to keep them awake. However, if they felt the need to use narcotics, they would not go for LSD, which is basically a fad of the American youth, not much popular in South Asia.

The use of Google Earth maps is a classic Vickers touch. None of the sites targeted by the terrorists was a military installation; they are all shown in every tourist map. Even if one doesn’t care to buy a tourist map, it is easy to get there merely by asking directions. Vickers, who is very fond of killing several birds with one stone, added Google Earth to the paraphernalia of terrorists because he is known to oppose this service; he considers it a security risk, probably rightly so, and wants it to be unavailable to the general public.

And, the terrorists conveniently kept quiet about the most important part of their mission: The message they wanted to convey, the goals they wanted to achieve. This gives free hand to Vickers and co. to fill in the blanks, to attach any motive to the terrorists they like.

Then, there is the little matter of the American officials ‘who preferred to remain anonymous’, contending even before the Indians that Pakistan was involved in the incident. Even when the operation against terrorists was still in progress, Americans started saying repeatedly that they suspect Pakistani involvement. Among the other peculiarities mentioned here, it is this slip that removes the mask from the face of Vickers.

The conclusions drawn by X, Sasha and Misha are logically correct. Taken together with our earlier findings, these are strong arguments to suspect that Vickers engineered the Mumbai incident. However, the question is: Was it an end in itself? What was the objective?

As Sasha said in one of his conversations, “It cannot be an isolated phenomenon. There must be something before and after it.”

Early complete jigsaw puzzle

In order to get as complete a picture as possible we picked the brains of X in Washington and Sasha and Misha in Moscow in numerous lengthy, intensive sessions.

Information came thick and fast; with the hindsight of nearly 16 months of legwork we knew the right questions to ask. For the sake of readability and coherence, we have paraphrased the gist of our conversations with X, Sasha and Misha. Input from our contributors in New Delhi, Tehran and Kandahar is also blended into this write up:

American Dilemma: The US military is burning nearly 600000 gallons of fuel per day. More than 80% of this comes from Pakistan, through 700 or so road tankers that are vulnerable to all kinds of attacks on their long journey from facilities in Pakistan to American bases in Afghanistan.

The reserves in Afghanistan will suffice for only two weeks if the supply line is disrupted.

Aware of this, the Americans have been trying to create an alternate route through Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Even if the alternate route is opened fully, it is very long and inefficient and there are risks that Americans are not in a position to counter at present.

There is need to abandon the Pakistan route but there is nothing to replace it.

Bifurcating Pakistan: The solution that is agreed to nearly unanimously by the American policymakers is that Pakistan must be split into two parts: the Americans would like Balochistan province to become an independent country and they don’t care where the rest of Pakistan goes.

In fact, it is a goal the Neocons have been pursuing for a long time. A few years ago, they pumped Baloch insurgency but it proved an exercise in futility.

Vickers, in one position or the other, has never been far away from the process of decision-making. He sees many advantages in splitting Pakistan into two parts.

Benefits of bifurcating Pakistan: From American point of view, there are many benefits in creating an independent Balochistan:

• An independent Balochistan will be an ideal territory to keep supply lines open to the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan.
• Independent Balochistan will provide Americans with excellent locations for putting up their military and naval bases to police the Persian Gulf and make sure that no other naval power including India, China and Russia ever gets upper hand in the Indian Ocean.
• An independent Balochistan will be the place from where Americans can maintain permanent pressure on Iran, even in the remote possibility that they may have to eventually leave Iraq.
• China and Russia will be denied any access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean.
• The Gulf countries will remain dependent on the USA for export routes of their hydrocarbon products.
• Full control of the entrance to the Gulf will enable USA to allow or deny oil flow by tankers to any country in the world.
• Central Asia is a land-locked region and the whole region would be on the mercy of the United States.
• If Balochistan is detached from Pakistan, the rest of Pakistan is likely to exist as a perpetually unstable entity, creating a permanent source of trouble for India. This fits nicely with other American plans because India has come very close to becoming an economic rival of the United States.

Why Mumbai incident: One doesn’t need to be an exceptionally brilliant person to understand immediately that Pakistan had nothing to gain and everything to lose from Mumbai incident.

If we assume that it was done by a jihadi outfit on its own, it would be the most foolish thing to do because of the consequences that should have been discernible at the time of planning.

However, if we agree to the assertion that Vickers planned it, through proxy forces, for advancement of American objectives in the region, everything suddenly makes sense.

Here are some pointers:

• One logical consequence is that India and Pakistan would probably go to war or at least move their forces to the borders in a position of war readiness. Every expert knows that keeping forces ready for war is nearly seven to eight times more expensive than keeping them in the barracks. This is an excellent way to make sure that Indian and Pakistani economies would be crippled for a long time to come.
• India and Pakistan are negotiating for two gas pipelines, one from Iran and the other from Turkmenistan. There are also plans to put oil pipelines from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to South Asia. USA would use every method to deny India the energy resources of Central Asia and Iran-India is not what USA has in mind. The tide has reversed already and it is not to the liking of the Americans. Students from the United States are now coming to India, Indian businessmen are giving tough time to American corporations worldwide, and India has entered some of the export markets that were traditionally dominated by the west. In short, a weak India will be acceptable as a friend but a strong India will be a pain in the neck for Americans. because an economically strong
• The global financial and economic crisis was triggered by the follies and dishonest practices of the American corporations; the American economy is still in free fall and the end is nowhere in sight. On the other hand, the Indian economy has not suffered a proportionately comparative loss. The steep fall on one side and the lesser fall on the other means that the real gap between the American and Indian economies has somewhat narrowed down because of the twin financial and economic crises. Mumbai incident is an attempt to remedy the situation in favour of the United States.
• In a way, Mumbai incident is similar in concept to Bin Laden tapes. With dependable regularity, Bin Laden tapes appeared whenever Bush was going through difficult times. The Mumbai incident magically appeared when Americans needed to remove Pakistani forces from the Afghan border so that American forces could operate freely in the Frontier province of Pakistan, and push for bifurcation of Pakistan to solve their supply problems permanently.

Reaction in India: As far as we have been able to confirm through our sources, Indian leadership is trying to handle the situation in a calm and measured manner. However there are two kinds of pressures on the Congress government: From one side they are being pressed by BJP and other parties through public protest, and on the other side they are being pressured by the Americans to act fast and hard against Pakistan.

For instance, we know for sure that the name of Hamid Gul was included in the list of people wanted by India on the insistence of Americans. India never wanted to put Gul on the list. Americans forced them to include his name because it is an impossible demand; refusal by Pakistan to hand over Gul would give opportunity to Americans to push India for war.

India-Pakistan confrontation: As mentioned, Americans have maneuvered India to place impossible demands on Pakistan. The next logical step would be to encourage India to deploy its forces along the Pakistan border, forcing Pakistan to do the same on its side of the border.

By any degree of confrontation, both the countries would be net losers; the only winner would be the United States.

Bonus hit on China and Russia: Mumbai incident has indirectly affected Chinese and Russian interests in the region.

Two more successful moves on the chessboard and the Americans would be in a position to block RussiaChina in the greater Central Asian region. and If Balochistan is detached from Pakistan, it would contribute to American ambitions to put a full-stop to expansion of Russian and Chinese economic and political influence in the entire region.

Iran: Whatever the Americans are doing, they have an eye on Iran. Encirclement of Iran is central to their plans. In addition to whatever is being done through MeK and Jundullah, the Americans are spending more than US $ 80 million annually to create internal dissent in Iran.

Our sources in Iran tell that Iranian authorities are aware of American machinations and they feel adequately prepared to counter whatever is sent in their direction.

Central Asia, the traditional playground: Nothing has changed for Central Asia. What was true in the nineteenth century is true in the twenty-first century. Central Asia is still the playground of the big powers.

There is increased pressure to acquire airports and military bases in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

Colour revolutions, on the pattern of Ukraine and Georgia are being prepared in all the Central Asian countries. Money is flowing generously to anyone who shows a spark. In their desperation and hurry, Americans are sometimes using crude and obvious methods.

Disposal of surplus Opium: Afghanistan produced 6000 tons of opium in 2006, 8200 tons in 2007 and 7700 tons in 2008. On average, the world demand of opium-based narcotics, including heroin, is only half of this production. Where is the rest of opium going?

We have reports from Afghanistan that the American forces – this includes all kinds of Americans such regular forces, CIA, Socom and contractors – have been buying and storing all the surplus opium.

This report gets credence from the fact that about 70% of all opium production in Afghanistan comes from Helmand province, an area under the direct control of the Americans.

What would the Americans do with all this opium?

Experts are of the view that this opium, in raw or refined form, would be spread in the neighbouring countries (Pakistan, India, Iran, Central Asia and China). Some of it would go to Russia also.

This would bring several advantages to the Americans: 1. By increasing drug addiction in target countries, Americans would sap the economies of these countries and produce the generations of junkies that would be long-term liabilities for their countries; 2. If the opium is mostly consumed in the neighbourhood, less of it would be left for export to the American markets; 3. Narcotics are a traditional source of additional revenues for the American forces, especially the CIA.

The suspicion that the American want to spread drug addiction in the neighbouring countries is also supported by the fact that even though the ‘farm-gate’ price of opium has remained stable at nearly US $ 70 per kilo, it is becoming available in the neighbouring countries at around US $ 40 per kilo. Clearly, the Americans are subsidizing the export.

http://www.newscentralasia.net/Articles-and-Reports/389.html

Written By: Afreen Baig

Dr Ayesha Siddiqa’s ‘The Military Inc.’ is a book deflective of reality, highly derogatory and against the very notion of sovereignty.

Dr Ayesha Siddiqa launches the book by giving the impression that her intention is to cover the entrepreneurial activities of military worldwide. However, in depth reading reaffirms suspicions that her book massively targets the Pakistan Military and the top echelons of the Armed Forces, most of which are based upon self serving assumptions and intentional hoodwinking. A labyrinth of financial figures is presented to further obscure the ordinary reader’s intelligence.

The book sets forward four arguments. First, that MILBUS (Military Business) is military capital that perpetuates the military’s political predatory style; and is kept concealed and includes questionable transfer of resources from public sector to individuals connected with armed Forces. Second, the military’s economic greed increases in totalitarian systems. Third, Military convinces the citizens to bear additional costs for security on basis of conceived threats to the State. Fourth, the book considers the Pakistan Military the cause of all ills, social disparity and democratic fiasco.

Let’s start by setting the record straight. MILBUS in Pakistan – is the result of honest intentions and visionary policies – to raise independent resources, to self-finance the on-going national technological development, to modernize strategic assets, and most importantly, the determination to rely less on Foreign Aid. While at the same time, build facilities for retired military personnel and their families; and slowly withdrawing from National Defense budget allocation as a percentage of GDP.

MILBUS also exists in well developed countries like the USA, UK, France, China, Israel or even Turkey. The Milbus or the PMEs (Private Military Enterprises) are generally known as the Private Military Industry. Famous US PMEs include Halliburton, Black-water worldwide, Defensecurity, Titan Corporations, Kellogg Brown & Root, Air Scan, DynCorp’s, CACI International, etc. Famous UK PMEs include Black-Op’s and Aegis Defense Services. Most of these are active beneficiaries of the Iraq War. The worldwide PME industry is now worth over $100 billion a year. Thus, this is not just a Pakistan specific industry.

MILBUS in Pakistan is being criticized unnecessarily, with the sole intention to malign the Armed Forces. The Pakistan military has never intended to deliberately conceal their economic activities and they do not cause injustice by weighing heavily on civilian corporate sector or individual leaders.

The book ‘Military Inc’ is based upon a series of presumptions and false accusations. Throughout her book, the author obstinately insists that the growth of Military economy is the case of self interest and predatory acquisition by senior officers, in which it allow the Generals to seek benefit for themselves and their clients.

The author fails to provide, any concrete evidence that could confirm her allegations, that questionable transfer of wealth is made to individuals connected with armed forces. All she could give in example were the 500 sq yard official plots given to the Generals at the end of their service, as part of their benefits, and hence her assumption that a retired general is worth from Rs.150 million to Rs.400 million.

Rarely do critics mention, that nominal deduction from the pay of all military officers are made during their service, in return for a small apartment or a small housing, which is handed over at the time of their retirement. However, this facility is still not available to all retiring servicemen.

Next, the book alleges that the military’s economic greed increases in totalitarian systems, where the general public, private businessmen, civilian corporate sector and national business units are all oppressed to encourage and endorse military business units. Her book focuses largely on the four welfare projects managed by the Pakistan Military i.e. The Fauji Foundation (FF), the Army Welfare Trust (AWT), Shaheen Foundation (SF) and Bahria Foundation (BF), and in some places the Frontier Works Organization (FWO).

The author believes that “the profit earned by military is directly proportional to power and gives the armed forces a sense of being independent of the incompetent civilians” – which can only be considered as an extremely reckless comment.

There was great wisdom behind establishing these welfare projects. The visionary minds knew that “the profit earned by the military will be directly proportional to Sovereignty of the Country and the Institution”.

The Military established its first welfare foundation in 1954, with funds received from the British as part of Pakistan’s share of the Post War Services Reconstruction Fund. In India, those funds were distributed immediately amongst those who fought the Second World War. Unlike India, Pakistan’s wise military opted to use those funds to establish projects that would ensure the overall well-being, availability of jobs, and a decent pension for their armed forces.

The initial purpose of these welfare projects was to create employment opportunities for the honorable retired or disabled military personnel.  Servicemen – whose only obligation is defending the borders of Pakistan.

This one wise decision, not only raised the morals of the serving military men, but also gave the ordinary citizens a reason to join the Armed Forces of Pakistan and serve their country. Assured that their future is protected, the servicemen live their lives in testing times on borders, remote locations and a life away from family.

The Fauji Foundation, Shaheen Foundation and Bahria Foundation were all established under the Charitable Endowments Act 1890. The Army Welfare Trust was established under the Societies Registration Act 1860.

Then all these entities are registered Tax-paying Companies. The Army Welfare Trust and the Fauji Foundation pays tax at 20% of their profits. Shaheen Foundation and Bahria Foundation pay Taxes at 30% of their profits. Fair enough!

This limited industrial base that evolved over years added to the military’s credibility and resolves to contribute towards the Nation’s socio-economic development and Pakistan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Like any ordinary successful businessmen or multi-national corporations (MNCs), the Pakistan Military utilized their available structure, nominal budget and dedicated their human resources for the welfare of the uniformed men and civilians working in those companies. While also pioneering technology, developing expertise and establishing quality control.

The book ‘Military Inc’ accuses the Pakistan Armed forces of running business (MILBUS) that are diverse in nature, ranging from small scale to large scale corporate enterprises. As examples, it quotes Schools, Banks, Insurance Company, Radio and TV, a Fertilizer company, Hospitals and Clinics, Cement plant, Universities and institutes, etc.

Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa left no opportunity to magnify and exaggerate the limited and partial presence of MILBUS competing in Pakistan’s broad based expanding economy.

Let’s analyze the limited magnitude and negligible worth of these Military run ventures, compared to similar mega business entities currently present in Pakistan.

According to State Bank of Pakistan, there are total 73 Banks in Pakistan. From which, there are 24 Limited banks, 11 Foreign Banks, 8 Financial Banks, 4 Specialized Banks, 13 Investment Banks, 7 Micro-finance Banks and 6 Islamic banks. Out of these total 73 banks – Dr Ayesha Siddiqa tends to be intolerable towards ONE ‘Askari Bank’ run by Military? In 2007, Askari Bank paid a Tax of Rs. 743 million.

According to Federal Bureau of Statistics, there are 24 Cement plants in Pakistan, and only ONE owned by ‘Fauji Cement Company Ltd’. A Tax-paying company listed on the Stock Exchange.

According to State Bank of Pakistan, there are total 59 Insurance companies in Pakistan. There are 4 in the Public sector, 50 companies in the private sector and 5 are incorporated abroad. Why should anyone be narrow-minded towards ONE owned by military – ‘Askari General Insurance Ltd’, which is listed on the Stock Exchange and pays Tax?

According to the Health Division and the P.M.D.C, there are around 924 Hospitals, 12,726 Medical Institutions, 560 Rural Health Centers and 4712 Dispensaries all over Pakistan. Out of these, if 10 Hospitals and 20 Medical Centers are being run by Fauji Foundation, what’s the hue & cry about? These Medical services are offered to the military and civilians alike. Even the prestigious Aga Khan Health Services (AGHS) own 7 Hospitals and 164 Medical Centers.

According to State Bank Pakistan, there are above 10 Fertilizer Plants in Pakistan from which 6 are State owned and the rest are private. Out of these, only ONE is military owned, the ‘Fauji Fertilizer Company Ltd’, which is listed on the Stock Exchange and audited by KPMG Taseer Hadi & Co, and pays Tax annually.

According to Higher Education Commission, there are 122 Universities in Pakistan. Out of which, 65 are in the Public sector and 57 in the private sector. Foundation University and Bahria University are the only two affiliated with Armed Forces providing quality education to all citizens alike.

Foundation Schools have 90 branches all over Pakistan; compared to the City School which has more than 150 branches and the Beacon-house School which has around 130 branches. We as a Nation should triumph the quality education being promoted by the Foundation schools and the model paradigm implemented.

The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) has 50,125 companies registered with it. From these only 9 are MILBUS projects. Why can’t Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa accept these 9 MILBUS projects out of the 50,125 projects broadmindedly?

The author also alleges that Military’s Internal Economy is hampering the growth of Pakistan’s free market economy – which of course is not true. For her information, under this same system and era, and under the leadership of General Musharraf, Pakistan’s free market economy boomed from $75 billion in 1999 to become $160 billion in 2007.

In the last 6 years, the free market economy of Pakistan expanded by $85 billion. The expansion and growth the Civilian Corporate sector, National Business Units and Multi-National Corporations witnessed in these last 6 years remain unprecedented in Pakistan’s Economic History. Hence proven, that Military’s Internal Economy did not hamper Pakistan’s free market economy!

According to Dr Ayesha Siddiqa’s book, the worth of Fauji Foundation is $169m, the worth of Army Welfare trust is $862m, the worth of Shaheen Foundation is $34.4m and the worth of Bahria Foundation is $69m. Total worth of MILBUS entities in Pakistan arise to ONLY $1.135 billion.  

Hence, the presence of MILBUS companies, in Pakistan’s free economy of $160 billion, amongst these other sectors and enterprises arises to a negligible maximum 0.8%.

The Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) Market Capitalization in January 2008 stood at $75 billion. MILBUS worth as compared to KSE again arises to only 1.5%.

It’s amusing to note that Dr Ayesha Siddiqa wrote a whole book, to malign a system (MILBUS) whose worth does not exceed 0.8% of Pakistan’s free market economy.

Dr Ayesha Siddiqa’s desire to portray the Pakistan Military as a coercive and self serving breed aiming to consolidate their economic power at the expense of Pakistan, not only erodes her neutrality into bias, but the above economic comparisons also contradict all her presumptuous and sham claims. As MILBUS in Pakistan has been competing fairly in free market and contributing to today’s knowledge-based economy. It has played an active role to generate revenue for Pakistan and in contributing to overall GDP.

One of the greatest wisdom foreseen, behind establishing MILBUS was to liberate the Pakistan Armed Forces of international aid assistance and interference. Classified financial autonomy gives the Armed Forces a sense of self-respect and confidence of being independent of the dominating ‘International Coalition of the willing’ and their foreign aid.

The Pakistan Army has received a total of around $17 billion from the United States for arms, equipment and compensation since 1954, the year the United States entered into defense pacts with Pakistan. Much of it was uselessly spend during the 1980’s Afghan war and the wars Pakistan fought with India. After 9/11, the famous foreign assistance of $10 billion comprises 60% reimbursement costs for expenditure incurred by the Pakistani Military while patrolling on PAK-Afghan border, recorded in the ‘Coalition Support Funds’. These worthless assistances have not helped the Pakistan Army contrary to perception propagated in media reports.

Because, with these insignificant and worthless assistance, follows a series of humiliating articles and editorials composed in American print media. The clueless and prejudice Pakistani media ignorantly picks up the chanting and further plays an important role in distorting and altering the actual facts and figures. No relevant person is approached to clarify and set facts straight. Authors like Dr Ayesha Siddiqa bank on such distortion to further slander the admirable Pakistan Military.

After year 2000, the $85 billion expansion of Pakistan’s economy, decreased the ratio of US aid & assistance to Pakistan’s economy by around 100%. Now the U.S aid & assistance account to only 6.25% of Pakistan’s expanding economy. Pakistan is successfully wriggling out of foreign influence. Visionary MILBUS was the right step in the right direction at the right time!

Pakistan Military requires a proper platform utilized to clear the misperceptions being propagated against them and counter the sham allegations. In short, Pakistan military lacks the exposure to enhance their PR with the Public. Pakistani GHQ and ISPR should take up an active role similar to Pentagon and make their interactions more effective.

Next, the book ‘Military Inc’ considers Pakistan Military the root cause of social disparity and democratic fiasco. It alleges that socio-political fragmentation would result in strengthening the army’s control over politics. Throughout her book, Dr Ayesha Siddiqa lambasts and scoffs at the concept of MILBUS accusing the military of building assets and calling them as the ‘new land barons’.

In her desperation to smear the Army, she even fails to condemn the corruption practiced and coercive measures exercised by the inept political leaders. How these redundant leaders influence the bureaucracy, alter the constitution, plunder national institutions, stagnated the trade & exports, multiplied the foreign debts for the country, rob the country of the foreign reserves and accumulate their wealth in developed countries – is all together ignored by her conveniently.  

The truth is that the Armed forces are forced to intervene reluctantly and take control of the state to save it from the irresponsible and hopeless politicians, who drag the country towards brink of collapse, every time they come to power.

In short, Pakistan’s external debt rose from $18 billion in 1988 to become $38 billion by end of 1999. In 1999, Pakistan’s total debt (internal & external) was almost 90% of its GDP. External debt in ratio to foreign exchange earnings were 347%. Debt servicing allocated in 1999 budget was 61% of total revenue resources. According to the World Bank, in 1999-2000 Pakistan was amongst the highly indebted countries.

Despite the above mentioned debacle for Pakistan – the substantial expansion in the personal wealth, land and business interests of Mr. Zardari and Mr. Nawaz Sharif has earned them a place in the ‘Top 5 richest people’ of Pakistan in 2007. Not a single General or military servicemen made it to the list of ‘Top 40 Richest Pakistani’. Who should we consider a peril to Pakistan’s existence – these fraudulent politicians or the reserved military?

The Raiwind complex of Nawaz Sharif, build on an area of around 2000 acre, consist of palatial  residences, 300 acre farm, 500 bed hospital, a school, 200 acre dairy farm, etc – constructed at a cost of above Rs. 800 million. He personally owns Ittefaq foundries, three Sugar mills, numerous Textile mills, Steel Mills, Paper Mills, Spinning mills, Engineering companies, and numerous other business units. He owns several residential properties in Lahore and Muree. He owns vast acres of lands in Sheikhapura, Chunian, Raiwind, Multan and Bhopattian. These feudal turned politicians can easily be labeled as the ‘old Pakistani barons’.

Dr Ayesha Siddiqa also alleges that the military convinces the citizens to bear additional costs for security on basis of conceived threats to the State. She wants the public to believe that their taxes are being exploited at the expense of the notion ‘National Security’. This statement of hers is an attempt to ignore and snub the volatile situation Pakistan faces at its borders.

She also remains oblivious to the fact, that India allocates 5 times that of Pakistan’s defense spending.

However, under President Musharraf, the military spending DECREASED as percentage of GDP and National budget. It now stands at 3% of GDP and 15% of National budget. It strikes out though, how Dr Ayesha Siddiqa veils and ignores the bulk of the National budget of 85% that lies at the disposal of the manipulative hands of our shady politicians. The public has the right to know, what proper utilization has been brought about with that unaccountable 85% in the 1990’s?

This derogatory book ‘Military Inc’ intends to sow seeds of disenchantment amongst the general public against the modest and patriotic institution of the Armed forces of Pakistan, and lower its grace.  Those Armed Forces of Pakistan that run to protect and deliver relief, to ordinary Pakistanis in times of calamities, natural disasters, floods, train accidents, and earthquakes. Does Pakistan have any other force or institution which is as disciplined and effective in providing speedy help immediately? Shouldn’t we strengthen this only institution that we have?

The publication of Dr Ayesha Siddiqa’s own book ‘Military Inc’ in 2007, in President Musharraf’s era, repudiates her claims to term the military rule as manipulative and suppressive. It’s evident that no subtle or coercive measures were taken against her or any arm-twisting to curb the publication of this highly controversial book! Where would she find such boundless and gracious freedom? The book ‘Military Inc’ has become a checker of the chessboard being maneuvered by the unknown and ambiguous foreign powers interested in Balkanization of Pakistan.

The ultimate objective of the book ‘Military Inc’ is to perpetrate friction and cause dissent amongst the ranks of the disciplined Armed Forces. By deliberately triggering upheaval within the lower ranks, the intention appears to encourage internal revolt. As a consequence, the unity, discipline and allegiance of the Armed Forces of Pakistan can be destroyed.  

Thus, to protect the allegiance of the Armed Forces, the whole concept of visionary MILBUS is justified, as a set of activities for the development of Pakistan’s military might, meant to counter the rising regional threat convergence and decreasing dependence upon foreign aid – ultimately protecting the sovereignty of Pakistan and its savior Armed Forces!

Glory and Triumph to Pakistan Armed Forces!

Afreen Baig is an independent analyst majoring in International Relations and Economics. She can be reached at afreenbaig@gmail.com

Written By: Afreen Baig  

Foreign Reserves – a significant economic indicator and of vital importance to every expanding economy. Foreign Reserves is the first and basic economic indicator that transmits an air of confidence and trust, amongst the potential foreign & local investors and the nation. Foreign Reserves are held in abundance and accumulated – in order to sustain the confidence of a country’s capacity to carry out external trade confidently, to balance the momentum between demand & supply of foreign currencies, and also used as an intervention tool by the State Bank. Reserves also bail out the economy in times of financial crisis.

By October 2007, at the end of Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz’s tenure, Pakistan raised back its Foreign Reserves to a handsome $16.4 billion. His exceptional policies kept our trade deficit controlled at $13 billion, exports boomed to $18 billion, revenue generation increased to become $13 billion and attracted foreign investment of $8.4 billion.

Pakistan recently has seen a drastic drop in its Reserves by 50% and its currency devalued by 40%, which has left ordinary people confused and the usual cynics have started heaping the blame onto the policies of Mr. Shaukat Aziz, without even knowing the basic macro-economic indicators nor understanding the relationship b/w Foreign reserves, Trade deficit and Currency devaluation.

The Trade deficit (Exports minus Imports) is always managed in ratio to Revenue generation, Capital inflows and Reserves. Almost all developing economies face the dread of trade deficit but their abundant foreign reserves gives them the fiscal space to overcome those grievances.

Exports – $18 billion

Imports – $30.53 billion

Trade deficit – $12.53 billion

Foreign Reserves – $16.4 billion

What is to be seen above is that, Pakistan’s Foreign Reserves $16.4 bn exceeded the trade deficit $12.53 bn by a comfortable $3.87 billion and with an additional foreign investment of $8.4 billion – Pakistan’s currency stayed stable at Rs.61 per dollar.

Currency starts to devalue ONLY when the Trade deficit surpasses the Foreign Reserves.  This rare phenomenon occurred in PPP’s incompetent & dense minded government, which has led to devaluation of the currency by 40%. They failed to protect our Sovereignty – our Foreign Reserves!

In PPP’s inept government of eight months,

Trade deficit – $20.74 billion

Foreign reserves – $8 billion

Under PPP, the Reserves fell from $14 billion to $8 billion and the trade deficit increased from $12.53 billion to $20.74 billion.

The moment the foreign reserves ($8 bn) fell below the trade deficit ($20.74 bn), the currency starts to devalue. Under Mr. Shaukat Aziz, Rupee stayed stable till October 2007, because our Reserves $16.4 billion EXCEEDED our Trade deficit of $12.53 billion.

In 2007, when international oil prices reached an alarming level of  around $90 per barrel, predicting to exceed $140 per barrel, it hurt the Imports bill of many developing countries, by increasing the trade deficit. The experienced Mr. Shaukat Aziz gauged this situation and immediately started monitoring & controlling individual sectors that were importing. He allowed imports only in sectors that were export specific. His efforts resulted in decreasing our Import bill by 6.53% by September 2007 (one month before he left).

Rupee stayed stable throughout Mr. Musharraf’s supported governments. Trade deficit never exceeded the foreign reserves in the last eight years. The results were as follows – a stable rupee:

2001-02: Rs. 61
2002-03: Rs. 57.7
2003-04: Rs. 57.92
2004-05: Rs. 59.66
2005-06: Rs. 60.16
2006-07: Rs. 60.5
2007 (Dec): Rs. 61

What did the inefficient PPP do in these last eight months? They failed to monitor each sector of imports to control them individually. Pakistan’s economy started destabilizing because PPP could not guard our $14 billion reserves. Nor did they utilize any effort to increase the reserves from where Mr. Shaukat Aziz left it at $16.4 billion! The easier way out for them is to beg around the world barefaced or go back to IMF disgracefully.

What did the PPP further do? They increased the import bill by 55% in the months April to June 2008 and again increased it by 52.65% in the months July to September 2008 – though world oil prices fell from $140 per barrel to $70 per barrel.

Flight of capital takes place ONLY in economies where there is lack of trust and faith! Investors and endowing Public do not trust the government of PPP and are wary of PPP’s earlier corrupt reputation.

In the first four months of PPP, around $22 billion were withdrawn from the economy and KSE’s market capitalization fell by $29 billion. The State Bank was forced to place ban on transfer of dollar outside Pakistan.

Foreign reserves get hurt twice in this depletion process. First, when the investors and public pull back their money. Second, when macro-economic indicators witness imbalance and the government is forced to pay their external liabilities through these Reserves. This second stage occurs only when the government loses other means of regular income and is unable to control their imports.

Every country in the world is forced to make Imports. Imports help boost Exports. Even the world exporter China makes an import worth around $954 billion, to further promote their exports. But, Imports should be Export specific – scrutinized and restrained monthly – which was being done under the policies implemented by Mr. Shaukat Aziz.

Let’s analyze the steady India, as an example, with GDP growth of 9%.

Indian Imports – $188 billion (compared to Pakistan’s imports of $40 billion)

Indian Trade deficit – $63 billion (compared to Pakistan’s deficit of $20 billion)

The Indian currency is not devaluing because their Foreign Reserves $308 billion exceed their trade deficit of $63 billion.

Had Mr. Shaukat Aziz continued, the Trade deficit would have been kept controlled in accordance with Pakistan’s Revenue generation, Capital inflows and Foreign Reserves – which would have kept our rupee stable and economy booming at 7% GDP growth.

This latest IMF tranche of $7.6 billion, pre-arranged for a period of two years, will not help boost an economy whose foreign investment is declining, and where the trade deficit exceeds the total foreign reserves. This economic deception is yet another soothing drug given to us, by our unpopular democratic government of PPP.

If Pakistan wishes to remain free from influence of IMF, there is no better option than to assert our economic sovereignty and accumulate Foreign Reserves, from help of over-seas Pakistani. Additionally, attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and public & private portfolio investment.  Regrettably, PPP lacks the credibility and the reliability to attract back that trust and confidence!

Afreen Baig is an independent analyst majoring in International Relations and Economics. She can be reached at afreenbaig@gmail.com

The only safe ship in a storm is leadership – Faye Wattleton

18 August 2008, has become a day of gloom for all Musharraf lovers. Today, our eyes and hearts cry! The man we so loved, honored, admired and cherished for his determination to deliver for Pakistan – and deliver he remarkably did! He was a man who believed & practiced in ‘Pakistan First’. The only honest and visionary leader we ever had. Pakistan progressed and prospered under his leadership. Pakistan had hope under his selfless & patriotic policies. We love you Musharraf!

Time is neutral and does not change things. With courage and initiative, leaders change things – Jesse Jackson

General Musharraf in his historic speech to the nation, also enumerating the successes of his 8 years rule, announced to resign as President of Pakistan. General Musharraf was his confident self and his message optimistic. He bowed out with dignity and courage, to avoid confrontation, and in the best interest of the nation and the country. In his words, it was not the time for individual bravado. He received a guard of honor before he parted the Presidency.

Nonetheless, despite his mistakes, he has been that rare phenomenon in Pakistani politics — an honest man with good intentions who tried to serve his country to the best of his abilities. In a country that has suffered so much over the years from corrupt and self-serving politicians, there have been too few figures like him. (Editorial Arab News)

For us – General Musharraf  is our Hero – Our Leader !

A leader takes people where they want to go. A great leader takes people where they don’t necessarily want to go, but ought to be – Rosalynn Carter

Highlights of President Musharraf’s last speech  (Here) and (Here) and (Here) and (Video of Speech)

Updated September 2009!

Compiled by: Mirza Rohail B and Afreen Baig

Pak Economy in 1999 was: $ 75 billion (Source)
Pak Economy in 2007 is: $ 160 billion (Source) and (Source)
Pak Economy in 2008 is: $ 170 billion (Source)

GDP Growth in 1999:  3.1 % (Source)

GDP Growth in 2005:  8.4 % (Source)

GDP Growth in 2007:  7 % (Source)

GDP Growth in 2009:  2 % (Source) and (Source)

GDP Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in 1999: $ 270 billion (Source)
GDP Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in 2007: $ 475.5 billion (Source)
GDP Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in 2008: $ 504.3 billion (Source)

GDP per Capita Income in 1999: $ 450 (Source)
GDP per Capita Income in 2007: $ 926 (Source)

GDP per Capita Income in 2008: $1085 (Source)

Pak revenue collection 1999: Rs. 305 billion (Source)
Pak revenue collection 2007: Rs. 708 billion (Source) and (Source)

Pak revenue collection 2008: Rs. 990 billion (Source)

Pak Foreign reserves in 1999: $ 1.96 billion (Source)
Pak Foreign reserves in 2007: $ 16.4 billion (Source) and (Source)

Pak Foreign reserves in 2008: $ 8.89 billion (Source)

Pak Foreign reserves in 2009: $ 14.4 billion (Source)

Pak Exports in 1999: $ 8 billion (Source)
Pak Exports in 2007: $ 18.5 billion (Source)

Pak Exports in 2008: $ 19.22 billion (Source) and (Source)

Textile Exports in 1999: $ 5.5 billion (Source)
Textile Exports in 2007: $ 11.2 billion (Source)

KHI stock exchange 1999: $ 5 billion at 700 points
KHI stock exchange 2007: $ 75 billion at 14,000 points (Source)
KHI stock exchange 2008: $ 46 billion at 9,300 points (Source) and $20 billion at 4,972 points (Source)

KHI stock exchange 2009: $ 26.5 billion (Source) at 9,000 points (Source)

Foreign Investment in 1999: $ 301 million (Source)
Foreign Investment in 2007: $ 8.4 billion (Source)

Foreign Investment in 2008: $ 5.19 billion (Source)

Large Scale Manufacturing (LSM) in 1999: 1.5% ( Source)

Large Scale Manufacturing (LSM) in 2005: 19.9% (Source)

Large Scale Manufacturing (LSM) in 2007: 8.6% (Source)

Large Scale Manufacturing (LSM) in 2008: 4.8%  (Source)

Debt (External Debt & Liabilities) in 1988: $ 18 billion

Debt (External Debt & Liabilities) in 1999: $ 39 billion (Source) and (Source)

Debt (External Debt & Liabilities) in 2007: $ 40.17 billion (Source)

Debt (External Debt & Liabilities) in 2009: $ 50.1 billion (Source)

Debt servicing 1999: 65% of GDP (Source) and (Source)
Debt servicing 2007: 28% of GDP (Source) and (Source)

Debt servicing 2008: 27% of GDP (Source)

Poverty level in 1999: 34% (Source) and (Source)
Poverty level in 2007: 24% (Source) and (Source)

Literacy rate in 1999: 45% (Source)
Literacy rate in 2007: 53% (Source)

Pak Development programs 1999: Rs. 80 billion (Source)
Pak Development programs 2007: Rs. 520 billion (Source)
Pak Development programs 2008: Rs. 549.7 billion (Source)

© Our leader – Musharraf

 Compiled by: Afreen Baig

1. Pakistan economy was the 3rd fastest growing economy after China & India in 2006. [Source]

2. Pakistan in 1999 was an economy of $75 billion and now in 2007 it is a $160 billion economy. [Source]

3. Under Musharraf’s vision: 9 world class Engineering universities being developed. [Source. Project halted due to Political uncertainty]

4. Private sector institutions have increased from 36,096 (in 1999) to become 81,103 (in 2006). (Source)

5. Pakistan is the 3rd best in world Banking profitability. [Source].

6. Pakistan IT industry now values around $2.8 billion, including $1.4 billion of IT exports. [Source] and [Source].

7. Around 80,000 direct jobs & 500,000 indirect jobs have been created by the Telecom sector alone. [Source].

8. Industrial Parks are being setup throughout the country for the very first time. [Source & this & this].

9. Major Mega projects like the Saindak, Rekodiq, Marble production, Coal production and Mining & Quarrying are being pursued. [Source].

10. GDP growth is now 6%. Earlier it was 3.5%.

11. Foreign Reserves from $1 billion to $17 billion. (Source)

12. Karachi stock market: rose from 700 points to 13,000 points. [Source].

13. Literacy rate has improved by 11%. [Source].

14. Poverty levels have decreased by 10%. [Source].

15. 3 dams have been constructed: Mirani, Subakzai, Gomalzam dams. [See this, this, and this. (Kurram Tangi Dam)].

16. 6 Motorways completed or under construction: M1, M3, M8, M9, M10, M11. [Source].

17. Six major highways under construction. [Source].

18. GWADAR advance Mega Sea port developed under Musharraf’s vision. [Source].

19. Historic 100% increase in Tax collection of $11 billion. [Source & this].

20. Large scale manufacturing is 30 year high. [Source].

21. Construction activity is 17 years high.

22. Newly found World class copper- gold deposits in Chagai will fetch around $600 million per year.

23. A new Oil refinery with UAE will fetch $5 billion & will process 300,000 oil barrels a day. [Source].

24. CNG sector has attracted over $70 billion investment in last 5 years. [Source].

25. Industrial sector registered 26% growth. [Source].

For detailed Information see - Musharraf Era: Pakistan Flourishes

©Our leader – Musharraf

Compiled By: Mirza Rohail B

The right Manager manages his company with whatever resources he has, and manages to set it towards an unprecedented growth and prosperity, utilizing all internal and external factors. Musharraf proved to be the right Manager for Pakistan! MNC’s also provide excellent job opportunities; and with them bring in the required Capital, latest Technology, developed Human resources, management, quality & safety standards.

1.     Dubai Ports World announced on 1 June 2006, that it will spend $10 billion to develop Real estate, infrastructure and transport in Pakistan.

2.     Emaar Properties announced 31 May 2006, three Real estates developments in the cities of Islamabad and Karachi. The projects with a total investment of $2.4 billion will include developing commercial and residential property.

3.     Emaar Properties also signed a unprecedented $43 billion deal to develop two Island resorts – Bundal Island and Buddo Island – over the decade.

4.     International Petroleum Investment Co, owned by the government of Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates; has received approval from Pakistan’s government to build a $5 billion Oil refinery at Hub in Baluchistan. The refinery, which will be Pakistan’s biggest, have the capacity to process 300,000 barrels of oil a day.

5.     2006: The government is all set to establish an ‘Oil city‘ with an investment of $40 billion at Gwadar Port to make it the biggest crude and refined oil storage base in the region. The government has allotted 12,500 acres of land in Gwadar. The Chinese Petroleum Chamber would come up with $12.5 billion investment plan for the project.

6.     Kuwait will establish an Oil refinery at Port Qasim, 50 km southeast of Karachi, at expected cost of $1.2 billion. Refinery would have the capacity to refine 100,000 barrels of oil a day.

7.     The Canadian conglomerate Cathy Oil and Gas signed a memorandum of understanding in late 2006 to invest $5 billion in oil and gas exploration, development, production and commercialization in Pakistan.

8.     Canadian Oil & Gas Company signed with Pakistan a $ 200 million project that would generate 50,000 direct jobs in Sindh. It will explore, develop, produce and commercialize of Coal Bed Methane (CBM) in Pakistan up-to 70,000 barrels a day for about 20 years.

9.     July 2006: The Government awarded three blocks in the country’s offshore Indus Delta to British Petroleum Pakistan. BP Pakistan (formerly known as Union Texas Pakistan) will Explore gas blocks U, V and W, covering an area of 21,000 square km, for oil and gas reserves.

10.  Dubai’s Foreign investment in Pakistan’s capital markets recorded significant growth in 2006 and more than doubled to Dh1.278 billion ($351.5 million) by June 30 this year. It stood at Dh554.9 million last year.

11.  The KESC has awarded the contract for Phase-I of the 220 MW Power plant to METKA, EPC contractor, a Greek Company of international repute, whereas Phase-II for 565 MW is under process, it is reliably learnt. The EPC cost of the project is around $186 million including approximately 11 million dollars for chiller equipment.

12.  Sept 26: Am Power Company, a Kuwait-based company, intends to build 225MW combined cycle Power project located at the Sundar Industrial Estate at an estimated cost of $200 million.

13.  The Credit of building the Chashma-2 goes to Musharraf Government. PM Shaukat Aziz launched work on the Billion Dollars 325-megawatt plant in Chashma, which is the second to be built at the site with Chinese help. Chashma-2 cost is around Rs 51 billion which also included Rs20.1 billion foreign exchange component.

14.  In the much-awaited, but positive development, WAPDA has finalised a Chinese consortium China Gezhouba (group) Co Ltd China and CMEC, China (CGGC-CMEC) for construction of strategically most important project of 969 MW Neelum-Jhelum Hydropower. Cost of Construction is above $1.8 billion.

15.  French Renault is establishing a 40-million-euro assembling plant of Renault Logan cars in the country, with the production capacity of 15,000 automobiles per year. This project would attract 40 million euros’ investment and create 600 job opportunities.

16.  Automobile industry in Pakistan has made remarkable progress during the last few years. Despite low indigenous base, it has attracted almost Rs100 billion investment. Rs 52 billion has come in direct manufacturing and Rs 35 billon in ancillary industry.

17.  Pakistan Suzuki, a leading automobile company, has exported worth $957 million during last financial year 2005-06, which has been considered by the government as an encouraging sign.

18.  The Motorcycle industry in the country is progressing so well as manufacturing of motorcycles has touched the Rs.0.7 million mark in financial year 2005-06. Crankcase is manufactured mainly by only two companies but their production capacity is approx 6,000 sets per month.

19.  Honda Atlas Cars; held a Manufacturing Capacity Expansion ceremony of its auto plant. HACPL will increase annual production capacity will be doubled from the current 25,000 units to 50,000 units by the end of 2006. Total investment around Rs1.67 billion.

20.  Manchester firm called Drillcorer has just moved production of its drills to Pakistan. The result is that it can now sell them for £15,000 rather than the £65,000 it would have to charge if they were produced in Britain.

21.  2005: Brunei government is financing the US$2.6 million training “Institute for Pakistan Foreign Service”. Under construction.

22.  WASHINGTON: Pakistan ranked first among all developing world recipients in the value of Arms transfer agreements in 2006, concluding $5.1 billion in such agreements.

23.  2-12-07: Cement sales by Pakistani manufacturers to local and foreign buyers is expected to have reached 11.848 million tonnes; during the first five months (July-November). Exports are expected to grow by 155 % year-on-year to 2.531 million tonnes for the five-month period.

24.  Pakistan’s Financial Sector is witnessing robust growth in Islamic banking. Two fully-fledged Islamic banks — one local and one foreign-based — have opened 23 branches recently. Bank Islami will be the 3^rd  Bank. The 4^th Dubai Islamic Bank would open around 70 branches. Saudi Arabia would open the 5^th Islamic Bank soon.

25.  Takaful Pakistan Limited would soon commence operational activities in the country with an initial paid-up capital of Rs200 million and an authorized capital of Rs 300 million. Takaful is a system of Islamic insurance.

26.  14-6-07: Standard Chartered Bank of Pakistan (SCBP) has made a mega investment of Rs 30 billion to grow in a significant way in Pakistan.

27.  Pakistan’s leading Edible Oil buyers are establishing 4 new Refineries, officials in the industry said. Most of the refineries will be operational by the end of 2007 and they will double Pakistan’s CPO refining capacity of 2,025 tonnes per day.

28.  26-1-07: Canadian Wireless systems developer TenXc Wireless Inc. is partnering with Pakistani company Coherent Designs Pvt. to establish a joint development centre for wireless products in Pakistan’s capital. Global WiMAX market was worth $1.1 billion in 2006 and is expected to grow to $3.3 billion by 2009.

29.  The Minister inaugurated ceremony of a software technology park. The high-tech IT park has been set up at Rawalpindi by a leading US IT company MTBC to start its business operations in Pakistan.

30.  Capital Investment Overseas, an Abu Dhabi based company, will build a five-star hotel in Lahore, with an estimated investment of Rs20 billion (Dh1.25 billion). “The construction of 602 room hotel will be completed by the year 2011.  

31.  Saudi-Kuwaiti joint venture Mid Roc Tussonia Ltd will invest $3 billion to $4 billion in next seven years in power generation, refining and real estate sectors in Pakistan. This was stated by the president of Mid Roc Group Sheikh Humoud Al-Sabah at the launching of the joint venture here. Sabah said that his company would set up two wind power generation plants at Mirpur Sakro at a cost of $200 million. 2,500 acres of land has been acquired for this purpose. Will also establish lube-based oil refinery at Port Qasim over 500 acres of land at a cost of $1.5 billion.

32.  Tata Motors, India’s largest automobile firm, announced its entry in Pakistan through its subsidiary Tata Daewoo Commercial Vehicle Co with the commissioning of a new truck and bus assembly unit in Karachi. The plant has a capacity to produce 3,000 vehicles.

33.  In 2004, Access Group International announced plans to invest $1 billion over the next 5 years in solar cell manufacture and wind farms. MOUs have been signed with Alternate Energy Development Board.

©Our leader – Musharraf

Footnotes and links:

1. Dubai Ports

2. Emaar

3. Bundal Island

4. UAE refinery

5. Oil city

6. From the President of Pakistan website.

7. n/a

8. Canadian oil & gas

9. BP

10. Dubai Foreign Investment. See also this.

11. See this.

12. n/a

13. Chasma-2

14. See this.

15. Renault

16. Automobile industry

17. n/a

18. Motorcycle industry

19. Honda Atlas

20. Drillcorer

21. n/a

22. Pakistan topped list of arms purchasers

23. See this.

24. See this.

25. See this.

26. See this.

27. See this.

28. See this.

29. See this.

30. See this.

31. See this.

32. See this.

33.

©Our leader – Musharraf

Written by: Afreen Baig

Picture Courtesy Waleed Irfan Superbikez

War on Terrorism (WoT) did not start with the advent of 9/11, rather it started in 1980’s when Russia was defeated in Afghanistan, and the USA pulled out abandoning the hundreds of thousands of equipped and trained guerillas. Those guerillas and militants integrated in small pockets in various regions of Afghanistan and NWFP. They utilized their militancy to influence domestic tribes and mosques to instigate and promote radicalism. In 2000-01, Government of Pakistan was forced to ban several extremist outfits due to increase in sectarian violence and its effect on the lives of ordinary Pakistanis. For Pakistan – it was already at war with extremism!

9/11 further changed the political dimensions for USA, and also changed Pakistan’s destiny. A destiny that is full of expectations, decision making, media trial, uprising opportunist and extremist hoping to destabilize Pakistan. Who will be the ultimate winner is yet to be seen. The regional environment is a complex one and Pakistan is fighting a multi-faceted battle that will change the course of history.

9/11 put Pakistan in a complicated situation, where tough decisions had to be taken. Richard Armitage’s threatening message forced Pakistan to gauge the urgency and seriousness of the episode. The message was clear – the USA will do anything, to do what it had to do in its National Interest. NATO will follow suit. Pakistan was left alone to decide and protect its National Interest. The President decided in Nation’s self-interest and self-preservation. War on terrorism (WoT) marked its presence – it was inevitable!

Implications of war are grave and Pakistan having gone under a similar situation in 1980’s knew better. Millions of effected immigrants will insist & require safe dwellings in the tribal areas of NWFP. Keen RAW and Russian espionage missions will try to cross over and operate from our tribal areas. Transport of illegal weapons and arms would have taken place to support our local opportunist rebels. Desperation might have compelled the US and NATO forces to march into a sovereign Pakistan. Above all, India was more than willing to extend its support and services to US on its WoT. Keeping in mind these ground realities; we had to choose our destiny carefully.

  Vigilant and military style analyses were contemplated to calculate the pros and cons. The leadership in Pakistan war-gamed the USA and NATO as an enemy and realized that it was worthless committing suicide over the obstinate Taliban. Our out-dated military was no match for the world’s strongest and finest military, excelling in Air-force supremacy. Pakistan’s stagnated economy had only slightly started recovering, after being tagged as one of the highest indebted countries. Galvanizing the whole nation into agreeing to fight the USA and NATO was another impossible task. Indian eagerness to join the War on Terror was an alarming condition that Pakistan could not have over-looked. Indian jets flying over Pakistan’s space, with our Strategic assets’ lying below were a suicidal recipe. An accidental Indian bomb dropped on our Kahuta plant would have created disaster.

The Pakistani leadership couldn’t and shouldn’t have risked the entire 160 million Nation, for a few obstinate Taliban. A Pakistani delegate was sent to negotiate with the Taliban to pursue them to hand over Osama bin Laden to USA. The consequences were also made clear, but the over confident Taliban lacked vision to foresee their destiny. Consequently, Pakistan was forced to cut off diplomatic ties with the stubborn Taliban. Given the looming conditions, only a lunatic would have advised the contrary.

The US plans were evident – they will go to war! When any country of the world goes to war, its neighboring countries are forced to secure their borders further raising the security color codes. Pakistan planned no different. It drew up plans to secure its NWFP border along Afghanistan. Around 80,000 troops were placed to patrol and were assigned specific targets. The ultimate decision to secure our borders did not completely go to waste, and was extremely beneficial in controlling cross border terrorism and infiltration. Pakistan had taken a carefully scrutinized decision.

In return for participation, the USA had assured Pakistan, that India and Israel will not participate in War on Terror. Second, the USA will not act unilaterally inside Pakistan. Third, the USA will reimburse the costs incurred on Pakistani troops and logistical help. Fourth, the USA will ensure rescheduling of Pakistan’s foreign debt. Pakistan’s intentions were sincere and made with utmost patriotism. Then, who started working behind the scenes, planning to destabilize Pakistan and how and why?

It is true, that the USA planned this war, not to fight terrorism, but to secure the vast reserves of gas and oil of the Caspian Sea region. Afghanistan was their selected and cheapest route to lay the oil and gas pipelines, starting from the central Asian states. Who then created trouble in Afghanistan, in the tribal areas of Pakistan and in Baluchistan, to jeopardize American interest and Pakistan’s booming economy?

Pakistan’s image had improved world-wide due to its participation in WoT. Rescheduling of Pakistan’s foreign debt gave it the space to implement visionary fiscal and macro-economic policies. The micro-economic and macro-economic policies boomed Pakistan’s stagnated economy from $75 billion into a $160 billion one. Our exports increased by a 100% and so did our revenue. Our currency’s rating was upgraded and Pakistan saw a new era of multi-national corporations. Foreign investment chose Pakistan as its destination and stock markets profited from the liberal policies. Institutions world-wide like the World Bank, IMF, and Asian Development Bank heaped praises on Pakistan’s economic reforms. Reports by J. P Morgan, the Merrill Lynch, the City Group and the Goldman Sachs gave high marks to Pakistan’s current and future economic prospects as well as to the prudent handing of economy by economic team of the government.

Pakistan had already started attracting the foreign investment that earlier used to eye the Indian market. Pakistan’s geo-strategic location and its competitive labor prices further won preference over the Indian destination. Pakistan’s development programs modernizing the infrastructure paid off well, compared to India’s crumbling infrastructure. Who obviously could not tolerate Pakistan’s bright future?

Three years back the relics of Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) re-emerged with force, advocating Liberation of Baluchistan from Pakistan. A total of 843 attacks and incidents of violence have been reported since 2002, in Baluchistan, including 54 attacks on law-enforcement agencies, 31 attacks on gas pipelines, 417 rocket attacks on various targets, 291 mine blasts and others on various occasions. It is reported that BLA members have become well-trained and well-armed, with machine guns, rocket-launchers, Motorola wireless sets, and Thuraya satellite phones receiving information about the movement of government troops. Their organized attacks using sophisticated weapons against the Pakistan Army and strategic installations compelled the Pakistani intelligence to determine the root cause and analyze the hands behind them.

 PML-Q senator Mushahid Hussein Syed conceded last year, the involvement of Indian RAW in Baluchistan, while blaming India for exploiting the Afghan ministry of tribal affairs to conduct covert activities against Pakistan. He further accused RAW for establishing its training camps in Afghanistan in collaboration with the Northern Alliance remnants. Approximately 600 Ferraris, or Baluchi tribal dissidents, were getting specialized training to handle explosives, engineer bomb blasts, and use sophisticated weapons in these camps. This news came as no surprise. Indian agenda to orchestrate dissent and support extremist elements inside Baluchistan and NWFP started becoming evident.

 Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman Navtej Sarna was quoted saying “The government of India has been watching with concern the spiraling violence in Baluchistan and the heavy military action, including use of helicopter gunships and jet fighters by the government of Pakistan to quell it and we hope the government of Pakistan will exercise restraint and take recourse to peaceful discussions to address the grievances of the people of Baluchistan.” This statement from Indian Foreign Ministry says it all clearly!

 In early 2007, the Pakistani military authorities claimed there were 500-600 foreign militants in the South Waziristan area when army operations first started in early 2004. Of them, some 400 have either been killed or captured, according to the army, while a remaining 200 still “stranded” in North Waziristan are now using the Pakistan-Afghanistan border strip as their base to launch midnight guerilla attacks. The Media should question the presence of these Uzbeks, Tajiks, Arabs, and Afghans in Pakistan’s tribal agencies.

 Abdullah Mehsud was detained at Camp Delta in Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba and held for 2 years. After his release in early 2004, he returned to Waziristan, and kidnapped two Chinese engineers working on a dam in his region. Who supplied him, Baitullah Mehsud and Maulana Fazallulah – with all the resources, weapons, logistics help, information and money to create havoc in NWFP? It is well known that India other than having an embassy in Kabul; set up four consulates, in Kandahar, Jalalabad, Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat – all neighboring NWFP. The intentions need no further elaboration.

 This is also well known that the Russians were also eyeing the Caspian Sea oil and gas reserves. Energy deprived Indian economy also requires vast supply of gas and oil to sustain itself. A stable and booming Pakistan will steal the growth and regional aspirations that India desires. India cannot endure nor allow Pakistan to become another stable mini-China. Mainland China is competition tough and enough for India.

 Israeli help to India is also apparent. Recently, the Israeli ambassador in New Delhi has said his country’s assistance to India ‘brought about the turnaround’ in the 1999 Kargil war with Pakistan. He said, “The ties between India and Israel were beyond sale and purchase of weapons. And with all due respect the secret part of it will remain secret”. Surely a bold statement!

 Currently, the interest of both the USA and Pakistan are being bogged down. These masked groups of achievers seem to be making the most out of War on Terrorism and by trying to deliberately destabilize Pakistan. To top it all, the Pakistani media has projected Pakistan’s standing with respect to WoT in a wicked way. Their insistence that Pakistan military is fighting the US foreign war against our own citizens is nothing but deceit and sham exaggeration. The Pakistan military is rightly crushing these foreign agents and rebel separatist, whose sole intention is to destabilize Pakistan.

This WoT that started off as a simple patrolling exercise on NWFP border, has transformed into fighting off foreign extremists and militants trying to conquer tribal agencies in NWFP and Baluchistan. The US and NATO fight in Afghanistan, gave many conspiring elements and countries to execute their fiendish agendas. Had the leadership of Pakistan and the Armed Forces, not foreseen and calculated the effects of war in Afghanistan – Pakistan would have been in a much graver and tormenting situation.

Thus, Pakistan’s decision in 2001 was far-sighted that avoided direct conflict with the super-powers of the world, and by stationing 80,000 troops on borders, we were able to confine and control the small rebels. The leadership of Pakistan did earn unfair criticism in local media, but it saved Pakistan from a bigger disaster. Otherwise, those small consulates that are functioning from Afghanistan would have rooted themselves inside NWFP and few areas of Baluchistan. Those small miscreants in NWFP and Baluchistan, who are acting as agents of foreign agencies, will soon be eliminated and the involvement of foreign agencies exposed.

This War against Terrorism and Extremism can easily be won, if our Political parties would introduce democracy within them and give way to honest leadership; those who would prefer the interest of Pakistan above their personal feudalistic agendas of increasing wealth and estates.

Lastly, a quote by Robert Dreyfuss, which may not sound relevant for now, but it indicates volumes about a particular mindset. The book ‘Devil’s Game’ – published in 2005 quotes on page 336-337 – “Neo-conservatives want to control the Middle East, not reform it, even it means tearing countries apart and replacing them with rump mini-states along ethnic and sectarian lines. The Islamic right, in this context, is just one more tool for dismantling existing regimes, if that is what it takes.”

Pakistan must always decide in its National Interest! Pakistan cannot afford Political instability, growing insurgency and a demoralized Army!

Afreen Baig is an independent analyst majoring in International Relations and Economics. She can be reached at afreenbaig@gmail.com

Compiled By: Mirza Rohail B

©Our leader – Musharraf

All this is all the more amazing when one considers that just six years ago, Pakistan was on the verge of bankruptcy, with only a little more than $1bn in foreign exchange reserves and its stock market teetering at 1,000 points (worth $5 billion only) and foreign debt servicing at 65% of GDP. Our exports were at a pitiful $7.5 billion.

The once ever-declining rupee stood stable at around 60-61 to a dollar since Musharraf took over. Of the 184 member countries of the IMF, Pakistan’s rate of economic growth 7% is one of the best in the world. The Karachi stock market is now above 13,000 points and worth around $65 billion. Now foreign debt servicing has lowered to become 28%. Our exports increased to become $18 billion.

1. Pakistan economy is among the fastest growing economies in the world as its economy has reached the size of $170 billion in 2008 from a mere $70 billion in 1999. Pakistan attracted a record FDI of $8.4 billion in 2007.

2. 2007: National revenues had swelled from Rs 308 billion during 1988-99 to around Rs 800bn in 2008; and Federal Board of Revenue estimates now 2.8 million Income Tax payers.

Year             Total CBR     Direct         Indirect      Custom     Sales     Central excise 

1998-99       308.5bn        110.4bn       198.1bn     65.3bn      72bn         60.8bn

2005-06       712.5bn       224.6bn       487.9bn     138.2bn    294.6bn      55bn   

2008-09       810.3bn        305bn             –          105.3bn    319.3bn       80.5bn  (2008-09 Progressive)

3. Public sector development program (PSDP) has also grown from Rs 80 billion in 1999; to Rs 520 billion in 2007 and increased further to Rs 549.7 billion in 2008.

4. FACT of 2006-07: The rate of growth in Pakistan Large Scale Manufacturing (LSM) is at a 30-year high. Construction activity is at a 17-year high.

LSM: 1999-00 was  1.5% and 2004-05 was 19.9% and 2006-07 was 8.6% and 2007-8 is 5%.

5. FACT of 2007: The Infrastructure Industries Index, which measures the performance of Seven industries, i.e. Electricity generation, Natural gas, Crude oil, Petroleum products, Basic metal, Cement and coal, has recorded a 26.2 percent growth in Industrial sector of Pakistan.

6. FACT of 2006-07: Jan 14: Pakistan now has a total of 245,682 Educational institutions in all categories, including 164,579 (i.e. 67 per cent) in the public sector and 81,103 (i.e. 100 per cent) in the private sector, reports the National Education Census (NEC-2005). The census — jointly conducted by the Ministry of Education, the Academy of Educational Planning and Management (AEPAM) and the Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) — reveals that the number of private-sector institutions has increased from 36,096 in 1999-2000 to 81,103 in 2005, i.e. by 100 per cent. 45,007 Educational Institutions have increased in Musharraf Era.

7. FACT of 2006-07: Pakistan is 3rd in world in Banking profitability, a report of IMF said. On the IMF chart, in late 2006, Pakistan’s banking profitability is on third position after Colombia and Venezuela. On the IMF chart India is on 36th position and China is on 40th position. Pakistan’s Banking sector turned profitable in 2002. Their profits continued to rise for the next five years and peaked to Rs 84.1 ($1.1 billion) billion in 2006.  Pakistan’s Financial Services

8. 11 May 2009: By producing 7.746 tonnes of gold during the last five years – 2004 to 2008 – Pakistan has joined the ranks of gold producing countries. According to the data with the Saindak Metal Limited – during the last five years – Pakistan has produced 86,013 tonnes of copper, 7.746 tonne gold and 11.046 tonne silver, besides the production of 14,482 tonnes of magnetite concentrate (iron), bringing in a total of $633.573 million.

9. In 1999 what we earned as GDP: we used to give away 64.1 % as foreign debt and liabilities. Now in 2006, what we earn as GDP: we give ONLY 28.3 % as foreign debt and liabilities. Now we are SAVING 35 % of Our GDP for economic growth.

External debt & liabilities (EDL):

1988 – $ 18 billion

1990 – $ 20 billion

1999 – $ 39 billion

2007 – $ 40.17 billion

2008 – $ 45 billion

2009 – $ 50 billion

10. According to Economic Survey 2005. Poverty in Pakistan in 2001 was 34.46%. And, now after 7 years of Musharraf; Poverty in 2005 was 23.9%. Poverty DECREASED by 10.56%. Overall, 12 million people have been pushed out of Poverty in 2001 -2005!

11. 2007: Literacy rate in Pakistan has increased from 45% (in 2002) to 53% (in 2005). And, Education now receives 4% of GDP and English has been introduced as compulsory subject from grade 1.

12.  12-4-07: The IT industry, which was virtually non-existent seven years ago, has grown to be worth $2 billion of which $1 billion is export related. It rregistered a 50% growth. 55 foreign IT companies have already entered the market. Now the sector employed 90,000 professionals.

13. 30-1-08: The government has decided to set up a modern hospital cum Medical University in collaboration with the Harvard Medical International, USA, at a cost of Rs 18 billion. The university will be built at the Defence Housing Authority (DHA), Islamabad. A total of 2,500 students will be taught at the graduate level, while additional 600 seats will be available for postgraduate research courses.

14. Nov 2006: President Musharraf says that Pakistan will set up Nine Engineering World Class Science and Technology Federal Universities by 2008 with foreign assistance. He said the institutions of higher learning would be established in collaboration with Italy, South Korea, Japan, France, Sweden, Netherlands, Germany, Austria and China. The Cost of building these Foreign Universities will be above Rs 96.5 billion.

The Vice Chancellors, Heads of department, Professors and Faculty of the planned university will be from these Foreign Universities; while the Examination system, Quality assurance followed and the Degree awarded will also be from these Foreign Universities.

15. Government has approved to give at least 4% of GDP to Education in 2007 budget.

16. In 1999-2000 there were 31 Public Universities. Now 2005-2006 there are 49 Public Universities. HEC setup 47 new Universities.

a) Air University (established 2002)

b) Institute of Space technology, ISB (established 2002)

c) Sardar Bahadur Khan Women University, Quetta (established 2004)

d) University of Science & Technology, Bannu (established 2005)

e) University of Hazara (founded 2002)

f) Malakand university, Chakdara (established 2002)

g) Karakurum International university, Gilgit (established 2002)

h) University of Gujrat (established 2004)

i) Virtual University of Pak, Lahore (established 2002)

j) Sarhad University of IT, Peshawar (established 2001)

k) National Law University, ISB (2007)

l) Media University, ISB (2007)

m) University of Education, Lahore (2002)

n) Lasbella University of Marine Sciences, Baluchistan (2005)

o) Baluchistan University of IT & Management, Quetta (2002), etc.

17. 6-member delegation of Australian Department of Education, Science & Technology and AusAID, is visited Pakistan on the request of PM Shaukat Aziz to help Pakistan in its efforts to realign its TVET (Technical and Vocational Education and Training) according to the market needs. Chairman NAVTEC Altaf Saleem informed the delegation about NAVTEC plans to increase the capacity to train one million people annually by 2010 from the present annual capacity of 320,000.

18. Defense Exports of Pakistan have crossed the $200 million mark as the country’s robust Defense manufacturing industry continues to expand. This was disclosed by Major General Syed Absar Hussain, Director General, Defense Export Promotion Organization; after IDEAS 2006 Karachi . Defense Industry UAV.

19. President Musharraf inaugurated an over Rs. 1.36 billion 18 Mega Watt Naltar hydro power project. The project, completed in four years at Naltar near Gilgit.

20. Pakistan is now in Large-scale Nuclear expansion. The reactor under construction… could produce over 200kg of weapons-grade plutonium per year, assuming it operates at full power for a modest 220 days per year. At 4 to 5 kilograms of plutonium per weapon, this stock would allow the production of 40-50 Nuclear weapons a year,” the report said.

21. The Karachi Port Trust (KPT) and Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH) of Hong Kong will sign a concession agreement tomorrow for setting up a US$1 billion Deep-water container port, the first in Pakistan. KPT will invest $450 million for infrastructure development for the project. HPH will invest $557 million. In the first phase, a 1,500m quay wall will be built with a designed dept of 18m.

22. GILGIT: President Musharraf inaugurated the dry port in the border town of Sust, 200km north of Gilgit. The Dry port, a Pakistan-China joint venture, was built in 2004 at a cost of Rs90 million. It is 10,000-foot high Sust Dry Port.

23. Dec 2006: President Musharraf said many canals, including the Thal and Raini canals, were being constructed for better utilization of the water available. He said Rs66 billion was being spent on brick-lining of 87,000 canals in the country, adding that 6,000 new canals would be brick-lined next year.

24. The Private Power Infrastructure Board (PPIB) has approved expansion of Tarbela dam power project that would generate 960 MW costing $500 million.

25. President Musharraf Thursday inaugurated the Mirani Dam. Mirani Dam in Kech area of Mekran district with a catchment area of 12,000 square kilometre has been built in four years at a cost of Rs6 billion that includes Rs1.5 billion in compensation to the affected people. It will have a storage capacity of over 300,000 million acre feet of water.

26. Gomal Zam Dam: This project started Aug 2002 and is expected to be completed early 2008. It is located in the Damaan in NWFP. It is 437 feet high and will irrigate about 163,000 acres of land. The total costs amounts to Rs. 12 billion. Having a gross storage of 1.14 MAF. It will produce 17.4 MW of electricity.

27. Mushrraf says the government is constructing the Rs40 billion Katchi Canal and Punjab had been gracious to provide land for its 350 kilometre stretch that will pass through the province.

28. The Economic Coordination Committee decided to set up a $2-billion mega Oil refinery at Khalifa Point in district Hub, Balochistan. The refinery, commissioned by 2010, would have a maximum refining capacity of 13 million tons of petroleum products – higher than the country’s total existing capacity of 12.8 million tons.

29. Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation (PSMC) during the quarter July-Sept 2007 recorded the highest ever-sales figure of Rs 9.3012 billion.

30. The Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) sector of Pakistan has attracted over Rs 70 billion investments during the last five years as a result of liberal and encouraging policies of the government. Presently, some 1,765 CNG stations are operating in the country, in 85 cities and towns, and 1000 more would be setup in the next three years. It has provided employment to 30,000 people in the country.

31. The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) has registered 1,135 companies during the first quarter (July-September 2007). With the new registrations the total number of registered companies with SECP as on September 30 has reached 50,125.

32. Telecom sector has attracted an investment of $ 9 billion in last three years. It created of 80,000 jobs directly and 500,000 jobs indirectly.

33. Corrupt & Incompetent Nawaz Sharif made one motorway M2 (Lahore – Islamabad). Under Musharraf 6 Motorways completed or under construction: Pakistan Motorways & Highways.

M1 (Islamabad to Peshawar) – (Rs.13 bn) – [155 km] – (started 2003 – Completed Oct 2007)